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The Paradox of Empathy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2021

L.A. Paul
L.A. Paul*
Affiliation:
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
*
Email: laurie.paul@yale.edu
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Abstract

A commitment to truth requires that you are open to receiving new evidence, even if that evidence contradicts your current beliefs. You should be open to changing your mind. However, this truism gives rise to the paradox of empathy. The paradox arises with the possibility of mental corruption through transformative change, and has consequences for how we should understand tolerance, disagreement, and the ability to have an open mind. I close with a discussion of how understanding this paradox provides a new explanation for a certain kind of standoff between the believer and the skeptic with regard to religious belief.

Keywords

Transformative experienceempathyreligious conversionreligious disagreementevidencetestimonyepistemologybelief in Godlived experiencephenomenal hypothesesdirect acquaintance
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Special Issue 3: Episteme Conference Special Issue , September 2021 , pp. 347 - 366
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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