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Improving Workplace Safety in the Ontario Manufacturing Industry, 1914–1939

  • Javier Silvestre (a1)

Abstract

The safety of workers and the costs to employers and the economy as a whole became a serious problem in industrializing nations. Workplace safety in the Ontario manufacturing industry deteriorated at the end of the nineteenth century. In response, the province legislated to regulate safety standards and factory inspection. However, this strategy failed to reduce accident rates. As in the United States, it was the enactment of workers' compensation legislation that generated the economic incentives for Ontario's employers to invest in safety. Yet in contrast to the United States, where safety was predominantly organized inside firms, employers in Ontario developed a comprehensive institutional framework to organize a range of safety actions.

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1 North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, U.K., 1990), 61–69.

2 U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor: Workmen's Insurance and Compensation Systems in Europe, 1909, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1911), 5, 94, and 1150 ; Rubinow, Max, Social Insurance with Special Reference to American Conditions (New York, 1913) ; Bartrip, Peter W. and Burman, Sandra B., The Wounded Soldiers of Industry: Industrial Compensation Policy, 1833–1897 (Oxford, 1983), ch. 1 ; Lewchuk, Wayne, “Industrialization and Occupational Mortality in France prior to 1914,” Explorations in Economic History 28 (July 1991): 344–66 ; Aldrich, Mark, Safety First: Technology, Labor, and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870–1939 (Baltimore, 1997) ; Fishback, Price V. and Kantor, Shawn E., A Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers' Compensation (Chicago, 2000) ; Murray, John E. and Nilsson, Lars, “Accident Risk Compensation in Late Imperial Austria: Wage Differentials and Social Insurance,” Explorations in Economic History 44 (July 2007): 568–87 ; Silvestre, Javier, “Workplace Accidents and Early Safety Policies in Spain, 1900–1932,” Social History of Medicine (Mar. 2008): 67–86.

3 Eastman, Crystal, Work Accidents and the Law (Philadelphia, 1910), 4.

4 “Direct” costs refer to liability claims and medical aid. Reproduced in Dominion Department of Labour's Labour Gazette (Sept. 1931), 995–96. See, among others, the exhaustive ILO Report on Prevention of Industrial Accidents (Geneva, 1919). 6Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 246. See also Bartrip and Burman, The Wounded Soldiers; Hepple, Bob, “Welfare Legislation and Wage-Labour,” in The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine Countries Up to 1945, ed. Hepple, Bob (London, 1986), 114–53 ; Aldrich, Safety First; Fishback and Kantor, A Prelude; and Witt, John F., The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law (Cambridge, Mass., 2004).

7 International Labour Organization, Factory Inspection: Historical Development and Present Organisation in Certain Countries (Geneva, 1923).

8 See the articles by Doctor Friedrich Ritzmann, the chief of the Safety Service of the ILO, included in the journals Industrial Safety Survey and International Labour Review between 1926 and 1934. See also Bartrip, Peter W. J. and Fenn, Paul T., “Factory Fatalities and Regulation in Britain, 1878–1913,” Explorations in Economic History 25 (Jan. 1988): 60–74 ; Jones, Helen, “An Inspector Calls: Health and Safety at Work in Inter-War Britain,” in The Social History of Occupational Health, ed. Weindling, Peter (London, 1985), 223–39 ; Fishback, Price V., “The Irony of Reform: Did Large Employers Subvert Workplace Safety Reform, 1869 to 1930?” NBER Working Paper, 2005 ; Aldrich, Safety First; and Silvestre, “Workplace Accidents.”

9 Aldrich, Safety First. See also Fishback and Kantor, A Prelude, and the works cited therein.

10 Aldrich, Safety First.

11 Aldrich, Mark, “Regulating Transportation of Hazardous Substances: Railroads and Reform, 1883–1930,” Business History Review 76 (Summer 2002): 267–97.

12 For the theoretical model, See Stigler, George J., “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971): 3–21. Mark Aldrich reviews a number of case studies analyzed by business and economic historians in “Regulating Transportation,” 268. See also Cox, Mark, “Innovation on Trial: British Columbia Fruit Growers and the Rise and Retreat of Regulation, 1923–1931,” in Canadian Papers in Business History, vol. 2, ed. Baskerville, Peter A. (Victoria, B.C., 1993), 125–46.

