Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vfjqv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T07:03:55.424Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2022

Kok Yong Lee Open the ORCID record for Kok Yong Lee [Opens in a new window]
Kok Yong Lee*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University
*
Email: kokyonglee.mu@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding that the no-justification account implies that people living in Taiwan typically suffer from the Harman-style skepticism.

Keywords

Lottery paradoxthe no-justification accountjustificationknowledgeTaiwan
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 459 - 478
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Cohen, S. (1998). ‘Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76(2), 289–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeRose, K. (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Descartes, R. (1984). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 2. Translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. and Murdoch, D.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Douven, I. (2002). ‘A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability.’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53(3), 391–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douven, I. (2008). ‘The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89(2), 204–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dretske, F. (1971). ‘Conclusive Reason.’ In Perception, Knowledge, and Belief, pp. 3–29. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Engel, M. (2020). ‘Lotteries, Knowledge, and Inconsistent Belief: Why You Know Your Ticket Will Lose.’ Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02555-w.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2002). ‘Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.’ Philosophical Review 111(1), 67–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2012). ‘Arguing for Shifty Epistemology.’ In Brown, J. and Gerken, M. (eds), Knowledge Ascriptions, pp. 55–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, R. (1995). ‘In Defence of Closure.’ Philosophical Quarterly 45, 487–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, R. (1979). ‘Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 16(4), 247–57.Google Scholar
Gettier, E. (1963). ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23(6), 121–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A.I. (1976). ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy 73(20), 771–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A.I. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A.I. and McGrath, M. (2015). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Heller, M. (1999). ‘Relevant Alternatives and Closure.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77(2), 196–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelp, C. (2014). ‘No Justification for Lottery Losers.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95(2), 205–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelp, C. (2015). ‘Lotteries and Justification.’ Synthese 194(4), 1233–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klein, P. (2003). ‘How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.’ In Sosa, E., Kim, J., Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (eds), Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edn, pp. 35–51. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kroedel, T. (2012). ‘The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification, and Permissibility.’ Analysis 72(11), 57–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kyburg, H. (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.Google Scholar
Lee, K.Y. (2020 a). ‘On Two Recent Arguments against Intellectualism.’ NCCU Philosophical Journal 43, 35–68.Google Scholar
Lee, K.Y. (2020 b). ‘Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered – What Shifts? Epistemic Standards or Position?’ Logos & Episteme 11(1), 53–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1996). ‘Elusive Knowledge.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4), 549–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nelkin, D.K. (2000). ‘The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.’ Philosophical Review 109(3), 373–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pollock, J.L. and Cruz, J. (1999). Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edn. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck. New York, NY: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D., Millar, A. and Haddock, A. (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryan, S. (1991). ‘The Preface Paradox.’ Philosophical Studies 64(3), 293–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, J. (2006). ‘The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.’ Philosophical Studies 127(1), 87–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. (2016). Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. (2021). ‘Four Arguments for Denying That Lottery Beliefs Are Justified.’ In I. Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox, pp. 95–109. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stine, G. (1976). ‘Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.’ Philosophical Studies 29(4), 249–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutton, J. (2007). Without Justification. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Timmerman, T. (2013). ‘The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism.’ Logos & Episteme 4(1), 85–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vogel, J. (1990). ‘Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?’ In Sosa, E., Kim, J., Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (eds), Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edn, pp. 290–301. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar