51. Gleber, op.cit., 63–102, has an excellent account of Eugene's triumphant sojourn north of the Alps.

52. As John of Salisbury indicates, XVIII, 44.

53. JL, II, p. 60.

54. There are many accounts of the Normanraid, but Caspar, op.cit., 376f. remains the most satisfactory. It should, however, be supplemented by Rassow, P., “Zum byzantinisch-norm a n n i s c h e n Krieg (1147–1149),” MOIG, LXII (1954), 213–218.Google Scholar

55. DR, II, 1356, 1365, 1373, for the treaty with Venice. For the attack on Corfu, Cinnamus, III, 2, 4, pp. 92, 96–97; Nicetas, , De Manuele, II, 2, pp. 102–103Google Scholar; Hist. Due. Veneticorum, MGH SS, XIV, 75–76.Google Scholar We must recall that, in addition to dealing with the Normans, Manuel had to defend his northern frontier against barbarianinvasion. See Cinnamus, III, 3, pp. 93–95.

56. The principal sources for the treaty are Cinnamus, II, 19, IV, 1, pp. 87, 135; WE, 243, pp. 363–366. Other evidence may be found in DR, II, 1374 and Bernhardi, , Konrad III., 650f, 680f.Google Scholar Indispensable for the proper understanding of this treaty are Kap-Herr, op.cit., 32–36; Bassow, P., Honorimperii 26–37Google Scholar; Heilig, op.cit., 162f, the notes especially; Lamma, op.cit., I, 89f.

57. Anselm, of Havelberg, Dialogi, PL, 188, 1139.Google Scholar

58. Anselm of Havelberg, loc. cit.

59. Did Eugene blame the Greeks for the failure of the Crusade? John of Salisbury, who was an intimate of the papal court at this time, makes the Greeks responsible in part for the disaster, XXIV, 54. However, Constable, op.cit., 272–273 observes that not everyone blamed the Greeks and that the more judicious reserved judgment. I am inclined to ascribe such a temperate attitude to Eugene himself.

60. For the agreement between Roger and Eugene see Gleber, op.cit., 108–113, the most recent review of the agreement and its significance. Following Bernhardi, , Konrad III., 746fGoogle Scholar, he tends to present it as embodying a complete change in the papal attitude towards the Normans. However, the evidence suggests the interpretation presented in the text: John of Salisbury, XXVII, 60–61; Romuald, RISS (new), VII, I, 230; Ann. Casinenses, MGH SS, XIX, 310; Sig. Coat. Praem., MGH SS, VI, 454; Kehr, P., Italia Pontificia, VIII, 44–45.Google Scholar

61. JL, 9344, PL, 180, 1393–1394.

62. WE, 243, p. 364.

63. WE, 147, pp. 227–228; Zatschek, op. cit. (supra, n. 17), 350; Heilig, op. cit., 157–162, 167.

64. WE, 180, 181, 186–188, 191, 193, 239–242, pp. 300–302, 306–308, 311, 313, 358–363. For the dating of the letters, Zatschek, op.cit., 373, 387–389. Ohnsorge, , Zwcikaiserproblem, 94Google Scholar, describes brilliantly the changed attitudes in Conrad. On the other hand, Gleber, op.cit., 119–122; Zatschek, op.cit., 366, 458–460; Bernhardi, , Konrad III., 774–780Google Scholar, are guilty of much exaggeration of Conrad's new attitude towards the Church. As for Wibald of Corbie, there have been several monographs and studies. See Bastin, J., Wibald, Abbé de Stavelot et Malmede, du Mont Cassin et de Corbie (Verviers, 1931).Google Scholar Of late, the reign of Conrad III has been subjected to fresh scrutiny. See Geldner, F., “Zum neueren Beurteilung König Konrad III.”, Monumentum Bambergense. Festschr ft für Benedikt Kraft (Munich, 1955), 393–412.Google Scholar

65. Supra, n. 63.

66. WE, 214–216, pp. 332–336. See Zatschek, op.cit., 350–351, 380. These letters shed much light on the vicissitudes of the imperial idea in the High Middle Ages. See Baar, P. A. van den, Die kirchliche Lehre der Translatio Imperii Romani (Rome, 1956), 58–61Google Scholar; Folz, op.cit., 106–109; Lamma, op.cit., I, 101f.

