A new examination of this well worn theme seems to be appropriate in view of the current discussion of the place of metaphysics in the study of philosophy. The familiar supposition that philosophy may, and indeed should, dispense with all high speculations concerning the nature of “the grand scheme of things entire” while it devotes its time to “the order and connection of ideas in the mind,” or to that quasi-mental order known as scientific methodology, would make of philosophy either a segment of natural science or a footless and irresponsible expression of animal hungers and party causes. Any philosophy, so we are told, which indulges in metaphysics is a mere rationalization of animal “drives” on a par with folklore, religion, and magic. Aside from the suspicion that this supposition is itself a metaphysical hypothesis not subject to scientific verification, the reasonable manner of dealing with it is to test it by comparison with rival suppositions in the history of man.