page 105 note 1 Ashcraft, Richard, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Dunn, John, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 106 note 2 All page references in the body of this article are to Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights. The references to Locke's Two Treatises of Government are to the treatise, section and, where necessary, line numbers in Laslett, Peter, ed., Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)Google Scholar. The most recent and scholarly introductions to the Two Treatises and the secondary literature are Goldie, Mark, ed., John Locke: Two Treatises of Government (London: J. M. Dent, 1993), vii–xlviGoogle Scholar, and Wootton, David, ed., John Locke: Political Writings (London: Penguin, 1993), 7–131Google Scholar. The latter contains a number of important related manuscripts by Locke. Both editors present critical summaries of the scholarship on Locke on property.

page 107 note 3 Dunn, , The Political Thought of John Locke, n.pGoogle Scholar.

page 108 note 4 Tully, James, A Discourse on Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I have modified my views on Locke's political philosophy in a number of respects since 1980. See Tully, James, An Approach to Political Philosophy: John Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 109 note 5 Buckle, Stephen, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Sreenivasan, Gopal, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1995)Google Scholar. All page references are to the typescript. Goldie's interpretation of Locke on property is also in agreement with Buckle and Sreenivasan (Two Treatises, xxxvii-xli).

page 109 note 6 Tully, , A Discourse, 99Google Scholar; and Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962)Google Scholar. Sreenivasan further substantiates and clarifies the limited nature of Locke's and Lockean rights.

page 109 note 7 For the importance of the consent problem see Tully, , A Discourse, 95–100Google Scholar; Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 28–34Google Scholar; and Tully, “Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights,” in An Approach, 145–46.

page 110 note 8 One reason Locke sought to show how individuals could acquire property without consent is that Robert Filmer had cast doubt on Hugo Grotius' argument that property could arise through consent. Locke accepts Filmer's dubious point that if con sent were necessary (it is always sufficient), people would starve waiting for universal consent (11, 28). For the background to this problem in the natural law tradition see Buckle, , Natural Law, 162–168Google Scholar.

page 110 note 9 Tully, , A Discourse, 80–98Google Scholar.

page 110 note 10 Buckle, for example, in otherwise excellent discussion, argues against me that the commons is “negative,” then concludes he uses “negative” in the same sense as I use “positive” (Natural Law, 187).

page 111 note 11 Tully, . A Discourse, 122Google Scholar; Buckle, , Natural Law, 186Google Scholar; and Kelly, Patrick, “All Things Richly to Enjoy: Economics and Politics in Locke's Two Treatises of Government,” Political Studies 18 (1988), 289Google Scholar. For Simmons' reformulation of the right more in line with a right of access to the means of preservation see 302 and below.

page 112 note 12 Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 112Google Scholar.

page 112 note 13 Ibid., 37–38.

page 112 note 14 This is the solution of Locke's contemporary, James Tyrrell. See Tully, , A Discourse, 97–98Google Scholar. For an interesting but inconclusive attempt to show the close dependence of Locke on Tyrrell, see Wootton, , ed., John Locke: Political Writings, 49–89Google Scholar. Wootton's introduction also contains an excellent introduction to the con text of the composition of the Two Treatises.

page 113 note 15 Nozkk, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 175Google Scholar.

page 113 note 16 Waldron, Jeremy, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 155Google Scholar.

page 113 note 17 Tully, , A Discourse, 124–125Google Scholar; and Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 31Google Scholar. Simmons agrees with this interpretation.

page 114 note 18 “It is, I think, anachronistic to attribute to him any argument about the comparative economic merits of private and communist modes of production” (Waldron, , The Right, 70–71)Google Scholar.

page 114 note 19 For Locke's analysis of the historical development of property relative to America, see Tully, “Rediscovering America,” 137–79. For the use of Locke's analysis in the eighteenth century, see Tully, “Placing the Two Treatises,” in Phillipson, Nicholas and Skinner, Quentin, eds., Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 253–281CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 114 note 20 Tully, , A Discourse, 122Google Scholar.

page 114 note 21 Ibid., 105, 110.

page 115 note 22 Ibid., 105.

page 115 note 23 Ibid., 42.

page 115 note 24 Ibid., 104–24.

page 115 note 25 Ibid., 115, 118.

page 115 note 26 Ibid., 131.

page 115 note 27 Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 38–84Google Scholar. See also Buckle, , Natural Law, 149–153Google Scholar, and Shapiro, Ian, “Resources, Capacities, and Ownership: The Workmanship Ideal and Distributive Justice,” Political Theory, 19 (1991), 47–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 116 note 28 Ryan, Alan, “Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie,” in Martin, C. and Armstrong, D., eds., Locke and Berkeley (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 225Google Scholar, discussed in Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 42Google Scholar.

