“It seems to me…... that, as with a criminal offence, so in the case of cruelty there must be an element of mens rea.” Thus spoke Willmer L.J. in the recent case of Williams v. Williams, raising thereby a fundamental problem in the law of matrimonial cruelty, and providing incidentally an invitation to attempt an investigation of this difficult (and unsavoury) subject. It is proposed there-fore (I) to inquire in general what intention, if any, is needed in order to be cruel to one's spouse; (II) to ask in particular what is the relevance of mental disorder or illness suffered by an allegedly cruel spouse; and (III) to explore some lines along which this branch of the law might advantageously be reformed.

In an earlier article it was suggested that fiduciary relationships could be classified under four heads, in accordance with the different principles which govern each class. It would, of course, be pedantic to insist that these rules, necessarily among the most flexible in equity, should be regarded as rigidly codified and invariably applied strictly and to the letter; but for some purposes it is important to keep the differences between the categories clearly in mind. This is particularly the case with the classes which were referred to in the previous article as categories I and II: in the first group the beneficiary has the advantage of all the proprietary equitable remedies against a trustee, and the fiduciary has comparable duties, while in the second, the beneficiary's remedies (apart from the remission of contracts) are based on equitable obligation only. We shall now examine in more detail the principles governing fiduciaries in these two categories.