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Selling Elegant Glassware During the Great Depression: A. H. Heisey & Company and the New Deal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

P. Bradley Nutting
P. Bradley Nutting
Affiliation:
P. BRADLEY NUTTING is professor of history and coordinator of the Liberal Studies Program, at Framingham State College in Framingham, Massachusetts.
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Abstract

The sale of luxury goods during the 1930s represents an incongruous aspect of American business that has been largely ignored by historians. This essay focuses on the efforts of one manufacturer of high-quality, elegant glassware, A. H. Heisey & Company of Newark, Ohio, to survive the Great Depression. Heisey created successful new sales strategies and product designs to meet the changing tastes of its customers. Although difficult to gauge with precision, Heisey's business also benefited from the overlapping influence of several New Deal measures: the Beer–Wine Revenue Act, the National Recovery Act, and the National Housing Act. Paradoxically, Heisey was most hampered by President Roosevelt's adoption of fiscal restraint in 1937, a policy that the company's Republican executives strongly advocated.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 77 , Issue 3 , Autumn 2003 , pp. 447 - 478
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2003

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References

1 For illustrations, see Florence, Gene, Collector's Encyclopedia of Depression Glass, any edition (Paducah, Ky.).Google Scholar Other leading manufactures included Federal, Indiana, and Jeannette Glass. See Venable, Charles et al., China and Glass in America, 1880-1980: From Tabletop to TV Tray (New York, 2000)Google Scholar.

2 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition (Washington, D.C, 1975; Part I, Series G269-282, G798-848)Google Scholar, identified some 30.4 million families and 38.4 million “consumer units” (families and un-attached persons) in the United States in 1935-36. The upper 22.3 percent (8.56 million) earned at least $2,000 per year ($38.46 weekly) and spent upward from $64 annually for household furnishings (almost twice the national average of $36) to an average of $342 for those earning in excess of $15,000. Assuming one adult woman per family and half of the 8 million unattached as female (34.4 million x 0.223) suggests a possible market of some 7.7 million, although the numbers would doubtless be far smaller, since household income does not necessarily correlate with middle-class values. Lyon, Leverett et al., The National Recovery Act: An Analysis and Appraisal (Washington, D.C, 1935Google Scholar), a Brookings Institution study, likewise places the market for consumer durables (defined as goods with a life span of three years or more) in the upper income groups and sees $2,000 as the minimum income for middle-class status (p. 827). Also see Alderson, Wroe, “The Consumer Market and Income Expenditure and Savings,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939 (Philadelphia, 1940), 4–5Google Scholar.

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6 Mike Hoffman, “Moolah Rouge: How Revlon launched a line of “affordable luxuries” in the heart of the Great Depression,” www.Inc.com/articles/marketing. Revson successfully charged fifty cents for a tencent nail polish; for falling yacht orders at Chris Craft, see www.greatlakesboating.com/pasLfeatures; for Oneida's selling silver plates as an alternative to sterling, see www.ywh.com/manufacture/flatware/Oneida.

7 Tobey, Ronald C., Technology as Freedom (Berkeley, Calif., 1996), 4–5Google Scholar; also see Field, Gregory B., “Electricity for All: The Electric Home and Farm Authority and the Politics of Mass Consumption,” Business History Review 64 (Spring 1990): 932–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Tobey and Field deny that the early New Deal was dominated by “economic maturity” thinking and stress growth-oriented policies aimed at the domestic market. Also see King, Tamara, “A New Way of Living: The Electric Home and Farm Authority” (Ph.D. diss., Auburn University, 2000)Google Scholar.

8 Blaszczyk, Imagining Consumers, 142. Heisey's principal competitor was Fostoria Glass of Moundsville, West Virginia; others included Cambridge Glass of Cambridge, Ohio, Duncan & Miller of Washington, Pennsylvania, Fenton Glass of Wheeling, West Virginia, and Imperial Glass of Bellaire, Ohio. Also see Florence, Gene, Elegant Glassware of the Depression Era, 8th ed. (Paducha, Ky., 1999)Google Scholar. In 1932 total sales for the handmade glass sector in 1932 came to $6,719,000; Heisey sales were $852,000, or 12.7 percent of the total; see RG 9.2.5, Box 556, Records of the National Recovery Administration, American Glassware Industry, Textual Records, Transcript of Oral Testimony, 11/3/33, vol. 3, p. 15, National Archives, College Park, Md. For Heisey sales, see Table 1.