67. WE, 182, p. 302.

68. WE, 194, 195, pp. 313–314, dated by Zatsehek in October, 1149, op.cit., 369. The papal legation is JL, 9344, PL, 180, 1393–1394.

69. For the capture of Corfu by the Greeks and Venetians, Cinnamus, III, 5, pp. 98–101; Nicetas, II, 5, V, 9, pp. 113–118, 222–226. Further, by this time Manuel had drawn Pisa into his coalition against Roger, DR, II, 1376.

70. John of Salisbury, XXVIII-XXIX, 60–62. Other useful sources include Sig. Cont. Praemonstatensis, MGH SS, VI, 454; Romuald, RISS(new), VII, I, 230; Dandolo, , Chronicon, RISS (new), XII, I, 243Google Scholar; Cinnamus, II, 19, pp. 87–88.

71. For the defeat at the Fountain of Murad, Runciman, History, II, 326.Google Scholar

72. WE, 252, p. 377. No doubt, Theodwin was encouraged to write to Conrad by Godfrey of Langres who was travelling with Louis and Eleanor. See Suger, , Epistolae, 94Google Scholar, PL, 186, 1394–1395.

73. Many scholars have presented these developments in the terms of the formation of a triple entente between Louis, Roger and Eugene. Its purpose was the launching of a new crusade whose first objective would be the conquest of Constantinople. See Bernhardi, , Konrad III., 809–811Google Scholar; Norden, op.cit., 84–85; Hefele, op.cit., V, I, 820–821; Caspar, op.cit., 374; Zatschek, op.cit., 393, 460; Gleber, op.cit., 123–125; Berry in Setton, op.cit., I, 511; Ostrogorsky, op.cit., 340; Vacandard, E., Vie de Saint Bernard (2 vols., Paris, 1927), II, 439–440Google Scholar; Chalandon, , Domination normande, II, 148Google Scholar; Runciman, , History, II, 286–287Google Scholar; Eastern Schism, 127–128; Lamma, op.cit., I, 99–100; all these limit the entente to Roger and Louis. Yet there is no suggestion of an entente of any kind in John of Salisbury, whose description of Eugene's encounter with Louis and Eleanor is famous, XXIX, 61–62. Nor is there evidence in the letters of Louis. See Suger, , Epistoae, 22, 39, 48, 50, 52–60, 69, 94, 96Google Scholar, PL, 186, 1357–1358, 1365–1366, 1374–1380, 1384, 1394–1396. Only 39, 1365, makes any reference to “Greek treachery.” As Constable reminds us, op.cit., 218–219, n. 24, Louis in later years did not reproach the Greeks for the disaster. As for the Papacy, JL, 9347, to Suger, gives no indication of any intrigue.

74. Cinnamus, III, 6–11, pp. 101–118; Historia Welf. Wein., MGH SS, XXI, 468Google Scholar; Heilig, op.cit., 157f.

75. Vita Sugerii, III, 8Google Scholar, PL, 186, 1204–1205. It is to be noted that this writer, endeavouring to enhance the prestige of his hero, misrepresents Suger's activity on behalf of the crusade as a response to papal appeals for action.

76. For the letters arriving in France from the Latin Orient, which stimulated Suger to summon a new expedition, see Röhricht, R., Regesta regni Hierosolymitani (2 vols. in one, Innsbruck, 1893–1904)Google Scholar, No. 261.

77. For evidence of Conrad's sickness, see WE, 231, 236, 243, 248, pp. 350–351, 355, 363–366, 371.

78. The troubles of Wibald and Anselm may be seen reflected in WE, 201, 202, 206, 211, 221, pp. 319–322, 325–326, 330, 339–341. However, Conrad's disfavour must not be painted in too dark colours, see 203, 205, pp. 322–323, 324–325.

79. Wibald's restoration to favour may be seen in WE, 222, 223, 226, pp. 341, 342, 344–5.

80. Bernhardi, , Konrad III., 775f;Google Scholar Zatschek, op.cit., 374–375, 393 and Gleber, op.cit., 124–125, attribute Conrad's postponement of the legation to his conviction that Eugene was heart and soul behind the conspiracy against the East-West alliance. I have suggested that the evidence points in other directions.

81. JL, II, 64.

82. WE, 198, pp. 316–317. Zatsehek, op. cit., 393–394 uses this letter as evidence that the Papacy was the “soul” behind Roger's conspiracies against Conrad and Manuel. This interpretation seems to me to be incorrect.

