Was nineteenth-century Japan an example of finance-led growth? Using a new panel data set of firms from the Meiji period (1868–1912), this article tests whether financial sector development influenced extensive firm activity across industries and locations. Results from a two-stage least squares first difference model suggest that financial intermediation is associated with additional net firm establishment, particularly in light manufacturing sectors like textiles. The overall effect is muted in the latter part of the period and among peripheral regions, which may underscore the respective roles of institutions and agglomeration economies in later stages of development.

This article challenges the ‘regulatory license’ view that reliance by regulators on the output of rating agencies in the 1930s ‘caused’ the agencies to become a central part of the fabric of the US financial system. We argue that long before the 1930s, courts began using ratings as financial-community-produced norms of prudence. This created ‘a legal license’ problem, very analogous to the ‘regulatory license’ problem, and gave rise to conflicts of interest not unlike those that have been discussed in the context of the subprime crisis. Rating agencies may have had substantial responsibility for the Great Depression of the 1930s.

This article argues that the promotion boom which occurred in the railway industry during the mid 1840s was amplified by the issue of derivative-like assets, which let investors take highly leveraged positions in the shares of new railway companies. The partially paid shares which the new railway companies issued allowed investors to obtain exposure to an asset by paying only a small initial deposit. The consequence of this arrangement was that investor returns were substantially amplified, and many schemes could be financed simultaneously. However, when investors were required to make further payments it put a negative downward pressure on prices.

Improved information technology and higher volume should drive orders to be concentrated in one market, lowering the costs of transactions. However, the opposite occurred during the bull market of the 1920s when rapid technological change spawned a flood of new issues. This article employs newly recovered data for 1900-33 on the volume and seat prices of regional exchanges to examine how these rivals successfully competed with the NYSE, leading to its relative decline at the zenith of the market. The history of US exchanges reveals that the tendency towards concentration of trading is periodically reversed when new industries, whose technologies are risky and unfamiliar, are more easily accommodated by existing or new rivals to the dominant exchange.

The English law reform movement produced numerous proposals for land registries during the Interregnum, but the idea of land registration took on economic connotations only after the Restoration, when controversy arose over the role of registration as a settled and reliable basis of credit. While the discourse of law reform was confined to the context of English law, the debate over whether and how land registries should be established extended to the economic field, and to international arenas in which England competed with, and sometimes imitated, her rivals in trade, particularly Holland. On one side of the debate, advocates of land registration insisted that registries would clarify the ownership of land, offer a firm foundation for credit, and consequently, improve English trade. On the other side, opponents of registration argued that such excessive openness of information would be hazardous to credit. For both advocates and opponents alike, the central issue was the role of registration in creating more reliable credit.

The failure in 1697 of the ‘Malt Lottery’, the second lottery loan, presents a fruitful case study. From a practical point of view, it tells us three things. First, the technical features of the English state lottery loans were established for more than a century after only three experiments. Second, its two components (‘lottery’ and ‘loan’) led to an abnormally poor return for investors since its expected return was 3.91 per cent whereas its effective return was 5.84 per cent – two figures in contradiction with the 6.3 per cent advanced by Dickson (1967). Third, a most strange solution was devised to counteract the failure: delivering the unsold tickets to the Exchequer to be used as cash. From a more theoretical point of view, the condition North and Weingast (1989) advanced for a successful financial issue proves necessary but not sufficient. The Malt Lottery failed (1,763 tickets sold out of 140,000) because it did not meet the three requirements for success: its return was too low and was lower than the return on competitive assets; its reimbursement dates were uncertain; and the economic and political environment was gloomy.

In 1899, James Keene, a prominent bear, and Roswell Flower, a well-known bull, both attempted to manipulate the share price of Brooklyn Rapid Transit (BRT), a young commuter railway company. Flower and Keene were stock ‘operators’, who used pools of cash from like-minded investors to push share prices higher or lower. In their efforts to garner profits, BRT operators claimed insider status, planted rumors in the press, used leverage to accumulate large positions, manipulated borrowing costs and camouflaged trades. The events of 1899 can shed light on current market dynamics, and we draw parallels between the predatory trading strategies used in 1899 and those of today.

Continental pawnbroking institutions, Monts-de-Piété, were introduced in Ireland in the 1830s and 1840s but did not establish a permanent status. Irish social reformers believed that a Mont-de-Piété system would reduce the cost of borrowing for the poor and also fund a social welfare network, thus negating the need for an Irish Poor Law. This article explores the introduction of the Mont-de-Piété charitable pawnbroker in Ireland and outlines some reasons for its failure. It uses the market incumbents, private pawnbrokers, as a base group in a comparative study and asks why the Monts-de-Piété were the unsuccessful ones of the two. The article finds that the public nature and monopoly status of Monts-de-Piété on the Continent realised economies of scale and gave preferential interest rates on capital, as well as enabling the Mont-de-Piété loan book to be cross-subsidised. These conditions were not replicated in Ireland, hence the failure of the Monts-de-Piété there.

