1 On the subject of Aristotle's use of the phenomenological approach, see Nussbaum, Martha, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially chap. 8.Google Scholar

2 This classification of Hume would be disputed by some contractarians and utilitarians, but I think Hume's ethics are best understood in neo-Aristotelian and anti-proceduralist terms. See Baier, Annette, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), especially chap. 10.Google Scholar

3 One might ask: why focus on these two particular philosophers, out of all the possible representatives of each paradigm? For one thing, I was attracted by the idea of contrasting two leading Canadian philosophers. Charles Taylor is as good a representative of the neo-Aristotelian approach as anyone. I chose to deal with Hobbesian contractarianism for a couple of reasons. One concerns the state of the debate. Taylor and Bernard Williams have already given us their criticisms of utilitarian and neo-Kantian ethical theories (and of R. M. Hare in particular), but they have had little to say about the contract theory of Gauthier and Narveson. Thus, I have chosen to explore the fresh issue of a Taylor-Narveson confrontation rather than to rehash old arguments. My other reason is more personal. As a graduate student at the University of Waterloo, I have been exposed to the ideas of Jan Narveson over a number of years, and he and his students (especially Alix Nalezinski and Malcolm Murray) have provoked me to consider the contractarian approach quite carefully and to develop many of the objections raised in this article.

4 Taylor, Charles, “Justice After Virtue,” in After Maclntyre, edited by Horton, John and Mendus, Susan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 31.Google Scholar

5 Narveson, Jan, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 122–23.Google Scholar

6 Taylor, Charles, “The Diversity of Goods,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 133.Google Scholar

7 Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 27, 56.Google Scholar

8 Taylor, “Justice After Virtue,” p. 28. These points are made at greater length in Sources of the Self.

9 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 515. Taylor does not defend this proposition as extensively or in as much detail as one would like, considering its widespread denial by contractarians of all stripes and by critics of modernity such as Alasdair Maclntyre. However, the fact that our society is able to sustain a civil peace and a continuing political conversation is prima facie evidence that there is a certain amount of agreement among its citizens. Insofar as contractarians maintain that (a) there is one true theory of justice which all rational creatures should agree on, but (b) people disagree hopelessly about the good, their arguments often have a peculiarly schizophrenic character. Moreover, in their own way, libertarian contract theorists seek to overcome apparent disagreement and find underlying agreement. They appeal to the liberal principle of “live and let live” as a sort of universal dispute-settlement mechanism. In many spheres, this principle is a good way of overcoming disagreement, and it reflects liberal values that are widely shared in society. In many other spheres, however, Undemocratic principle (properly constrained by certain guarantees of individual rights) has much wider allegiance. In order to function well, this principle requires that people accept the legitimacy of democratic decisions (such acceptance is almost universal in our society), that they agree at least to some extent in their values and conceptions of the good, and that they try to accommodate one another's vital interests when they disagree. Unfortunately, doctrinaire theories of justice, both libertarian and egalitarian, tend to encourage irreconcilable ideological opposition, rather than the mutual accommodation of everyone's vital interests.

10 Ibid., p. 505.

11 Ibid., p. 503.

12 Ibid., p. 57.

13 See Taylor, Charles, “Reply to Braybrooke and de Sousa,” Dialogue, 33 (1994): 128CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Taylor, Charles, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” Political Theory, 12(1984): 152–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Taylor, Charles, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, edited by Rosenblum, Nancy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 159–82.Google Scholar

15 Taylor, Charles, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” in The Quality of Life, edited by Nussbaum, Martha and Sen, Amartya (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 225–26Google Scholar. Taylor's argument owes much to Alasdair Maclntyre.

16 Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, p. 166.

17 Ibid., p. 176. The Lockean Proviso: “in prohibiting each from bettering his situation by worsening that of others, but otherwise leaving each free to do as he pleases, not only confirms each in the use of his powers, but in denying to others the use of those powers, affords to each the exclusive use of his own. The proviso thus converts the unlimited liberties of Hobbesian nature into exclusive rights and duties.”

18 Ibid., p. 132.

19 Ibid., p. 183.

20 Ibid., pp. 281–82.

21 Plato, Euthyphro, in The Last Days of Socrates, translated by Hugh Tredennick (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 9c. Socrates asks: “Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?” For Narveson's own use of a version of the Euthyphro problem against divine command theories of morality, see Narveson, Jan, Moral Matters (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1993), p. 43.Google Scholar

22 It is not within the scope of this article to back this up with an analysis of the libertarian movement. However, the most influential theorists of contemporary libertarianism are novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand and free-market economists such as Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman. Rand's novels uphold the ideals and values of radical individualism (and are quite non-neutral about questions of the good), while the economists uphold laissez-faire against government regulation and bureaucracy. It is these sort of arguments, and not contract theory's abstract justification of negative liberty, which are the primary sources of contemporary libertarianism. For a wide-ranging and critical analysis of libertarianism, see Newman, Stephen, Liberalism at Wits' End, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar. For a look at Ayn Rand and her influence among libertarians, see Branden, Barbara, The Passion of Ayn Rand (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986)Google Scholar. Moreover, the reasons ordinary people may come to agree with libertarians on particular issues are diverse and non-doctrinaire. They may think they are unjustly overtaxed and that their tax dollars are being wasted, or feel frustrated and alienated by government bureaucracy. Such sources of popular libertarian sentiment, however, have nothing to do with contractarian libertarianism. They can be tapped into by many political movements, and can be usefully addressed by Taylor's approach to ethics.

23 Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, p. 333.