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INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON EQUALITY VERSUS PRIORITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 May 2015

Alex Voorhoeve
Alex Voorhoeve*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: a.e.voorhoeve@lse.ac.uk. URL: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/voorhoev
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Extract

This symposium publishes for the first time three key contributions to the debate on the nature and importance of the distinction between egalitarianism (the view that it is in itself bad, when and because it is unfair, for some to be worse off than others) and prioritarianism (the view that each person's welfare has diminishing marginal moral value and that the moral value of a person's welfare depends only on that person's level of welfare, and not on how anyone else fares). These papers were commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2000. They were intended for publication in a WHO volume which has not yet materialized, and this has hindered access to these important papers. Permission was therefore secured from the WHO to publish them here.

Type
Symposium on Equality versus Priority
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 201 - 202
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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