9 Felt, Thomas G., A. H. Heisey & Company: A Brief History (Newark, Ohio, 1996), 2–14Google Scholar; Felt, “Heisey in the Trade Journals—No. 300 Peerless,” Heisey News: The Official Publication of the Heisey Collectors of America (Jan. 1989): 6-8.

10 “Interview with Fred Bosworth [Heisey salesman],” Heisey News (July 1997): 14; Stout, Sandra, Heisey on Parade (Lombard, Ill., 1985)Google Scholar, especially ch. 6, “Progression of Advertisements.”

11 Blaszczyk, Imagining Conumers, 29; Davis, Pearce, The Development of the American Glass Industry, Harvard Economic Studies 86 (Cambridge, Mass., 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glover, John G. and Cornell, William B., The Development of American Industries: Their Economic Significance (New York, 1946), 483Google Scholar.

12 Felt, A. H. Heisey, 16-20, 34; Gordon, Colin, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics, 1920-1935 (Cambridge, U.K., 1994), 110–13Google Scholar, underscores the amiable relationship between management and labor in the glass industry; speech by Gillooly, Michael J., 29 June 1936, American Flint 25, no. 5 (Aug. 1936): 17–18.Google ScholarHoeber, Helen S., “Collective Bargaining in the Glass Industry,” Monthly Labor Review 42 (May 1936): 1204–7Google Scholar, considered the labor-management relations in the glassware industry a model of industrial cooperation. Industry-wide contracts were negotiated by fourteen labor-management teams representing sectors as varied as scientific equipment, lamp chimneys, and tableware.

13 Felt, A. H. Heisey, 20-1; “Interview with Fred Bosworth,” Heisey News (Oct. 1997): 12-14. For a laconic, prounion, Wilson Heisey speech, see American Flint 25 no 5 (Aug 1936): 3.

14 Crockery and Glass Journal (Oct. 1933): 11. CGJ, the principal trade publication of the related industries, contains an enormous amount of information on the concerns of the two industries.

15 Stout, Heisey on Parade, 145, 250-3; Mowry, George E., The Urban Nation (New York, 1968), 17, 25Google Scholar.

16 Felt, A. H. Heisey, 23, quoting E. Wilson Heisey.

17 For glassware tariffs, see Alderfer, E. B. and Michl, H. E., Economics of American Industry, 2nd ed. (New York, 1950), 230Google Scholar. Most scholars believe the Smoot-Hawley Act to have been an unmitigated disaster, but Eckes, Alfred E., “Revisiting Smoot-Hawley,” Journal of Policy History 7, no. 3 (1995): 295–310CrossRefGoogle Scholar, sees the tariff as a “molehill, not a mountain” (p. 297). He agrees that it failed to help the domestic economy, but denies the tariff spawned an international trade war. See also Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 10, 299Google Scholar.

18 CGJ (Mar. 1933): 13; “Should Larger Cash Discounts be Granted?” CGJ (Apr. 1931): 15; “Cut Throat Competition the Fault with Department Stores,” CGJ (May 1931): 15; “Manufacturers—Show More Price Courage!” CGJ (July 1932): 11; RG 9.2.5, Box 556 NRA Records, American Glassware Industry, Transcript of Oral Testimony, vol. 3,10-17.

19 “News of the Glass Factories,” CGJ (Sept. 1931): 39; Bredehoft, Neila, Collector's Encyclopedia of Heisey Glass, 1925-1938 (Paducah, Ky., 1986), 11–12, 95-118.Google Scholar

20 “Interview with Fred Bosworth—Part VI,” Heisey News (Apr. 1998): 12-13; “Sales Room Sets a New Mark,” Heisey News (July 1998): 13; “Taste and Distinction Characteristic of Heisey Glass Display,” CGJ (Feb.1931): 67, 70; Trial Balance Ledger, 1932-1936, folios 1-15, Heisey Archives, National Heisey Glass Museum, Newark, Ohio. True profit and loss, as we know from recent corporate history, are not always apparent. Dr. H. Thomas O'Hara, professor of finance, Sawyer School of Management, Suffolk University, Boston, audited the Trial Balance Ledgers and determined that the clearest indicators of the company's performance over time were merchandise sales figures.

21 Leuchtenburg, William E., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 46Google Scholar. For the debate on the Beer Act, see Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933,374-76; “Repeal! How Dining Tables will Grow!” CGJ (Sept. 1933): 16-17; “Glass Promotion Possibilities in Prohibition Repeal,” CGJ (Oct. 1932): 16-17; “What will Repeal do to Glassware?” CGJ (Oct. 1933): 11; “Prosit Equals Profits,” CGJ (Apr. 1933): 15; “Right Out of the Kiln,” CGJ (Apr. 1933): 18; Bredehoft, Collector's Encyclopedia, 10, 271, 224-5, 401, 404.