13 In the field of workplace health and safety, See Stern, Marc J., “Industrial Structure and Occupational Health: The American Pottery Industry, 1897–1929,” Business History Review 77 (Autumn 2003): 417–45; andEsbester, Michael, “‘No Good Reason for the Government to Interfere’: Business, the State and Railway Employee Safety in Britain, c.1900–39,” Business and Economic History On-Line 4 (2006).

14 Seftel, Howard, “Government Regulation and the Rise of the California Fruit Industry: The Entrepreneurial Attack on Fruit Pests, 1880–1920,” Business History Review 59 (Autumn 1985): 369–402 ; Law, Marc T., “The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation,” Journal of Economic History 63 (Dec. 2003): 1103–30.

15 Williamson, Oliver E., “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (Apr. 1999): 306–47, esp. 320 and The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of Economic Literature 38 (Sept. 2000): 595–613, esp. 602–3.

16 Langlois, Richard N., “Chandler in a Larger Frame: Markets, Transaction Costs, and Organizational Form in History,” Business and Economic History On-Line 1 (2003), 8–9 and The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,” Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (Apr. 2003): 351–85, esp. 368–69.

17 Scholz, John T., “Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory,” Law and Contemporary Problems 60 (Summer 1997): 253–68 ; Scholz, John T. and Gray, Wayne B., “Can Government Facilitate Cooperation? An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (July 1997): 693–717.

18 Piva, Michael J., The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto (Ottawa, 1979), 16 ; Campbell, Elizabeth J., “The Balance Wheel of the Industrial System: Maximum Hours, Minimum Wage, and Workmen's Compensation Legislation in Ontario, 1900–1939,” PhD diss., McMaster University, 1980, 199 ; McCallum, Margaret E., “Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919–1939,” Canadian Historical Review 71 (Mar. 1990): 46–79 ; Naylor, James, The New Democracy: Challenging the Social Order in Industrial Ontario, 1914–1925 (Toronto, 1991), 165–75 ; Grant, Hugh M., “Solving the Labour Problem at Imperial Oil: Welfare Capitalism in the Canadian Petroleum Industry, 1919–1929,” Labour/Le Travail 41 (Spring 1998): 69–95.

19 Mining and construction are not included. Data come from rearrangements of census data by Drummond, Ian M., George, Peter, Inwood, Kris, Sinclair, Peter W., and Traves, Tom, Progress without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario from Confederation to the Second World War (Toronto, 1987), 362–64. See also Taylor, Graham D. and Baskerville, Peter A., A Concise History of Business in Canada (Toronto, 1994), 317–19 and 244.

20 McCalla, Douglas, “The Ontario Economy in the Long Run,” Ontario History 90 (Autumn 1998): 97–115, esp. 99.

21 Statutes of the Province of Ontario, The Ontario Factories' Act, 1884 (Toronto, 1884), ch. 39, 146–61, esp. 153 ; Statutes of the Province of Ontario, The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889 (Toronto, 1889), ch. 43, 155–61 and 160–61. The size of factories subject to inspection was reduced from twenty to five employees in 1889. Work in agriculture, lumbering, mining, the building trades and construction of railways and canals was excluded.

22 Non-fatal accidents are usually more affected by changes in inspection and reporting efforts, as well as “moral hazard” problems. In fact, the non-fatal accident rate (not shown here) tripled after the Workmen's Compensation Act entered the statute book in 1914. Another more reliable source on non-fatal accidents is utilized below.

23 Annual Report of the Inspectors of Factories (hereafter ARIF), 1899, 6 ; ARIF 1901, 6; ARIF 1903, 5 and 27; ARIF 1904, 13–14; ARIF 1905, 31; ARIF 1910, 6. Michael Piva and Eric Tucker minimize the impact of improvements in reporting on accidents recorded from 1900 onwards; Piva, Michael J., “The Workmen's Compensation Movement in Ontario,” Ontario History 67 (Mar. 1975): 39–56, esp. 39–41, andTucker, Eric, Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850–1914 (Toronto, 1990), 181. See also ARIF 1917, 63.

24 Output data in this section are based on census data for 1890, 1900, and 1910, and include rearrangements by Drummond et al., Progress without Planning, 353–59 and 393, as well as previous adjustments by Gordon Bertram. Output has been deflated using the general wholesale index for fully and chiefly manufactured materials included in Leacy, Frank H. and Urquhart, Malcolm C., eds., Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto, 1983), K44.