83. For the Greek advance and retreat in the Mediterranean, see Cinnamus, III, 5–6, 9, pp. 98–102, 113. For the continuing war with Hungary and Serbia see III, 7, 10–11, pp. 103–106, 113–118. Chalandon's account, Jean et Manuel, 318–334, is excellent. Lamma's terse description of Manuel's policies, op.cit., I, 101, may be applied here: “—Grandiosità di disegni e difficolt di attuarli.”

84. Accounts of the rupture between Greeks and Venetians may be seen in Cinnamus, III, 5, 6, IV, 14, pp. 98, 102, 170; Nicetas, , De Manuele, II, 5, p. 113Google Scholar; Dandolo, RISS (new), XII, I, 242–244; Hist. Due. Tenet. MGH SS, XIV, 71Google Scholar; Kehr, , Italia Pontificia, VII, II, 21–22.Google Scholar There is another dimension to these developments. The Venetian Patriarch had opposed the signing of the treaty with Manuel in 1148. So great was his opposition to the Doge's policies that he had been expelled from the city. The Patriarch appealed to the Papacy for help, and Eugene responded by laying the city under interdict. Gleber, op.cit., 119–120, suggests that this is yet another mmanifestation of Eugene's hatred for the Greeks. However, the evidence suggestsrather that the quarrel between Patria ch and Doge had been endemic for some time prior to 1148 and that the Greek alliance had served merely as a pretext for new controversy betweenenemies of long standing. As for Eugene, it was but natural that he come to the Patriarch's defence in order to protect the freedom of the Church in Venice. Nonetheless, Gleber 's suggestion is a tantalizing one, and there may be more here than we have allowed. See Kretschmayr, op. cit., I, 235–236 and Kehr, P., “Romund Venedig bis ins XII. Jahrhundert,” Quellen und Forschungen, XIX (1927), 1–180Google Scholar, rf. here, 131–133.

85. WE, 231, 232, 236, pp. 350–352, 355.

86. Primary evidence for the motives at work in this French attempt to inaugurate a new crusade is to be found in Bernard, , Epistolae, 364, 380Google Scholar, PL, 182, 568–570, 583–584 (ed., James, op. cit., 398, 408, pp. 469–470, 477–478); De considerations II, 1Google Scholar, PL, 182, 741–745; Peter the Venerable, Epistolae, VI, 16–18, PL, 189, 424, 427; Suger, , Epistolae, 133–135Google Scholar, PL, 186, 1410–1412.

87. Peter, the Venerable, Epistolae, VI, 16Google Scholar, PL, 189, 424. However, Peter was a friend of long standing with Roger, PL, 189, 280–282. His hatred of the Greeks would be ardently seconded by Godfrey of Langres and Odo of Deuil.

88. Suger, , Epistolae, 143, 146Google Scholar, PL, 186, 1415–1417.

89. The above interpretation differs, invarious respects, from those offered by Hefele, op.cit., V, I, 843–844; Vacandard, op.cit., II, 440–442; Bréhier, L., L'Église et l'Orient au moyen age. Les croisades (Paris, 1907), 108Google Scholar; Chalandon, Domination normande, II, 148–149Google Scholar; Grousset, R., Histoire des Croisades (3 vols., Paris, 1934–1936), II, 269Google Scholar; Haller, op.cit., III, 95–96; Runciman, History, II, 286–287; Ostrogorsky, op.cit., 340; Lamma, op. cit., I, 104. These writers tend to see the French as wholly given over to a war of revenge on Byzantium.

90. WE, 252, p. 377.

91. This defence of Bernard against the charge that he gave his sanction to an anti-Byzantine crusade is directed against those scholars listed in n. 89.

92. WE, 252, pp. 376–378.

93. WE, 237, 243–246, pp. 355–357, 363–369. Note that in 243, p. 365, Conradrefers to the French nation as unanimously in favour of an attack on the Byzantine empire. Considering the response Suger's efforts were to receive, and the fact that the anti-Byzantine motif was not dominant in Suger's attempt to create a new expedition, Conrad's remark may be dismissed as hyperbole designed to enhance his own prestige with Manuel.