22 CGJ (Nov. 1933): 23, quoting Clarence Heisey; “Glassware Code is Practically Complete,” CGJ (Dec. 1933): 71; Trial Balance Ledger, 1932-1936, folios 1-15. Also see Table 1.

23 Johnson, Hugh S., The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (Garden City, N.Y., 1935), 88–96, 250-70Google Scholar; Schlesinger, Arthur, Coming of the New Deal (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 87–118Google Scholar; Hawley, Ellis, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton, N.J., 1966), 17–34, 66Google Scholar; Eisner, Mark Allen, “Discovering Patterns in Regulatory History: Continuity, Change and Regulatory Regimes,” Journal of Policy History 6, no. 2 (1994): 157-72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gordon, New Deals, 190. For a copy of the NIRA, see Lyonet al., The National Recovery Act, 889-99.

24 CGJ (Jan. 1932): 19; David Fisk, “We Need a Czar,” CGJ (Apr. 1932): 31; Trial Balance Ledger, 1932—1936, folios 1-15, Heisey Archives; “Potters and Glassmakers Preparing Trade Codes,” CGJ (July 1933): 22; “Glass Makers Discuss Code,” CGJ (Aug. 1933): 14.

25 Writing in October 1936 the CGJ editor observed, “During the dark days of our recent 'depression' [which he assumed was over] china and glassware took on the chin . . . many more and greater blows than most merchandise due to its own character of permanence” (p. 11). See “The NRA: What does it Mean for our Industry?” CGJ (June 1933): 8. Gordon, New Deals, 196, found such behavior typical of many producers who had given up on 1920s-style voluntary controls by trade associations as a means of dealing with competition. Hawley, in The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, likewise believes the great majority of businessmen wanted a “price floor” (p. 111).

26 Hawley, The New Deal, 40-1; RG 9.2.5, Box 556, NRA records, American Glassware Industry, Transcript of Oral Testimony, 11/3/33, vol. 3, 10-17. Aldelfer and Michl, Economics of American Industry, note that Japanese glassware threatened machine-made producers, whereas European imports challenged luxury glassware makers (p. 231).

27 “Code Troubles Disturb Industry,” CGJ (Aug. 1933): 14; “Hearing Due Soon,” CGJ (Sept. 1933): 35; “Glassware Makers at Hearing,” CGJ (Nov. 1933): 36; National Recovery Administration, Code of Fair Competition for the American Glassware Industry as approved on January 16, 1934 (Washington, D.C., 1934), 257–71Google Scholar. The typescript of the industry submission is in RG 9.2.5, Box 556, File 8, NRA Records, Transcripts of Hearings, American Glassware Industry. For 1932 wages in the industry, see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review 37 (Oct. 1933): 918–19Google Scholar.

28 Gordon, New Deals, 196. Most big businesses initially backed the NRA. See Eisner, “Discovering Patterns,” 172; Romasco, Albert U., The Politics of Recovery: Roosevelt's New Deal (New York, 1983), 181, 192, 197–200.Google ScholarGerber, Larry G., “The National Recovery Act in Comparative Perspective: Organized Labor's Role in American an d British Efforts at Industrial Planning,” Journal of Policy History 6, no 4 (1994): 403–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, views the weakness of labor in the United States as critical to understanding the NRA's initial popularity. He sees the greatest business support coming from industries hostile to unions (p. 405). This was decidedly not the case with Heisey or glassware in general. Although only twenty-six codes provided for union representation (p. 425), the AFGWU president served as an advisor to the Glassware Code Authority, CGJ (Oct. 1933): 40.

29 Code of Fair Competition for the Glassware Industry, 270.

30 “Blue Eagle Benefits,” CGJ (Sept. 1933): 11.

31 “Watch Washington,” CGJ (May 1933): 7-8.

32 Stout, Heisey on Parade, 228. The full-page ad first appeared in CGJ (Sept. 1933): 5.

33 Trial Balance Ledger, 1932-1936, folios 8-23.

34 “NRA is Helping Business,” CGJ (July 1934): 21; Lyon et al., National Recovery Act, 820, citing NBER figures.