page 117 note 29 Tully, , A Discourse, 119Google Scholar; Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 80Google Scholar; and Buckle, , Natural Law, 151Google Scholar.

page 117 note 30 See Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 65–71Google Scholar, for a clear analysis of Two Treatises, 1, 51–55Google Scholar.

page 117 note 31 For the following sections on the justification of English colonization in America see Tully, , “Rediscovering America,” 145–155Google Scholar.

page 118 note 32 Tully, , A Discourse, 99Google Scholar.

page 118 note 33 Ibid., 123–24.

page 119 note 34 See especially Ashcraft, Richard, Locke's Two Treatises of Government (London: Unwin, 1987, 81–151Google Scholar (an interpretation which is in general agreement with the one advanced in this article). For a review of this literature, see Tully, , “After the Macpherson Thesis,” in An Approach, 71–95Google Scholar; and for the colonial dimension of Locke's argument. Arneil, Barbara, “All the World Was America: John Locke and the Defense of Colonialism” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1993)Google Scholar.

page 119 note 35 Tully, , “Rediscovering America,” 159, 167Google Scholar.

page 124 note 36 See ibid., 155–64.

page 124 note 37 Simmons discusses this stretch of the text in a footnote in which he criticizes me, among other things, for arguing that Locke is morally ambivalent about the consequences of money and then draws a somewhat similar conclusion himself (304–05).

page 124 note 38 Buckle, , Natural Law, 151–153Google Scholar.

page 125 note 39 Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 107–115Google Scholar.

page 125 note 40 Accordingly, the claim right to work and the correlative duty to make work avail able to the able unemployed in political society follow from the sufficiency limit.

page 125 note 41 Sreenivasan, , The Limits, 119–122Google Scholar; Cohen, G. A., “Marx and Locke on Land and Labour,” Proceedings of the British Academy 71 (1985), 380Google Scholar; and Waldron, , The Right, 170Google Scholar.

page 126 note 42 I set aside here Locke's dubious argument that Amerindian hunters and gatherers were not self-governing nations but rather in the state of nature. If the Amerindians were organized into sovereign nations, as the British Crown held, then Locke's argument fails to justify appropriation in America. For Aboriginal sovereignty, see Tully, James, “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground,” in Paul, Ellen Frankel, Paul, Jeffrey and Miller, Fred, eds., Property Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 153–180Google Scholar. For an attempt to save some version of Locke's argument, see Flanagan, Thomas, “The Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian Lands and Political Philosophy,” this Journal 22 (1989), 589–607Google Scholar.

page 127 note 43 Chief Justice John Marshall, Worcester v. the State of Georgia (1832) 6 Peter 515 (USSC). See Tully, “Rediscovering America,” 174, and Tully, “Placing the Two Treatises,” 276–78.

page 128 note 44 Shurtleff, N., Records of Massachusetts Bay, 55–56 (1853), 213Google Scholar, cited in Clinton, Robert N., “The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs,” Boston University Law Review 69 (1989), 334Google Scholar. See Tully, , “Rediscovering America,” 171–174Google Scholar. The philosophical point of consent by treaty is not to win Amerindians over to Locke's framework but to reach an intercultural agreement on property relations by negotiation that satisfies the criteria of both systems. See Tully, , “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory,” 153–180Google Scholar.

page 128 note 45 Olivecrona, Karl, “Locke's Theory of Appropriation,” Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974), 231CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldie, , ed., Two Treatises, xliGoogle Scholar; and Tully, , A Discourse, 170Google Scholar.

page 128 note 46 Ibid., 166–67, 171.

page 129 note 47 Ibid., 164.

page 129 note 48 Ibid., 165.

page 131 note 49 The disagreement between us is that legal property rights are derived directly from natural principles for Simmons and Waldron, whereas they are mediated through the conventional considerations of parliamentary debate over the public good for me. This is an old disagreement over the Two Treatises that goes back to the radical or “direct” reading of the Two Treatises advanced by the colonial revolutionaries in the 1760s and the moderate or “parliamentary” reading advanced by the Loyalists. See Tully, “Placing the Two Treatises,” 265–75.

page 131 note 50 Tully, , A Discourse, 169Google Scholar. Sreenivasan substantiates this (The Limits, 158).

page 131 note 51 Tully, , A Discourse, 169–170Google Scholar.

page 131 note 52 Simmons, , The Lockean Theory, 333, n. 69Google Scholar; and Tully, , A Discourse, 174Google Scholar.

page 132 note 53 For another important study in this analytical and historical genre, which carefully reconstructs the theories of rights and sociality prior to Locke, see Ravinder Chimni, “The Theories of Society in Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, McGill University, 1995).