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STATES OF NATURE AND THE NATURE OF STATES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2016

Edi Karni
Edi Karni*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 34th and Charles St. Baltimore, MD 21218, USA and Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. Email: karni@jhu.edu. URL: http://econ.jhu.edu/directory/edi-karni/
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Abstract:

This paper discusses the definition of the state space and corresponding choice sets that figure in the theory of decision making under uncertainty. It elucidates an approach that overcomes some conceptual difficulties with the standard models and accommodates a procedure for expanding the state space in the wake of growing awareness.

Keywords

States of naturedecision making under uncertaintyresolution of uncertaintychoice setunawareness
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 73 - 90
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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