25 ARIF 1900, 6; , Naylor, The New Democracy, 168–69 ; , Tucker, Administering Danger, 186–87.

26 , Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 42–43 ; , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 189 ; Risk, Richard C. B., “‘This Nuisance of Litigation’: The Origins of Workers' Compensation in Ontario,” in Essays in the History of Canadian Law, ed. Flaherty, David H. (Toronto, 1983), 424–25 and 432.

27 , Tucker, Administering Danger, 49.

28 , Risk, “‘This Nuisance of Litigation,’” 450–52 ; , Tucker, Administering Danger, 39–40.

29 The Ontario Factories' Act, 1884, 146–61. See a detailed list of amendments to 1914 in , Tucker, Administering Danger, 223–27.

30 , Tucker, Administering Danger, 154 and 197 ; , Devine, Industrial Safety Legislation in Ontario: The History of an Act and its Administration (Toronto, 1975), 15, 20, and 30.

31 , Tucker, Administering Danger, 145–55 and 199 ; ARIF 1897, 7; ARIF 1890, 12.

32 ARIF 1919, 63. There is no systematic, disaggregated record of prosecutions. The number of prosecutions for breaches of all labor laws, including safety, child labor, and hours of work, remained very low and irregular.

33 Tucker, Eric, “The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety Standards in Ontario, 1860–1982: From the Market to Politics to …?McGill Law Journal 29 (Mar. 1984): 260–311, esp. 284–85.

34 , Tucker, Administering Danger, 155, 162, and 167.

35 ARIF 1914, 7; ARIF 1915, 7. The same argument for the whole of Canada is utilized in Sessional Papers, Report of the Department of Labour, 1916 (Ottawa, 1917), number 36, 94. It is also possible that confusion following the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1914 contributed to the sharp fall in 1915. See , Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 41.

36 ARIF 1916, 12.

37 Extraordinary events occurring in 1923 and 1929 contributed to the peaks in those years. In 1923, nine workers were killed by gas fumes in a single accident. See ARIF 1923, 48–49. The number of fatalities due to “falling substances” and “falls” was unusually high in 1929. See ARIF, various years.

38 The annual compound rates of growth in output per worker in manufacturing for 1918–1922 and 1929–1933 were -2.4 and -12.3 respectively. Statistics on output and gainful workers are from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, various years (Ottawa) ; and , Drummond et al. , Progress without Planning, 362–64. For de-fl ation, see note 24.

39 Data refer to compensated cases in “Schedule I,” which is explained below. Schedule I also includes lumbering, mining, and construction, but the source reports rates as a whole. I have estimated annual fatality rates between 1911 and 1939 for these three industries based on information published in the Labour Gazette (hereafter LG). Interestingly, fatality rates in lumbering, where the employers' safety association was created in 1915, displayed a downward trend in the 1920s and the 1930s. Fatality rates in mining and construction, with no safety associations until 1929 and 1930 respectively, present an upward trend.

40 I follow the methods proposed by Aldrich, Safety First. According to available data, first, I have estimated the average fatality rate in 1941 if the industry mix in manufacturing had been the same as in 1921. I have also estimated hours of work for skilled and unskilled workers (between 1911 and 1939, and between 1901 and 1939, respectively). Finally, I have gathered data on the number of electric power and light installations, which are utilized as a proxy for the extent of electrifi cation, as well as information on industrial medicine. Estimates, statistical analyses and sources, not shown here, are available upon request.

41 Reproduced in LG (Mar. 1929): 298.

42 The process of adopting workers' compensation in Ontario is analyzed by , Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 43–47 ; , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 186–92 ; , Risk, “‘This Nuisance of Litigation,’” 453–62 ; Gordon, Margaret S., “Industrial Injuries Insurance in Europe and the British Commonwealth before World War II,” in Occupational Disability and Public Policy, ed. Cheit, Earl F. and Gordon, Margaret S. (New York, 1963), 191–220, esp. 207 ; and Fudge, Judy and Tucker, Eric, “Pluralism or Fragmentation? The Twentieth-Century Employment Law Regime in Canada,” Labour/Le Travail 46 (Autumn 2000): 251–306, esp. 260.

43 For Britain, see Bartrip and Burman, The Wounded Soldiers. For the U.S., see Fishback and Kantor, A Prelude. For Quebec, See Copp, Terry, The Anatomy of Poverty: The Condition of the Working Class in Montreal, 1897–1929 (Toronto, 1974), 125; andStritch, Andrew, “Power Resources, Institutions and Policy Learning: The Origins of Workers' Compensation in Quebec,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 38 (Autumn 2005): 549–79.