35 “NRA is Helping Business,” CGJ (July 1934): 21; J. G. Roberts, “History of the Code of Fair Competition for the American Glassware Industry,” typescript (June 1936), 46, RG 9.2.5, NRA Records, Consolidated Box 558, File 27; “The Code is Dead,” CGJ (June 1935): 9.

36 “Ceramic Industry Troubled by New Tariff Bills,” CGJ (Apr. 1934): 38; “Imports are Investigated,” CGJ (June 1934): 9; “Imports Hearing at Tariff Commission,” CGJ (July 1934): 58, 64, CGJ (Nov. 1934): 17, 40. For the low tariff, pro-agriculture origins of RTAA, see Schnietz, Karen E., “The Institutional Foundation of U.S. Trade Policy,” Journal of Policy History 12, no. 4 (2000): 417–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “An Act to Stem Foreign Competition: A Statement by the American Glassware Association,” CGJ (May 1935): 13, 26. For the impact of the tariff, see Alderfer and Michl, Economics of American Industry, 231.

37 For illustrations of the shrinking prominence of the Blue Eagle in Heisey ads, see Stout, Heisey on Parade, 230; CGJ (July 1935): 28, quoting Clarence Heisey.

38 Lyon et al., National Recovery Act, 827.

39 “The Code is Dead,” CGJ (June 1935): 19; “Another Year Passes,” CGJ (Dec. 1935): 28. The editor believed a major problem facing the industry was imports and felt that the NRA had not helped on that score; CGJ (July 1935): 28, quoting Clarence Heisey. Gordon, New Deals, p. 283, traces business opposition to the New Deal and the NRA to four sources: (1) failure of regulatory policies; (2) failure to deal with “the reality and threat of international competition"; (3) regional jealousies; and (4) labor policy. The first two apply to Heisey and the elegant-glassware industry.

40 For an assessment of the act, see Chudacoff, Howard P. and Smith, Judith, The Evolution of American Urban Society, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1988), 236–48Google Scholar; Jackson, Kenneth T., The Crabgrass Frontier (New York, 1985), 190–205Google Scholar.

41 Romasco, Politics of Recovery, 183; Lyon et al., National Recovery Act, 882. Johnson, The Blue Eagle, 197-200, 206-11. There is fairly general agreement that the PWA never lived up to its potential and that Ickes was the wrong ma n to run the agency. See Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 103-10, 208, 284-7; Freidel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), 431Google Scholar; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 70; “The New Deal: An Analysis and Appraisal,” Economist (3 Oct. 1936): 5.

42 Tobey, Technology as Freedom, 92-129. Lyon et al., NRA, 827, held that the NRA reduced the purchasing power of the upper-income quartile because they had no wage increases. For rural values and concepts of luxury, see Tamara King's introduction to her dissertation, “A New Way of Living: The Electric Home and Farm Authority,” which suggests that public power and subsidized appliances, in addition to meeting the highly practical needs of eliminating “drudgery and darkness,” also signified “equality with city folks” and entry into the “modern age.”

43 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 12566 (Rep. Luce), 12566

44 Ibid., 11193 (Rep. Caviccia).

45 Floor discussion of the bill was extensive; see Ibid., 11191-12208, 11872-5, 12564-7. For the statute, see Ibid., 1246-65, ch. 847. For mortgage policies before the FHA, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 202-3

46 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 11981 (Barkley); 11916 (Celler); 11193 (Cavicchia).

47 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 134-5, considers Moffatt a “strange appointment” and does not believe the FHA began to realize its potential until statutory revision in 1938 permitted a 10 percent down payment. He is perhaps overly critical of both Moffatt and the agency. Ickes, Harold, Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, vol. 1 (New York, 1954), 234Google Scholar, entry for 24 Nov. 1934; Hays, R. Allen, The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Ideology and Change in Public Policy (Albany, N.Y., 1985), 79–89Google Scholar.

48 “Better Housing News Flashes,” RG 31. 1-9 Film Collections, National Archives, College Park, Md.

49 RG 31.1-14, Audio Recordings, National Archives, College Park, Md. The recordings were produced on 16-inch acetate discs for distribution to stations; Housing: Government Housing in the United States 1 (Apr. 1935): 13-18; G. K. Gilchrist, “Selling Modernization to the People,” in Housing 1 (Apr. 1935), 156-62 (Gilchrist was Moffatt's assistant); Chudacoff and Smith, Urban Society, 245.

50 Meikle, Jeffery L., Twentieth Century Limited: Industrial Design in America, 1925-1939 (Philadelphia, 1979), 164–5Google Scholar.

