The Rational and the Moral Order, a work of sweeping scope and depth, opens with three problems: the Rationality Problem, briefly, is that the following set is inconsistent, although each of its elements seems true: our conduct cannot be rationally justified unless it promotes our own good; moral conduct is rationally justified; but morality often requires that we do things that do not promote our own good. The Motivation Problem distills to this: can something be a reason for someone to do something without its actually motivating him to do so (the so-called “externalist” position), or is being a motivator a necessary condition of being a reason for that person (the “internalist position”)? Finally, the Sanction Problem notes that, although it seems plausible and generally accepted that immorality should be sanctioned, it seems neither plausible, nor is it generally accepted, that irrationality should be. Why this asymmetry? I restrict my attention, in what follows, to aspects of Baier's fascinating discussion on the Rationality Problem and the Motivation Problem.