Malmö diskont, a Swedish bank, was forced to close in 1817 after 14 years of operation because of a bank run. At the time, it was one of only three private commercial banks in Sweden. Eventually, all three banks succumbed to bank runs. The purpose of this article is to study the 1817 banking crisis from a new perspective by attempting to answer the following research question: why did Malmö diskont go under? Institutional theory is used here as a research tool. The assumption is that institutions set the limits for individuals' actions and sometimes direct them towards particular actions. The conclusions are derived from analysing the institutional framework at the time and how it interacted with Malmö diskont. The crisis evolved in two stages. The first stage occurred when the financial position of Malmö diskont severely deteriorated in the interaction between institutions and actors in 1817. The implementation of a bailout and a new institutional structure would have been necessary to save the bank. This conclusion complements earlier theories related to monetary or credit overexpansion as to why banking crises occur. The second stage occurred when the Swedish government allowed Malmö diskont to fall in October 1817.

We employ a panel data research design to examine the determinants of investment returns in the Swedish property fire insurance industry from 1903 to 1939 – a period of great economic and political uncertainty. Contrary to expectations, we find that mutual fire insurers generated systematically higher investment returns than stock fire insurers. Investment returns are inversely related to leverage but positively related to liquidity, showing that firms adopting a more precautionary investment strategy attain higher returns.

Savings banks were created as a means to encourage the newly created working class to save for the uncertainties of urban industrial life. This article explores the success of the Savings Bank of Glasgow, and pays particular attention to the response of savers to the financial and commercial crises of 1847 and 1857. The crisis of 1847 was shallower but longer lasting in Glasgow, while that of 1857 was greatly exacerbated by local conditions in the short term, but of little long-term importance to savers. It suggests that, in both crises, some elements of contagion may have been present but that those who panicked in 1857 were systematically different from those who did not.

The institutional environment of Portuguese banking during the golden age years of economic growth (1950–73) has been criticised in many instances, at the time and in recent literature. Direct observers of the period as well as historians have stressed two main aspects of that environment: excessive protection of existing banks, allowing them to obtain high rents, which represented a disincentive for them to compete and innovate; excessive concentration of their activity on short-term commercial paper, thus preventing them from contributing to finance growth. There seems to be a contradiction here, however, with the high growth rates of the years 1950 to 1973. The apparent contradiction is not limited to Portugal, in fact, as rapid growth in many economies in that period occurred within a framework of heavily regulated financial systems. This is the ‘financial paradox’ of the golden age. Portugal is an interesting case in the international perspective. As in the rest of the western world, legislation repressed banking quite tightly, but banks circumvented the law and competed with each other. The signs of competition were visible mostly in two dimensions: the growth of time deposits and geographical expansion.

Legal restrictions theory suggests that interest-bearing money would dominate if there were no legal impediments precluding competition with non-interest-bearing currency. There are very few historical examples with meaningful issues of interest-bearing currency, however, and these tend to occur during extreme circumstances like civil war. The Ottoman Empire in the 1840s offers an unusual opportunity to observe large-scale issuance of interest-bearing notes under stable conditions over an extended period of time. This experience features government-issued interest-bearing money circulating in the absence of legal restrictions – with the data pointing to a liquidity preference favouring the smaller denominations most useful in daily transactions.

This article reviews the political economy of Manchuria under the rule of Zhang Zuolin, which resulted in the economic instability that occurred during the winter of 1928. One can conjecture that the economic instability did not occur only because of the arbitrariness of the political and military regional government. The instability appears to be related to an ongoing seasonal demand for monies, which was relatively high between the months of September and March, since it corresponded to the period of commerce in soybeans − the region's main economic activity −, the migration of seasonal workers, and also the festive period of the Chinese New Year. The analysis was conducted based on primary materials published by the South Manchuria Railway Company, such as currency issuance and the variation of the exchange rate of the major currencies in circulation among foreign and Chinese currencies.

This article examines Britain's temporary import surcharge introduced in October 1964, a largely overlooked but significant dimension of the 1964 sterling crisis. Import surcharges (temporary supplementary tariff) were illegal under GATT rules and aroused fury among trading partners. Britain's surcharge is placed in context by consideration of the use of import surcharges by other countries under Bretton Woods as currency crisis management and balance of payments measures, notably Canada's import surcharge of 1962–3 that inspired Britain's. Developed by the Conservative administration from 1963, a 15 per cent surcharge was introduced by the newly elected Wilson government as a radical alternative to deflation or devaluation to help correct the record balance of payments deficit and meet the gathering sterling crisis. As a currency crisis management measure the surcharge worked in Canada but in Britain it made matters worse and was soon supplanted by conventional measures. Deemed a failure and discredited, the surcharge was eventually lifted in November 1966 ‘unwept, unhonoured and unsung’ (Financial Times). Nevertheless, while in place the surcharge provided significant temporary assistance to the improvement of Britain's balance of payments.