Early American life insurers found themselves facing the problem of asymmetric information, as they needed to rely on applicants themselves to provide truthful, complete answers to a standard set of questions. In an attempt to repersonalize the relationship between their boards of directors and the individual applicants, firms selected highly respected local citizens to act as their agents. These agents were expected to evaluate the appearance of candidates, unearth evidence of unhealthy family histories or questionable habits, and attest to the respectability of people writing testimonial letters on an applicant's behalf. In short, the initial purpose of the agency system was not to actively solicit customers, but rather to recreate the glass-bowl mentality associated with small towns or city neighborhoods.

This article examines some of the institutional conditions that facilitated the development of equity markets in Brazil. A critical factor was the addition to corporate bylaws of protections for investors, which enabled relatively large corporations in Brazil to attract investors in large numbers. By availing themselves of this strategy, the firms generated a relatively low concentration of ownership before 1910. Archival evidence, such as company statutes and shareholder lists, reveals that the addition of voting rights to their bylaws, particularly maximum-vote provisions and graduated voting scales (which stipulated that less-than-proportional votes increase in parallel with shareholdings), allowed many Brazilian corporations to balance the relative voting power of their small and large investors. In companies that made such arrangements, the concentration of ownership and control was sharply lower than in the average company. Judging by the Brazilian companies examined for this article, it also appears that the concentration of control was significantly lower before 1910 than it is today.

From 1900 through the 1920s, Singer put in place its proven selling system in Japan, despite making remarkably little adjustment to local conditions, and with a fair degree of success. But the company was hurt in the long run, with a turning point in the early- to mid-1930s, by its refusal to adapt—as its local competitors did—to the expectations of employees and the limited means of potential customers. Singer's dramatic rise and fall in Japan reveals ways in which practices of global capitalism are simultaneously transformed and transformative as they take root in particular locales.

How do we measure Alfred Chandler's achievement? What forces shaped his vision? What is his place in the pantheon of historians and social scientists? Might he rank with sociologists such as Talcott Parsons or even Max Weber? Economists such as Kenneth Arrow or even Joseph Schumpeter? With political scientists such as Louis Hartz, Robert Dahl, and Seymour Martin Lipset? It's too early to make these kinds of judgments, but some answers are certainly possible about his place among historians.

For the clerks who worked in British life-insurance companies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, occupational mobility was both an opportunity that motivated effort and a generator of wide disparities in pay and status. Ambitious clerks learned math in the hope of becoming actuaries. By the end of the nineteenth century, this pattern had changed, owing to the rise of branch networks and accompanying bottle-necks in the promotion process. Insurance companies tried to divert clerks’ ambition by offering them opportunities to engage in sports and other leisure activities, and by enhancing their financial security through staff pension schemes. Although these strategies only succeeded in retaining around half of all entering clerks for more than a few years, the activities added meaning to the lives of those clerks who stayed on and made vital contributions to the rapid growth of one of Britain's most important financial services.

For almost half a century, Alfred D. Chandler Jr. has enjoyed an enviable reputation as the most influential business historian in the world. Chandlerian business history is a mainstay of the “new” institutionalism that John Higham discerned over four decades ago in a justly admired survey of American historical writing; in addition, it has long been a cornerstone of the “organizational synthesis” that Louis Galambos championed in three widely discussed essays. Even in history departments that have shifted their primary focus from politics and economics to society and culture, Chandler remains required reading.

This article examines the emergence of the American stove industry, detailing the complex interactions among changes in the product, the organization of production, and the methods of selling cast-iron heating and cooking equipment to consumers nationwide, particularly in the antebellum years. This highly competitive industry, composed of hundreds of proprietary firms, became a site of considerable innovation in marketing. Manufacturers integrated forward, controlling the sale and distribution of their goods through networks of small retailers nationwide. The article explains how and why.

In Mexico, as in other parts of the world, the introduction of modern transportation and communications brought about major changes in the production and distribution of goods and in firms' management and structure. Between 1880 and 1910, the Mexican textile sector was modernized through the efforts of entrepreneurial French immigrants from Barcelonnette, whose closely knit network enabled them to succeed in overcoming limitations in the Mexican institutional framework.

