On 14 August 1988 the death occurred of Miss Pamela Banyard of Laxenheath. She had been the victim eighteen months previously of a savage and brutal attack for which her assailant was sent to prison for ten years on conviction of attempted murder and robbery. Why was he not convicted of murder? The answer in the words of the Crown Prosecutor: “We cannot prosecute for murder as she died more than a year and a day after the attack.”

It is forty years since Professor Newark wrote despairingly of nuisance that “the subject as commonly taught comprises a mass of material which proves so intractable to definition and analysis that it immediately betrays its mongrel origins.” The “truest dictum in the books” was that of Erle C.J., who had once said in answer to the question, what is a nuisance?, that it was “immersed in undefined uncertainty.” Little has changed since 1949. Public and private nuisance still face life together in the textbooks, the universities and the law reports, despite the convincing evidence all round, much of it gathered in Newark's article, that they have little in common except the accident of sharing the same name. Making hoax bomb calls, obstructing the highway and holding a badly organised pop festival are as vulnerable to a public nuisance action as are the more traditional occurrences of special damage from atmospheric, water and noise pollution. Private nuisance has, if anything, become even more confused and confusing. Its chapter lies neglected in the standard works, little changed over the years, its modest message overwhelmed by the excitements to be found elsewhere in tort. Any sense of direction which may have existed in the old days is long gone. The action now encompasses not only smelly oil depots, noisy speedboats and the like but also dangerous natural hazards on the land and the only slightly less natural “user of premises for prostitution and the perambulations of the prostitutes and their customers.” Sometimes negligence is essential to liability, sometimes it is quite irrelevant.

In a revolutionary but unsatisfactory recent decision, the High Court of Australia has allowed a third-party beneficiary of an insurance contract a right to sue the promisor. The decision casts doubt upon the whole doctrine of privity and ultimately upon bargain as the theoretical basis of promissory liability. The Trident case is unsatisfactory not because it allowed a third-party beneficiary a cause of action or because it challenges privity and bargain, but because it offers no satisfactory replacement for the theory of bargain. The reasons the court gave for recognising a right to sue are weak and inconsistent with the common law's approach to questions of civil liability. That approach is to give a plaintiff a cause of action against a defendant not solely because of something the defendant has done, but because there is a legally relevant link between what he has done and the plaintiff's condition. That is, the plaintiff must, in order to establish a right, satisfy some criterion for linking the defendant's behaviour to his complaint.

An extreme view of criminal responsibility might be that everyone is under a duty to act in such a way that others are not led to cause harm, so that in some circumstances he would be responsible for “causing” harm that is directly caused by others, even though it is caused without his authorisation, help or encouragement.

The title of this article is not felicitous, but the author has not been able to think of one which would be palpably less infelicitous.

The word “transnational” is used simply to indicate that the article is not concerned with inter-state or inter-Provincial situations of the sort liable to arise in federal or composite constitutional structures.

Why is making obscene telephone calls like laying manure in the street? Answer: in the same way as importing Irish cattle is like building a thatched house in the borough of Blandford Forum; and as digging up the wall of a church is like helping a homicidal maniac to escape from Broadmoor; and as operating a joint-stock company without a royal charter is like being a common cold; and as keeping a tiger in a pen adjoining the highway is like depositing a mutilated corpse on a doorstep; and as selling unsound meat is like embezzling public funds; and as garaging a lorry in the street is like an inn-keeper refusing to feed a traveller; and as keeping treasure-trove is like subdividing houses which so “become hurtful to the place by overpestering it with poor.” All are, or at some time have been said to be, a common (alias public) nuisance. The definition of this offence, according to Archbold's Criminal Pleading and Practice, is as follows: “Every person is guilty of an offence at common law, known as public nuisance, who does an act not warranted by law, or omits to discharge a legal duty, if the effect of the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.” The person who commits a public nuisance incurs liability to life imprisonment and unlimited fines. He can be made vicariously liable for the offence if it is committed by his servants. He can be ordered to stop it by an injunction, and made to pay damages in tort if it causes anyone loss. With such a broad concept in existence, backed with such broad remedies, what need have we of any other criminal offence?—or torts?—or remedies in administrative law?

The Critical Legal Studies movement has been described by one of its leading proponents as having “undermined the central ideas of modern legal thought and put another conception of law in their place.” Whether or not the movement has actually succeeded in doing so, this is a fair description of its ambition. The scholarship of the CLS movement disputes the idea that the power of judges and other government officials either can or should be constrained by sources of law such as constitutions, statutes, and precedent. It is marked by a rejection of the belief that “legal argument” can or should be an enterprise distinct from political argument. It is also marked by a rejection of “legal rights” as a desirable or even possible means of protecting individuals from government power.