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The British Academy Brian Barry Prize Essay: An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics

  • William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder and Sona N. Golder

Abstract

Political scientists typically develop different models to examine distinct political phenomena such as lobbying, protests, elections and conflict. These specific models can provide important insights into a particular event, process or outcome of interest. This article takes a different tack. Rather than focus on the specificities of a given political phenomenon, this study constructs a model that captures the key elements common to most political situations. This model represents a reformulation and extension of Albert Hirschman’s famous Exit, Voice and Loyalty framework. To highlight the value that comes from focusing on the commonalities that exist across apparently disparate political phenomena, the article applies the model to several issues in the democratization literature related to modernization theory, the political resource curse, inequality, foreign aid and economic performance.

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Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University (email: wrclark@tamu.edu); Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University (email: mgolder@psu.edu); Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University (email: sgolder@psu.edu). We thank Xun Cao, Charles Crabtree, Ronald Inglehart, Will Moore, Paul Poast, Christopher Reenock, David Siegel, Jeffrey Staton, David Wiens, Joseph Wright and Boliang Zhu for their helpful comments. We also thank audiences at Binghamton University, Florida State University, Rice University, Stanford University, the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Mannheim, the University of Michigan, the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and the 2013 Annual Meeting of the European Political Science Association. Finally, we acknowledge support for this project from the Research Center (SFB) 884 ‘Political Economy of Reforms’, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Online appendices are available at https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123416000442.

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The British Academy Brian Barry Prize Essay: An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics

  • William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder and Sona N. Golder

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