51 McDonald, Stewart, “The Federal Housing Administration Work in 1935,” Housing Officials' Yearbook 1936 (Chicago, 1936), 10–18Google Scholar; “A Governmental Stimulus,” CGJ (Sept. 1934): 12. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 66, argues that modernization was an “an outstanding success” while new housing moved “sluggishly.” Charles and Mary Beard, ignoring all evidence to the contrary, saw the National Housing Act as a complete sham, “little used by its supposed beneficiaries.” American in Midpassage (New York, 1939), 246Google Scholar.

52 Robert, S. and Lynd, Helen M., Middletown in Transition (New York, 1937), 535, 551Google Scholar; Historical Statistics of the United States, 640, N156-169; “Better Housing News Flashes,” RG 31.1, Films, National Archives, College Park, Md.

53 “October's Merchandising Calendar,” CGJ (Aug. 1935): 35. The editor added that, as his readers well knew, “October marks the beginning of the real business in china and glass, being the third biggest month of the year.” This was in anticipation of the Christmas “rush.”

54 Trial Balance Ledger, 1932-36, folios 8-31, Heisey Archives; “Opportunity for House-wares,” New York Times, 26 July 1936, sec. 3, p. 8. Also see CGJ (Dec. 1935): 27, 38, forecasting sales trends.

55 CGJ (Dec. 1935): 32, quoting Clarence Heisey. Gordon, New Deals, could have been describing Heisey when he wrote: “Those whom the New Deal disappointed suddenly saw federal power as a threat rather than a solution; those whom the New Deal helped were inclined to take the credit themselves and see politics as a costly obstacle to further growth and prosperity” (p. 281).

56 Clarence Heisey to J. W. Millholland, 30 Dec. 1935, T. Clarence Heisey [TCH] Correspondence, CORR #1,1933-36, File M, Heisey Archives; CGJ (Dec. 1936): 31.

57 Ibid.

58 CGJ (July 1936): 25, quoting Ray J. Gale, home-furnishing manager, Burdine's, in Miami, Fla.

59 Duncan, Alistair, Art Deco (London, 1991), 7–8, 69, 78Google Scholar; Weber, Eva, American Art Deco (New York, 1992), 43, 91Google Scholar; Kim Sichel, “Walter von Nessen: Early Post Modernist,” Industrial Design (May-June 1984): 38-41.

60 Bredehoft, Collector's Encyclopedia, 148-55. Bredehoft reproduces original catalog illustrations of the Stanhope line. For photographs showing colored knobs, see Florence, Elegant Glassware, 192-3. Incredibly he states that the knobs are “wooden,” which misses the point. Blaszczyk, Imagining Consumers, 12, 275-6.

61 Nock to Clarence Heisey, 2 Mar. 1936, TCH Correspondence, CORR #1, 1933-36, Heisey Archives, File N; Heisey to Nock, 5 Mar. 1936, Ibid.; Nock's letter includes a full-page ad of Chase chromeware showing Von Nessen's use of bakelite from the March 1936 issue of Fortune; Heisey to Von Nessen, 6 Mar. 1936, Ibid., File V; Heisey to B. C. Nebo, 6 Aug. 1936, Ibid., File N.

62 Nock to Heisey, 14 Apr. 1936 and 18 Apr. 1936, TCH Correspondence, CORR#1, File N; The Monogram (GE monthly in-house magazine) (Oct. 1936): 15; for a picture of the percolator, see “GE Coffee Maker, Dorchester, 5-7-37,” General Electric Photograph Collection, photo #555963, Schenectady Museum Archives, Schenectady, N.Y. In 1934 Heisey had sold unmarked Russian coffee glass from a discontinued line with the same percolator; see Heisey News (Aug. 2001): 19.

63 Clarence Heisey to Von Nessen, 6 Mar. 1936, TCH Correspondence, CORR#1, File V; J. S. Berthold (Plastic Molding Co.) to Von Nessen, 19 Mar. 1936, Ibid.; Nock to Clarence Heisey, 1 May 1936, Ibid., File N; Heisey to Nock, 8 May 1936, Ibid.; Nock to Heisey, 9 May 1936, Ibid.; Heisey to Nock, 8 May 1936, Ibid.; Nock to Heisey, 9 May 1936, Ibid. The cost of “moulds for th e plastic knobs” is in Trial Balance Ledger, 1932-1936, folio 32, Heisey Archives. The retail cost of the ensemble, including the coffeepot, heater, pressed wood tray, folding tray table, and the Stanhope luncheon set, was a pricey $23.95. The pieces could be bought separately. See Monogram (Oct. 1936): 15.

