This paper deals with the distinction between factual and episodic memory (memory that p vs. memory of particular x). The following theses are defended, (i) Episodic memory is internally related to a particular past experience. (ii) Factual memory about x does not imply episodic memory ofx. (iii) Episodic and factual memory may carry the same kind of information about the past. Finally, (iv) episodic memories are reflexive factual memories. When I remember x in the episodic sense, I have a collection of factual memories not only about x, but equally and simultaneously about the fact that this same collection comes directly from my past experience.

Martin-Löf's constructive theory introduces, beside proof processes—the brouwerian mental construction—proof objects that could become the subject matter of a new kind of proof theory. In contradistinction to the classical approach, the proposition can then be defined as the set of its proofs. The lower level type theory is therefore a set theory, where the operators Σ and Π generalize the Cartesian product and the functional space to families of sets. To obtain the familiar logical constants, we have only to choose the logical reading of a : A. Σ and Π become ∃ and ∀, or, if there is no functional dependency, & and ⊃.

Personal probability is now a familiar subject in epistemology, together with such more venerable notions as knowledge and belief. But there are severe strains between probability and belief; if either is taken as the more basic, the other may suffer. After explaining the difficulties of attempts to accommodate both, I shall propose a unified account which takes conditional personal probability as basic. Full belief is therefore a defined, derivative notion. Yet we will still be able to picture opinion as follows: my subjective probability is only a grading of the possibilities left open by my beliefs. My conditional probabilities generally derive — in a sense to be explicated — from the strongest belief I can maintain when admitting the relevant condition.

As van Fraassen pointed out in his opening remarks, Henry Kyburg's lottery paradox has long been known to raise difficulties in attempts to represent full belief as a probability greater than or equal to p, where p is some number less than 1. Recently, Patrick Maher has pointed out that to identify full belief with probability equal to 1 presents similar difficulties. In his paper, van Fraassen investigates ways of representing full belief by personal probability which avoid the difficulties raised by Maher's measure-theoretic version of the lottery paradox. Van Fraassen's more subtle representation dissolves the simple identification of full belief with maximal personal probability. His investigation exploits the richer resources for representing opinion provided by taking conditional, rather than unconditional, personal probability as fundamental. It has interesting implications for equivalent alternative approaches based on non-Archimedean probability, as well as for equivalent approaches in which assumption contexts representing full belief relative to suppositions are taken as fundamental.

Like Wittgenstein, John Searle believes that much of analytic philosophy—especially the philosophy of mind—is founded on confusion and falsehood. Unlike Wittgenstein, he does not consider this condition to be endemic to philosophy. As a result, Searle's dual goals in The Rediscovery of the Mind are to rid the philosophy of mind of the fundamental confusions that plague it, and to set the field on the path toward genuine progress. Thus, the book opens with a chapter entitled “What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?” and closes with “The Proper Study.” The text is a blend of old and new: Searle introduces several new ideas, the most important of which is his thesis of the unconscious, and incorporates them into theses that have figured prominently in his previous works. Even for those who will find little to agree with in this book, The Rediscovery of the Mind serves as a testament to the sheer scope and iconoclasm of Searle's work.

This, the latest volume in The Douglas Walton Encyclopedia of Argumentation—well, it's starting to look like that, anyway—is primarily concerned with four purported fallacies that involve an appeal to emotion: ad populum, ad misericordiam, ad baculum, and ad hominem. In very rough outline, the layout of the book is this. After some preliminary remarks about the four fallacies in the first chapter, and some remarks about the theoretical framework he will be working with in the second, Walton devotes a chapter apiece to each of the four in the order indicated above. A seventh chapter focuses on “borderline cases,” in which more than one of the so-called fallacies is involved, and an eighth summarizes and refines the findings of earlier chapters. As is obvious, The Place of Emotion is well organized; and, as would be a safe inference for anyone acquainted with any of Walton's work, it is written in a readily accessible and unpretentious style: a plain style, in the best sense of the term. Walton has something to say, and it's virtually impossible to miss it—and that independently of the fact that this book, like a number of his others, is somewhat repetitive. The Place of Emotion is one of those rare books that a specialist in a field would find of interest, but that could also be taught in an undergraduate course.

