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Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
Extract
Irving Janis's work on groupthink has attracted considerable attention from those who seek to explain foreign-policy decision making. The basic argument – that excessive esprit de corps and amiability restrict the critical faculties of small decision-making groups, thereby leading to foreign-policy fiascos – is both an appealing and a stimulating one. In addition, it is also an argument that is capable of being tested against empirical evidence. Thus, Frank Heller has suggested that groupthink may be very useful in explaining British policy during the Falklands Crisis. The purpose of this note is to indicate the utility of the notion of groupthink in explaining one recent foreign-policy fiasco, the attempt by the United States to rescue its hostages in Tehran.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985
References
1 For a critique of Janis's work on groupthink see Longley, J. and Pruitt, D., ‘Groupthink: a Critique of Janis's Theory’, Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 1 (1980), 74–93.Google Scholar
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