44 Sir Meredith, William R., Final Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers to Make Compensation to Their Employees for Injuries Received in the Course of Their Employment Which Are in Force in Other Countries, and as to How Far Such Laws are Found to Work Satisfactorily (Toronto, 1913), 14–15 and 18 ; Clark, Samuel D., The Canadian Manufacturers Association: A Study in Collective Bargaining and Political Pressure (Toronto, 1939), 33–34.

45 , Fudge and , Tucker, “Pluralism or Fragmentation?” 260. Several amendments were made between the first act and 1939, but basic features such as exclusions (agricultural and domestic employment as well as casual workers and home-based work) remained.

46 Similar exclusions prevailed in other countries at this time, as reported by Gordon, “Industrial Injuries.”

47 LG (Aug. 1920): 1017–19.

48 In 1939, the employee or (usually) the employer could opt to accept the compensation law in thirty-four U.S. states. See , Fishback and , Kantor, A Prelude, 103–4; andU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Comparison of Workmen's Compensation Law of the United States as of January 1, 1925 (Washington, D.C., 1925), 2.

49 Some industries, however, were permitted self-insurance. This is explained below. In the U.S., seven states had exclusive state funds, eleven had competitive state funds, and the rest had a private system. Self-insurance was often allowed under certain conditions. See , Fishback and , Kantor, A Prelude, 103–4.

50 Hookstadt, Carl, “Comparison of Canadian Workmen's Compensation Laws,” Monthly Labor Review 10 (Mar. 1920): 765–74, 766 ; LG (Apr. 1930): 397–99 ; Department of Labour of Canada, Workmen's Compensation in Canada: A Comparison of Provincial Laws (Ottawa, 1944).

51 Appeals to courts were allowed in U.S. states. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Comparison of Workmen's Compensation Law, 13 ; and LG (Apr. 1930): 399.

52 LG (Aug. 1920): 1016–17; ILO, Factory Inspection, 258–60 ; Department of Labour of Canada, Workmen's Compensation in Canada, 18–19.

53 Workmen's Compensation Board, The Workmen's Compensation Act (Toronto, 1914), 33. This mirrored the German model, as did other key features of the system. Meredith took his inspiration in writing the Ontario Workers' Compensation Act from his thorough study of existing laws in Europe and some U.S. states, especially Washington. See U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, 1039–42 ; , Hookstadt, “Comparison of Canadian Workmen's Compensation,” 171 ; and Department of Labour of Canada, Workmen's Compensation in Canada: Legislation Branch (Ottawa, 1969).

54 ILO, Factory Inspection, 258–60.

55 The industries included in Schedule I formed the collective fund. Schedule II included national, provincial, and municipal corporations, as well as telephone and telegraph companies, steam and street railways, and navigation companies. These industries were individually liable.

56 LG/i(June 1925): 582 ; LG (Oct. 1933): 975.

57 Sir Meredith, William R., Interim Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers to Make Compensation to Their Employees for Injuries Received in the Course of Their Employment Which Are in Force in Other Countries, Brief submitted by Canadian Manufacturers Association (Toronto, 1912), 54.

58 , Morley, “Accident Prevention,” 286.

59 , Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 46; , Risk, “‘This Nuisance of Litigation,’ ” 461–62.

60 See, for example, LG (June 1925): 585 ; and Ceramics and Stone Safety Association (hereafter SA), Report of the Annual General Meeting (hereafter RAGM) (Toronto, 1926), 6.

61 Workmen's Compensation Board, Annual Reports, 1915–1939 (Toronto, 19161940) ; Workmen's Compensation Board, The Workmen's Compensation Act with Amendments to 1920 (Toronto, 1920), 7–9 ; Workmen's Compensation Board, The Workmen's Compensation Act with Amendments to 1942 (Toronto, 1942), 7–8.

62 LG (Aug. 1920): 1017–18 and 1918–19.

63 Compensation in many U.S. states, meanwhile, was limited to between 150 and 400 weeks. Waiting periods for temporary disabilities were usually longer in U.S. states than in Ontario. See LG (Aug. 1920): 1012–20 ; LG (Apr. 1930): 399 ; , Hookstadt, “Comparison of Canadian Workmen's Compensation,” 173 ; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Comparison of Workmen's Compensation, 7–12 ; Workmen's Compensation Board, The Workmen's Compensation Act with Amendments to 1932 (Toronto 1932), 8 ; Dawson, Miles M., “Ontario Procedure in Settlement of Workmen's Compensation Claims,” Monthly Labor Review 42 (Jan. 1936): 1–9, esp. 3-4; and, Fishback and , Kantor, A Prelude, 208–17.