94. For an unfavourable judgment upon Wibald's conduct towards Conrad and Manuel, see Zatsehek, op.cit., 335, 392, 453. Saner attitudes prevail in Ohnsorge, , Zwtikaiserproblem, 92–93Google Scholar, and Lamma, op.cit., I, 111.

95. WE, 248–251, pp. 371–376. Henry probably brought also Wibald's private letter to the chancellor, supra, n. 92.

96. JL, 9385, PL, 180, 1414–1415.

97. Vita Sugerii, III, 8Google Scholar, PL, 186, 1205; Hefele, op.cit., V, I, 843–844; Vacandard op.cit., II, 442–450.

98. Bernard, , Epistolae, 256Google Scholar, PL, 182, 463–465 (ed., James, op.cit., 399, pp. 470–472). This letter reveals the danger in relying on such sources as Sig. Cont. Praem. MGH SB, VI, 455, which exaggerates the support given by the Papacy to Suger and Bernard in their efforts to raise a new crusade.

99. JL, 9398, PL, 180, 1419.

100. See JL, 9594.

101. JL, 9399–9403; WE, 273, pp. 400–401.

102. WE, 272 (JL, 9403), 278–282, 284, 297, pp. 399–400, 402–412, 425. Note that the Pope had asked Conrad to send Wibald as his representative.

103. Although Runciman's comments on the Dialogi in his Eastern Schism, 115–117, are excellent, they do scant justice to the political context in which this work appears and the purpose for which it was written.

104. JL, II, 67.

105. John of Salisbury, XXXII, 66–68; Romuaid, RISS(new), VII, I, 230–231.

106. John of Salisbury, XXXIV, 69–70. See P. Kehr, “Die Belehnungen,” 44.

107. John of Salisbury, XXXVIII, 77–79. Cf. Gleber, op.cit., 139.

108. Wibald was still a staunch supporter of the alliance with Manuel, WE, 343, pp. 475–477.

109. WE, 340, 344, 346, pp. 469–472, 477–480.

110. WE, 345, pp. 478–479. However, Lamma, op.cit., I, 112–113, judges this letter to be an indication of Conrad's desire to ally himself in some way with the Romans.

111. WE, 375, pp. 503–505.

112. JL, 9517, 9541.

113. WE, 372, pp. 499–501.

114. WE, 375, pp. 503–505, to Eugene. WE, 374, pp. 501–502, shows his concern for future relations between Frederick and the Papacy.

115. Zatschek, op.cit., 413–415.

116. JL, 9577.

117. JL, 9602, 9605, 9606.

118. JL, 9606 refers to Arnold's activities. WE, 404, pp. 539–543 is a letter from the Roman commune to Frederick. For Eugene's entry into the city, see Ann. Casinenses, MGH SS, XIX, 310Google Scholar; Romuald, RIBS (new), VII, I, 231- 232; JL, II, 82. See also P. Brezzi, op.cit., 388, and Dupré-Theseider, op. cit., 128f, 142f.

119. WE, 410, 411, pp. 548–550. The basic research into this opening gambit in Frederick's relations with Manuel is Ohnsorge, W., “Zu den aussenpolitischen Anfänge Friedrich Barbarossas,” Quellen und Forschungen, XXXII (1942), 13–32.Google Scholar

120. There are two redactions of the treaty, WE, pp. 546–547 and MGH Constitutiones, I, 202. Haller, op.cit., III, 498, skillfully presents the difficulties in dealing with the second of these. Concerning the treaty, see Zatschek, H., “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Konstanzer V e r t r a g s vom Jahre 1153,” Sitzungsberichte. Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien. Ph.-hist. Kl., CCX (1930);Google Scholar Gleber, op. cit., 152f; Rassow, , Honor imperii, 49f;Google Scholar P. Lamma, op. cit., I, 137f.

121. The development of Eugene's stature as politician and diplomat is often overlooked. See Hailer, op. cit., III, 84–85, whose assessment of Eugene is based on an uncritical acceptance of John of Salisbury's judgment, XXI, 51.

122. M. Jugie fails to give sufficient emphasis to the influence of political considerations on papal attempts at church union after 1054. See his Le Schisme Byzantin (Paris, 1941), 249.Google Scholar

123. It is to be noted that during the reigns of Hadrian IV and Alexander III southern Italy to a great extent ceased to be a source of tension and animosity between Rome and Constanstinople. As a result, church union was pursued with greatly increased vigour by both the Papacy and Byzantium alike.