At the end of the twentieth century, the global diffusion of one important financial service, insurance, was encouraged by deregulation, but it also encountered difficulties where deregulation remained incomplete and where there were many nonregulatory barriers to entry. International insurance was already well developed before 1914. The growth in the global insurance trade, however, occurred against a background of increasing national regulation and fiscal burdens in many countries, making international business affordable only for the largest companies with the deepest reserves. This paper offers some preliminary estimates of the extent of the international insurance trade during the half-century before the First World War, and assesses the impact of national regulatory regimes and nonregulatory factors on the development of this business. The analysis is placed within the framework of modern theories of regulation and multinational enterprise.

I remember the first time I read Alfred Chandler's Strategy and Structure as a graduate student in the mid-1970s. I was taking a class on the sociology of organizations and finding that many of the assigned books and articles did not interest me. Corporations are clearly one of the dominant forces in our society, yet none of what I read seemed to capture what they do and how they do it. Reading the first eighteen pages of Strategy and Structure was like having the scales fall from my eyes. Here was a historical view of the largest corporations that placed them in their context and, most important, showed that real people with real purposes undertook to make these organizations work. Chandler's book opened the black box of the large modern corporation for me. Chandler realized that what was interesting about corporations was not that they made profits, but how they did so. In a single chapter, Chandler articulated much that I had found lacking in organizational theory.

Based on theoretical findings of the new institutional economics, this examination of the history of the Swiss chocolate company Suchard (founded in 1826) and the Verband Reisender Kaufleute der Schweiz (Association of Swiss Commercial Travelers) describes the economic significance, social image, and everyday life of traveling salesmen between 1860 and 1920. By 1900, commercial travelers formed a critical link between the enterprise and the market, helping to drive the vertical integration of production and distribution. They enjoyed high standing within the company, and many were promoted to executive levels. Traveling salesmen were largely responsible for procuring information and expanding product sales in an era that preceded specialized market research and the domination of advertising companies.

The number of multinationals in the life-insurance sector expanded during the first era of globalization. Many of these firms gravitated to Spain, attracted by factors such as the country's small number of national companies and minimal regulatory requirements. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Spanish government began to impose more institutional regulations, increasing the guarantees, deposits, and reserves required of insurance companies. In response, American and British multinationals began to leave the Spanish market, propelled both by the new requirements and by a series of external factors that obliged American companies to reduce their international business. Finally, the economic disruption that accompanied the outbreak of World War I convinced American and British multinationals to withdraw from the Spanish insurance business.

This article analyzes the performance of foreign electric-utility companies and the evolution of the electric-power industry in Argentina from 1890 until the end of the 1950s, when the electric utilities were nationalized. It focuses on the decisions and strategies of the subsidiaries controlled by two holding companies: the Société Financière de Transports et d'Entreprises Industrielles (SOFINA) and the American & Foreign Power Company. The study suggests that the divergence in the performance of these two companies was determined both by their investment patterns and by their financial styles and management decisions. The impact of private decisions and public regulation on the Argentinean electric-power system is also explored.

Door-to-door selling was a key factor behind the particularly rapid interwar diffusion of vacuum cleaners among British households, relative to other “high-ticket” labor-saving appliances. Yet the door-to-door system incurred both high distribution costs and considerable controversy—owing to widespread sharp practice. Employers enticed salesmen through grossly inflated claims regarding earnings, which were in fact insufficient for most salesmen to make an acceptable living. This led many salesmen to engage in their own sharp practices—which eventually brought this form of marketing into disrepute.

Before World War I, most foreign investment in Latin America came from Britain. By World War II, however, the United States had become the main and unchallenged foreign investor in the region. This analysis of the negotiations that took place between the British firm (Pearson and Son) and the Colombian government over oil contracts reveals the reasons for the shift in influence. The company's lack of awareness that Britain had been overtaken by the United States as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere eventually caused the negotiations to collapse. While talks were proceeding, the company failed to consider how much influence the United States had on Colombian internal politics, and it overlooked the history of U.S.–Colombia relations. As a result, Pearson never received oil concessions in Colombia; instead, they were granted to American companies, consolidating U.S. power in the region.

What was Alfred D.Chandler's significance in the study of business history throughout the world? How did his views evolve? Why was his approach so influential? How did his thinking contribute to comparative business history and to the history of international business? This essay is designed to answer these questions.