¹ Macpherson, C. B.The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).Google ScholarAn earlier interpretation was published as “Hobbes Today” in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 11 (1945), 524–34.CrossRefGoogle ScholarThe later, “possessive individualist” interpretation has appeared in abbreviated form in Macpherson's “Introduction” to Hobbes's Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), and also in his essay, “Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke, ”Google ScholarRaphael, D. D. (ed.),Political Theory and The Rights of Man (London: Macmillan, 1967), 1–15. “Hobbes Today” has been reprinted as “Hobbes's Bourgeois Man”Google ScholarBrown, K. C. (ed.), Hobbes Studies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), 168–83,Google Scholar and in Macpherson, C. B.Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).Google Scholar“Natural Rights” has also been reprinted in Democratic Theory.Google Scholar

² Macpherson's interpretation will be discussed as it occurs in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Macpherson's earlier essay, “Hobbes Today” (reprinted as “Hobbes's Bourgeois Man”), does not use either the expression or the analysis of “possessive individualism”: that is, it does not argue that the text implies a universal opposition among men's powers, and so it does not seek to derive this postulate from a specific model of society. These elements are present, albeit in abbreviated form, in Macpherson's “Natural Rights” essay and in slightly more detail in his “Introduction” to Leviathan. (It may be noted that the latter essay appears to de-emphasize the universality of the opposition of powers.)

³ For brevity, I ignore Macpherson's opening claim that the men described in the first part of Leviathan are social and civilized men whose natures have been formed by living in a specific society.

⁴ Compare withBerlin, Isaiah“Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson, ” Political Quarterly 35 (1964), 444–68;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLetwin, William (Ed.), “The Economic Foundations of Hobbes' Politics, ”Google Scholar in Crabston, MauricePeters, R. S.(Ed.), Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972), 143–64;Google Scholar and Thomas, Keith The Social Origins of Hobbes' Political Thought, ”Google Scholarin Brown, K. C. (ed.), Hobbes Studies, 185–236.Google Scholar

⁵ On this account, such criticisms apply more directly to the earlier “Hobbes Today” essay.

⁶ However, William Letwin quite properly criticizes Macpherson's typology of social models (Letwin, “The Economic Foundations of Hobbes' Political Thought, ”144–52).

⁷ Macpherson refers briefly to Hobbes's remarks in Chapter VIII concerning virtue and the differences in men's wit (The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 34).

⁸ Passages in Leviathan are cited by reference to the chapter (in Roman numerals) and the paragraph (in Arabic). All quotations are from Macpherson's edition.

⁹ Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 35.

¹⁰ Ibid. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Ibid. 36.

¹¹ Recognizing the special problems of ascribing unstated postulates, Macpherson imposes three requirements (Ibid.): the postulate must be common enough that the writer could take it for granted in his readers, it must fill a gap in his argument, and it must be mentioned or used by the writer in some other context.Ibid.

¹² Hobbes also uses the word “extraordinary” in his list of examples.

¹³ Glory in this sense does not entail that men seek power over others, and so it does not entail any universal opposition among their powers.

¹⁴ This is the next reference to Leviathan In Macpherson's presentation, however, it is preceded by a brief discussion of The Elements. This discussion is addressed below, at the end of this section.

¹⁵ Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 37.

¹⁶ Ibid.Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Ibid.,36.

¹⁷ Ibid.,Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Ibid.,39.

¹⁸ It is worth stressing here that “benefits oblige” (XI.7). Careful attention to this paragraph ought to be prophylaxis against any temptation to read into Hobbes's account such oversimplifications as a universal opposition of powers or bourgeoisified commercial relations.

¹⁹ The case would be different if we were to make some rather large assumptions. If each man can buy the use of the powers of every other man, and if all men desire either to sell the use of their powers or to purchase the use of the powers of others, then all men must compete against one another in determining the market price for the use of any man's powers. Consequently, men's powers would then be put into universal opposition by market competition. It would then follow, as Macpherson argues, that power is a commodity, that is, produced for exchange. The difficulty is that this argument assumes the universal commodity market in power which Macpherson purports to prove in his discussion. If, as I suspect, this is Macpherson's argument, it is, accordingly, simply question-begging. In any case, as 1 argue in the next paragraph, there is no foundation for this assumption.

²⁰ similar considerations apply to Hobbes's subsequent discussion of “honourable. ”

²¹ Even Hobbes's defintion of “the value of a man” does not refer explicitly to any sale, lease, or alienation of the use of their powers by power-holders.

