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Volume 12 - November 1954

Contents

Page 2 of 4

Case and Comment

Research Article

Case and Comment

Other

Case and Comment

Research Article

  • Licences, A Jonah's Gourd*

  • H. G. Hanbuky
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 201-214

  • Nature of the problem

    Until a little while ago the subject of licences was commonly treated, from the standpoint of their revocability by the licensor, as one of the principal illustrations of the relations between equity and law. Denning L.J. has repeatedly ex cathedra insisted that fusion has now been effected, not only between the courts wherein the systems of law and equity were administered but between those systems themselves. In this particular subject, while it may be doubtful whether law and equity are fused, there is, unhappily, a certainty that they have been confused.

Case and Comment

Research Article

  • Mechanism of Definition as Applied to International Law

  • R. W. M. Dias
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 215-231

  • One danger that arises from the attention recently devoted to definition in jurisprudential writings is that too much importance may be attached to mere definition as such. Students especially tend to overlook the point that definitions possess no magic or finality, except when they happen to be prescribed authoritatively, for example by statute. What is important is not the definitions, but the analysis on which they are based. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to consider their function and structure, and that is the reason for Unking together in the present article two topics, which could otherwise be dealt with separately.

Page 2 of 4