64 Reproduced in LG (Aug. 1922): 844. See also Logan, Harold A., Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning (Toronto, 1948), 402 ; , Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 55 ; , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 311–14 ; and LG (Oct. 1918): 888.

65 , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 320–21 ; Workmen's Compensation Board, Ontario, Annual Report, 1918 (hereafter ARWCB), 63 ; ARWCB 1927, 8–9; LG (June 1928): [599–600.

66 ARWCB 1916, 7.

67 Workmen's Compensation Board, Table of Rates, various years (Toronto).

68 Workmen's Compensation Board, Table of Rates, 1921 (Toronto, 1921), 6.

69 Workmen's Compensation Board, Annual Reports, 1921–1939 (Toronto, 19221940).

70 See also ARWCB 1926, reproduced in the LG (June 1927): 636 ; and ARWCB 1927, 27.

71 ARWCB 1915, 29; ARWCB 1919, 3; ARWCB 1930, 29.

72 I have estimated an equation, available upon request, relating the natural logarithm of the rate of assessment on a constant and a time trend.

73 , Morley, “Accident Prevention,” 286.

74 Joint Safety Convention, Discussion to the Ontario's Accident Prevention Problem (Toronto, 1922), 10.

75 See for example LG (March 1922): 263 ; Furniture Manufacturers SA, RAGM 1923, 2; Food and Tobacco Products SA, RAGM 1926, 4 and 8; Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1921, RAGM 1928, 8; Chemical Industries SA, RAGM 1932, 2; Printing Trades SA, RAGM 1933, 2; Joint Safety Convention, Discussion to the Solution of the Accident Problem from the Engineering Standpoint (Toronto, 1922), 15 ; and Joint Safety Convention, The Solution of the Accident Problem by the Educational Method (Toronto, 1922).

76 ILO, Factory Inspection, 259 ; LG (Oct. 1933): 975 ; , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 324.

77 , Morley, “Accident Prevention,” 287 ; LG (Oct. 1933): 974 ; Joint Safety Convention, Ontario's Accident Prevention Problem (Toronto, 1922), 9 ; ARWCB 1927, 6–7; ILO, Factory Inspection, 259; ARWCB 1933, reproduced in the LG (May 1934): 429 ; , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 324.

78 Industrial Canada (Jan. 1907): 506 ; , Meredith, Interim Report, Minutes of Evidence, 10.

79 Joint Safety Convention, Discussion to the Solution of the Accident Problem, 15 ; LG (June 1925): 591 ; IAPA, Report of the Safety Convention and Annual General Meeting (hereafter RSCAGM) 1927, reproduced in the LG (June 1927): 640. See also Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1921, 8, and RAGM 1927, 19.

80 Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1921, 8. See also , Meredith, Interim Report, Minutes of Evidence, 163 ; IAPA, RSCAGM 1931, 21; and Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1927, 19.

81 Dawson, “Ontario Procedure.” See also , Gordon, “Industrial Injuries,” 208; and, Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 54.

82 LG (June 1927): 639. See also ARWCB 1926, reproduced in the LG (June 1927): 636; and ARWCB 1927, 27. An additional problem was the increase in medical costs. The Associations recognized that accident prevention was the priority rather than accident follow-up. See Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1921, 5; Textile Manufacturers SA, RAGM 1928, 4; and Printing Trades SA, RAGM 1933, 5.

83 Reproduced in LG (June 1925): 587 ; and LG (Oct. 1933): 974.

84 Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1921, 6; Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1928, 15; Textile Manufacturers SA, RAGM 1923, 5; Printing Trades SA, RAGM 1932, 2; LG (June 1925): 586–89.

85 ARIF 1922, 83–88; Joint Safety Convention, Ontario's Accident Prevention Problem, 3–4 and 13 ; IAPA, RSCAGM 1931, 24–26; LG (Mar. 1929): 298 and 1301; , Campbell, “The Balance Wheel,” 322 ; , McCallum, “Corporate Welfarism,” 66 ; , Naylor, The New Democracy, 167.