64 CGJ (June 1936): 13; CGJ (July 1936): 29; New York Times, 19 July 1936, sec. 3, p. 8; 21 July 1936, 24; 22 July 1936, 36; 26 July 1936, 8; China, Glass and Lamps (Aug. 1936): 17. Clarence Heisey to Richard Heather, 25 July 1936, TCH Correspondence, CORR#1, File H.

65 New York Times, 24 July 1936, 1, 5, 11.

66 The podium is in the possession of the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kans. Theodore Rosenof, Dogma, Depression, and the New Deal (Port Washington, N.Y., 1975), 34-39, labels Landon's argument an expression of the “confidence thesis,” the central conservative critique of the New Deal.

67 Ream, Lois W., Bredehoft, Neila, and Bredehoft, Thomas, Encyclopedia of Heisey Glassware: Etchings and Carvings, 2nd ed. (Newark, Ohio, 1994), 244Google Scholar, etch pattern 9036. Wilson headed the original pre-convention Landon Club of Ohio, Newark Advocate, 16 Sept. 1936, 1.

68 American Flint 25, no. 7 (Oct. 1936): 45; “Business Upswing to Hold,” New York Times, 26 July 1936, sec. 3, p. 8.

69 Modern Plastics (Nov. 1936): 23, 27; Trial Balance Ledger, 1932-36, Folios 24-40; Clarence Heisey to B.C. Nebo, 8 Aug. 1936, TCH Correspondence, CORR#1, File N; Heisey to Von Nessen, 19 June 1936, Ibid., File V; “Message to Millions,” CGJ (Apr. 1937): 37. Also see Joseph D. Lokay, “Heisey Ads,” Heisey News (Mar. 1978): 10-11; “Admire the Cigar,” CGJ (July 1937): 10.

70 CGJ (Feb. 1937): 11, 20; American Flint 25, no. 12 (Mar. 1937): 45; “What's Washington Up To?” CGJ (Apr. 1937): 29, 33; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 244; Kennedy, David M., Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York, 1999), 355Google Scholar; Time, 7 Feb. 1938, 51-2.

71 “Depression is Over,” CGJ (Oct. 1936): 34; “Advances are Approaching Levels where Customers May Refuse to Buy,” CGJ (Apr. 1937): 18; Time, 7 Feb. 1938,51-2; Historical Statistics of the United States, 135, Series D 85-86, 650, Series N 291-300; Monthly Labor Re-port 46 (Dec. 1938): 244, 1262; Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 493; Roose, Kenneth, “The Recession of 1937,” Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948): 241CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 American Flint 26, no. 8 (Nov. 1937): 53; Ibid. 26, no. 10 (Jan. 1938): 40; Ibid. 26, no. 11 (Feb. 1938): 11. Figures derived from Trial Balance Ledger, 1937-41, folios 1-17, Heisey Archives; Heisey Price Catalog, 1937-38, 132, Heisey Archives; also see Table 1. Bredehoft, Collector's Encyclopedia, 148, believes some of the pressed pieces were made as late as 1941. If so, these were almost certainly the luncheon sets rumored to have been given away with GE refrigerators. These are the only Stanhope pieces readily available to collectors.

73 “Nothing over 51 cents,” Creative Design (Mar. 1937): 35; Heisey Price Catalog, 1937-38, 132, Heisey Archives; also see the price lists in Harold E. Willey, Heisey's Cut Handmade Glassware (private printing, 1974), 56-67.

74 Jones, Jim and Sparacio, Vince, Heisey's Classic “Ridgeleigh” Glassware (Newark, Ohio, 1987), 4, 21, 24Google Scholar; for Ridgeleigh illustrations, see Bredehoft, Collector's Encyclopedia, 124-48.

75 Clarence Heisey to Nock, 18 Apr. 1936, TCH correspondence, CORR#1, File N; Professor Don Valdes, former archivist at the National Heisey Glass Museum, remembers Stanhope as having been sold with a GE Toastmaster” in his father's hardware store; Wasson, “How Predictable are Fashion and other Product Life Cycles,” 268-71

76 Felt, A. H. Heisey, 48-9; CGJ (July 1935), 37, quoting Earl Newton, president of Imperial Glass Company, an elegant-glassware firm. He advocated a tax on labor-saving machinery of the mass producers. Surviving companies include Anchor Hocking and Federal Glass.