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The Receptivity of Hypotheses
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
Extract
The attention of scientists is now being drawn to a new branch of knowledge known as the “philosophy of science.” It is true, however, that philosophers of this country are not very happy about this word combination and often identify it with logical, positivism. Indeed, it would seem better to speak not of the philosophy, but of the logic of scientific development. Science has become an object of study, and there has emerged metascience, i.e., a science studying the logic of scientific structures. This field of knowledge cannot so far boast of generally accepted results. But it has done something else: new acute questions have been formulated and discussed fruitfully and originally. With this paper we are making an attempt to enter the discussion. The philosophy of science has not certainly taught scientists to discover the truth but it has indubitably increased their criticism towards their own activities, and this is really a very important accomplishment.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © 1977 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)
References
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6 The ideas exposed in this paragraph were prompted by Yu. A. Schreider in discussing my report.
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10 Monod also points out the fact that Darwin's theory implicitly contained a concept of a discrete hereditary code, while Lamarck suggested continuous changeability.
11 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.
12 For greater details, see S. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, Am sterdam, North-Holland, 1952.
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14 The concept of exponential or logistic growth of the number of scientists, papers or funds for science is a glance at the same problem, but from a different angle. (See V. V. Nalimov and Z. M. Mul'chenko, Naukometriya (Scientometrics: The Study of Science Development as an Information Process), Moscow, "Nauka," 1969.
15 Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, and Monod, op. cit.
16 Criticism and Growth of Knowledge.
17 If this is ignored, immediately false paradoxes arise. As an example we shall give the paradox of Mises (as described by V. V. Tutubalin in Teoriya veroyatnostei [Probability Theory], Moscow, Moscow University Press, 1972): In the classical probability theory there is the definition: two events are called incompatible if they cannot occur simultaneously, and the theorem: the probability of the sum of two incompatible events equals the sum of their probabilities. R. Mises invented the following paradox: a tennis player can go to a contest either in Moscow or in London, the contests taking place simultaneously. The probability of his winning the first prize in Moscow is 0.9. (of course, if he goes there), in London is 0.6. What is the probability of his winning the first prize here or there? Solution: according to the classical theory, the two events are incompatible, and for this reason the probability in question is 0.9 + 0.6 = 1.5. This paradox is, as a matter of fact, a result of misunderstanding since the probabilities 0.9 and 0.6 relate to different spaces of elementary events.
18 V. V. Nalimov, "Novatorstvo kak proyavlenie intellektual'nogo bunta (In novation as a Manifestation of Intellectual Rebellion)," Izobretatel i ratsionalizator, 7, 1976, pp. 38-40.
19 V. V. Nalimov, "O nekotoroi paralleli mezhdu printsipom dopolnitel nosti Bora i metaforicheskoi strukturoi obydennogo yazyka (On a Parallel between Bohr's Principle of Complementarity and Metaphoric Structure of Everyday Lan guage)," in Printsip dopolnitel nosti i materialisticheskaya dialektika, Moscow, "Nauka," 1976.
20 We often hear that space research has allowed us to cognize the Moon. But remember that we say a man cognizes a woman when he has his first intimate contact with her. True, he learns a lot—but what he learns turns out to be a mystery more profound than what he faced before. To make love with a woman, a man must be mature. Humanity has by now matured to the point where it can directly contact the Moon, biological cells, genes, and elementary particles. But isn't it better. in this case as in the previous one. to speak of possession rather than cognition?
21 P. C. Mahalanobis, "The Foundations of Statistics," in Dialectica, 8, n. 2, 1954.
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25 The Upanishad of the Va'yassane'ya Sanhita, Calcutta, Upanishads, 1853.
26 Criticism and Growth of Knowledge.