86 ILO, Factory Inspection, 258 ; LG (Oct. 1933): 975. The new inspectorate supplemented rather than substituted for provincial inspection. Provincial inspectors remained in charge of the enforcement of the Factories' Act, which was expanded with the enactment of the Factory, Shop and Office Building Act in 1913.

87 , Morley, “Accident Prevention,” 287. Information on the number of inspectors and inspections, not available annually, is taken from: ARWCB, 1920–1928; IAPA, RSCAGM 1923, 11; LG (June 1925): 582 ; LG (May 1940): 413 ; and , Morley, “Accident Prevention,” 287–88.

88 ILO, Factory Inspection, 253 and 258. See also Morley, “Accident Prevention”; and IAPA, RSCAGM 1931, 29–30.

89 For 1928, see Ceramics and Stone SA, RAGM 1928, 5; Leather, Rubber and Tanners SA, RAGM 1928, 5; Metal Trades SA, RAGM, 9; Packers SA, RAGM 1928, 7; Printing Trades SA, RAGM 1928, 6; and Textile Manufacturers SA, RAGM 1928, 5.

90 LG (June 1928): 600 ; LG (Oct. 1918): 888.

91 IAPA, RSCAGM 1923, 11; , Morley, “Accident Prevention,” 287 ; LG (Apr. 1926): 362. See also Furniture Manufacturers SA, RAGM 1923, 5; Implement and Vehicle Manufacturers SA, RGAM 1923, 6; Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1924, 7; Woodworkers SA, RAGM 1924, 6; Ceramics and Stone SA, RAGM 1928, 5; Printing Trades SA, RAGM 1928, 5–6; and Textile Manufacturers SA, RAGM 1928, 4.

92 For the Algoma Steel Corporation, see Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1933, 2.

93 LG (Nov. 1918): 1028 ; LG (Dec. 1925): 1190.

94 Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1921, 21; Food and Tobacco SA, RAGM 1926, 9–10; Joint Safety Convention, The Solution of the Accident Problem, 5–6 ; Metal Trades SA, RAGM 1927, 12; Printing Trades SA, RAGM 1933, 2; LG (May 1921): 650 ; LG (June 1927): 639 ; LG (June 1928): 610 ; LG (Apr. 1934): 323.

95 Canadian Congress Journal 4 (June 1925), 25 ; Canadian Congress Journal 6 (Sept. 1927): 15–16 ; Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Summary of the Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Convention, reproduced in LG (Oct. 1926): 964 ; , Dawson, “Ontario Procedure,” 9 ; , Logan, Trade Unions, 503.

96 I have not found evidence of any strong opposition by workers to the introduction of new safety procedures. We should not, however, dismiss the existence of antagonism. As shown by Aldrich, Safety First, with regard to the U.S. case, initial resistance was common because new safety procedures were often imposed from above. See also Esbester, Michael, “Organizing Work: Company Magazines and the Discipline of Safety,” Management and Organizational History 3 (Aug. 2008): 217–37; andTaksa, Lucy, “Intended or Unintended Consequences? A Critical Reappraisal of the Safety First Movement and its Non-Union Safety Committees,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 30 (Feb. 2009): 9–36.

97 For Canada as a whole, See Jamieson, Stuart, Industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto, 1973), 18–19 ; Huberman, Michael and Young, Denise, “Hope against Hope: Strike Activity in Canada, 1920–1939,” Explorations in Economic History 39 (July 2002): 315–54, and the works cited therein. For Ontario, see Tucker, “The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety”; Palmer, Bryan, “Taking It: Ontario's Workers Struggle,” in Lectures in Canadian Labour and Working Class History, ed. Cherwinski, W. J. C. and Kealey, Gregory S. (St. Johns, Newfoundland, 1985), 183–98; and, Douglas, Cruikshank and Kealey, Gregory S., “Strikes in Canada, 1891–1950,” Labour/Le Travail 20 (Fall 1987): 85–145.

98 , McCallum, “Corporate Welfarism,” 73.

99 , Tucker, “The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety,” 285.

100 , Tucker, Administering Danger, 208 ; , Piva, “The Workmen's Compensation,” 56.

101 Department of Labour of Canada, Workmen's Compensation in Canada, 3 ; , Gordon, “Industrial Injuries,” 208.

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Improving Workplace Safety in the Ontario Manufacturing Industry, 1914–1939

  • Javier Silvestre (a1)

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