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Against epistemic pessimism about moral testimony

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2019

Paddy Jane McShane
Paddy Jane McShane*
Affiliation:
University of Portland, 5000 N. Willamette Blvd., Portland, Oregon97203, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: mcshanep@up.edu
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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against what I call “epistemic” pessimism about moral testimony. Epistemic pessimists argue that moral testimony fails to transmit epistemic warrant as non-moral testimony does. I reject epistemic pessimism by defending the No Difference Thesis, that there is no in principle difference between the transmission of epistemic warrant by moral and non-moral testimony. The main thrust of my argument is that there is a good prima facie case to be made for the thesis, namely, that it is supported by all of the major current epistemological views of testimonial warrant, both reductionist and non-reductionist. After making this case, I consider five pessimist attempts to undermine the No Difference Thesis, and argue that none of these attempts succeeds. So, in the absence of any other compelling criticisms, we are justified in rejecting epistemic pessimism and accepting the No Difference Thesis.

Keywords

Testimonymoral testimonymoral knowledgemoral epistemologymoral deference
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 200 - 223
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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