²² The alleged universal commodity market in power would be somewhat more plausible if the postulated universal opposition of powers could be independently established, and conversely. The problem is that there is no evidence for either postulate. In this section, however, Macpherson appears to assume a universal opposition of powers as a basis for inferring a universal commodity market in power, and then to use the latter as a basis for inferring the former. If so, the fallacy of the argument will be evident. I say “appears” because by this stage in Macpherson's argument, the careful reader is left in considerable doubt about what precisely he means by “a universal opposition among men's powers” and its exact place in the logic of his account.

²³ Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 36.

²⁴ Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 1.8.4 (as quoted by Macpherson in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 36).This quotation is presumably supposed to meet the third of Macpherson's requirements for ascribing unstated postulates: specifically, that the postulate be used by the writer in some other context (Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 5).

²⁵ Even this may be questioned. The statement quoted from The Elements twice refers to the opposition between one man and “another” it does not refer to, or imply, any universal opposition between each man and all others. Thus, it may be read instead as an instance of a more limited opposition. At the very least, it cannot be said that the universal opposition of powers is explicit in this passage, and so it cannot be used to meet Macpherson's requirement (compare with note 24 above).

²⁶ This would appear to be Macpherson's own explanation; it is implied by his introductory remarks on method in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 5.

²⁷ Ibid. This would appear to be Macpherson's own explanation; it is implied by his introductory remarks on method in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Ibid., 40. Since the postulate is not stated by Hobbes explicitly, then how can Macpherson refer to it as “offered” and as “supported”?

²⁸ Ibid. Since the postulate is not stated by Hobbes explicitly, then how can Macpherson refer to it as “offered” and as “supported”?Ibid., 46.

²⁹ Ibid. Since the postulate is not stated by Hobbes explicitly, then how can Macpherson refer to it as “offered” and as “supported”?Ibid., 45.

³⁰ Ibid. Since the postulate is not stated by Hobbes explicitly, then how can Macpherson refer to it as “offered” and as “supported”?Ibid., 46.

³¹ Such regulation cannot here be presumed to alter the nature of man, for this would contradict the premiss of the argument.

³² This is supported by Hobbes's earlier statement (VIII. 16) and by a lengthy—and persuasive—textual discussion. It is not clear, however, whether the desire for unlimited power is innate in any man.

³³ Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 42.

³⁴ For purposes of argument, here, power-acquisition by moderate men is treated as a case of Macpherson's universal opposition of powers. Later in this analysis I show that it must instead be treated as a case of limited opposition.

³⁵ Macpherson presumably intended to show this by his earlier claim that every man's power is a commodity (as discussed in Part 1 above).

³⁶ Macpherson's initial statement is weaker: he says only that the postulated universal opposition of powers is “supported” by (Ibid. Macpherson presumably intended to show this by his earlier claim that every man's power is a commodity (as discussed in Part 1 above) Ibid., 40) or may be “derived” from (41) the social model. Thereafter he consistently states the role of the model in stronger terms: it is “needed” (45, 46) for the derivation in the sense that the derivation “implies” (42), “requires” (42), “depends on” (42), and “must be assuming” (46) the social model.

³⁷ Ibid. Macpherson's initial statement is weaker: he says only that the postulated universal opposition of powers is “supported” by (Ibid. Macpherson presumably intended to show this by his earlier claim that every man's power is a commodity (as discussed in Part 1 above) Ibid., 40) or may be “derived” from (41) the social model. Thereafter he consistently states the role of the model in stronger terms: it is “needed” (45, 46) for the derivation in the sense that the derivation “implies” (42), “requires” (42), “depends on” (42), and “must be assuming” (46) the social model.Ibid., 42.

³⁸ This, I think, is Hobbes's point. It will be noticed that the three extreme cases I stated above correspond roughly to the three causes of quarrel stated by Hobbes in the chapter on the state of nature (XIII.3–5): the first is the case of glory, the second of diffidence, and the third of competition. But while Hobbes states these as the bases of the state of nature, he also says that they are grounded in “the nature of man”: hence, these causes of quarrel occur both in the state of nature and in civil society. The difference is that these quarrels and oppositions are limited in civil society by the protective force of effective law; whereas in the absence of such law, or in the event of its collapse, the result is a universal opposition of powers wherein the life of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (XIII.9).