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7. These were the percentages in 1900. See Blaschke, Olaf, “Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26 (2000): 38–75Google Scholar, here 42; Joel F. Harrmgton and Helmut Walser Smith note that there were several instances of “confessional cleansing” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in which members of one confession were forced to migrate from one state to another; see “Confessionalization, Community, and State Building in Germany, 1555–1870,” Journal of Modern History 69 (1997): 77–101Google Scholar, here 86.

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33. The key work is Hübinger, Gangolf, Kulturprotestantismus und Politik: Zum Verhältnis von Liberalismus und Protestantismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994).Google Scholar

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42. “Religious Divide,” 45, 47.

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