In a blurb on the dust jacket, Hilary Putnam describes Barry Allen's Truth in Philosophy as “a good, provocative, and important book” discussing issues of “common concern to both analytic and continental philosophers.” Yet Putnam admits that Allen's views “are ones that I myself am committed to combating and … I am certain most analytic philosophers will want to combat.” All the more reason to read this book, of course: know your enemy. Since Rorty clarified recent European philosophy for us in the 1980s, we have seen the continuing political transformation of what used to be an abstract, purely academic domain. Indeed, in his last chapter, Allen connects truth with politics in his discussion of Foucault:

The production and circulation of truth is as capable of complicity with tyranny, and all the more so with tutelage, as any instrument of government, and its products do not have to be false to have this effect.… Truth is inextricably situated amid all the major asymmetries of social power, (p. 173)

Foucault challenges the assumption of many that in liberal democracies (of which Putnam, after his youthful excesses, must consider himself a defender) truth and freedom need each other.

The Rational and the Moral Order, a work of sweeping scope and depth, opens with three problems: the Rationality Problem, briefly, is that the following set is inconsistent, although each of its elements seems true: our conduct cannot be rationally justified unless it promotes our own good; moral conduct is rationally justified; but morality often requires that we do things that do not promote our own good. The Motivation Problem distills to this: can something be a reason for someone to do something without its actually motivating him to do so (the so-called “externalist” position), or is being a motivator a necessary condition of being a reason for that person (the “internalist position”)? Finally, the Sanction Problem notes that, although it seems plausible and generally accepted that immorality should be sanctioned, it seems neither plausible, nor is it generally accepted, that irrationality should be. Why this asymmetry? I restrict my attention, in what follows, to aspects of Baier's fascinating discussion on the Rationality Problem and the Motivation Problem.

Since I wrote my doctoral dissertation lo! these forty-seven years ago under Professor Quine, my colleague Alain Voizard thought it fitting that I comment on the paper just delivered. The invitation flattered me, I confess, as did Professor Quine's choice of a subject: free logic, a logic of which I was one of the numerous fathers thirty-five years ago. So, it is in my capacity as a commentator that I address you now, saving for tomorrow afternoon further thoughts prompted by this colloquium.

L'avènement de la modernité a privé la morale de ses sources traditionnelles et l'a laissée devant une dichotomie dont les termes sont également inacceptables: d'un côté l'historicisme avec son cortège de relativisme et de scepticisme et de l'autre, la raison impérative, universelle et vide de contenu moral. Entre les certitudes des Anciens, les dilemmes de la modernité et les abîmes du postmodernisme, la philosophie morale et politique contemporaine ne serait pourtant pas condamnée à l'impotence. La conviction de Charles Larmore est en effet que les diverses conceptions philosophiques qui nous ont successivement menés à pareille impasse nous offrent aussi les moyens d'en sortir. Cette conviction œcumenique est elle-même ancrée dans une ethique de la pensee qui devrait, comme l'auteur s'en explique dans l'introduction de Modernité et morale, nous détourner du dogmatisme et du monisme traditionnels de la philosophie. Sur cet arrière-plan métaphilosophique, l'auteur prétend done faire, des problèmes de la morale contemporaine, l'objet d'une discussion ouverte où il convie les philosophes de toutes tendances et de tous les temps.

Do Wittgenstein's late philosophical writings represent a religious point of view? There is a good deal of evidence—including a number of Wittgenstein's own avowals—for an affirmative answer. Against this, there is the stark fact that Wittgenstein's late philosophical writings never directly discuss questions of God and religion. So, if they do represent a religious viewpoint, a correct account of it would, it seems, need to address subtleties and hidden tendencies. While a number of philosophical authors have offered such accounts, nothing resembling a consensus has so far emerged.

Mon projet est de montrer qu'une meilleure compréhension de la position de Kant sur la valeur morale et sur le rôle de la compassion révèle que les objections soulevées par les théoriciens contemporains de la psychologie morale et par les féministes ne sont pas fondées, et que la position de Kant sur ces questions n'est pas du tout contre-intuitive. D'autres on dej´ soutenu que Kant accorde un rôle important á la compassion et que sa présence, pour lui, ne diminue pas la valeur morale des actions, mais je soutiens, plus positivement, que la présence de la compassion, pour Kant, est la marque d'une personne qui a progressé vers I'idéal, inaccessible et pourtant nécessaire, de la vertu morale et que la personne idéale de Kant est quelqu'un qui agit par devoir et qui a développé un sens aigu de la compassion.