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MIND-WORLD RELATIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

Abstract

The key concept of this contribution is that of aptness, or success that manifests the agent’s competence. This concept is used in an attempt to gain philosophical understanding not only of knowledge but also of perception and of intentional action.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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