With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

Rapid and comprehensive social change is required to mitigate pressing environmental issues such as climate change. Social tipping interventions have been proposed as a policy tool for creating this kind of change. Social tipping means that a small minority committed to a target behaviour can create a self-reinforcing dynamic, which establishes the target behaviour as a social norm. The possibility of achieving the large-scale diffusion of pro-environmental norms and related behaviours with an intervention delimited in size and time is tempting. Yet, the canonical model of tipping, the coordination game, may evoke overly optimistic expectations regarding the potential of tipping, due to the underlying assumption of homogenous preferences. Relaxing this assumption, we devise a threshold model of tipping pro-environmental norm diffusion. The model suggests that depending on the distribution of social preferences in a population, and the individual cost of adopting a given pro-environmental behaviour, the same intervention can activate tipping, have little effect, or produce a backlash. Favourable to tip pro-environmental norms are widespread advantageous inequity aversion and low adoption costs. Adverse are widespread self-regarding preferences or disadvantageous inequity aversion, and high costs. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and suggest suitable intervention strategies for different contexts.

We assess the effects of the Crianza Positiva text and audio e-messaging program on caregiver–child language interaction patterns. The program is a six-month-long intervention for families with children aged 0–2 aimed at strengthening parental competences. Its design exploits behavioral tools such as reminders, suggestions of action, and messages of encouragement to reinforce and sustain positive parenting practices. Families in 24 early childhood centers in Uruguay that completed an eight-week workshop were randomized into receiving or not receiving mobile messages. After the program, we videotaped 10-minute sessions of free play between the caregiver and the child, and decoded language patterns using automated techniques. The intervention was successful at improving the quality of parental vocalizations, as measured by the parent's pitch range. We also found suggestive evidence of increases in the duration of adult vocalizations. The results are consistent with more frequent parental self-reported involvement in reading, telling stories, and describing things to the child. Regarding the child, we find a nonrobust decrease in the duration of vocalizations, which we attribute to a crowding-out effect by the caregiver in the context of a fixed 10-minute suggested activity and a more proactive parental role.

Four experiments examine the impact of a firm deciding to no longer pay salaries for executives versus employees on consumer behavior, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 1 explores the effect of announcing either pay cessations or continued pay for either CEO or employees, and shows that firms’ commitment to maintaining employee pay leads to the most positive consumer reactions. Study 2 examines the effects of simultaneously announcing employee and CEO pay cessations: consumers respond most positively to firms prioritizing employee pay, regardless of their strategy for CEO pay. Moreover, these positive perceptions are mediated by perceptions of financial pain to employees, more than perceptions of CEO-to-worker pay ratio fairness. Study 3, using an incentive-compatible design, shows that firms’ commitment to paying employees their full wages matters more to consumers than cuts to executive pay, even when those executive pay cuts lead to a lower CEO-to-worker pay ratio. Study 4 tests our account in a non-COVID-19 context, and shows that consumers continue to react favorably to firms that maintain employee pay, but when loss is less salient, consumers prioritize cutting CEO pay and lowering the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. We discuss the implications of our results for firms and policymakers during economic crises.

Given the rates of transmission of COVID-19, relying only on manual contact tracing might be infeasible to control the epidemic without sustained costly lockdowns or rapid vaccination efforts. In the first study of its kind in Latin America, we find through a phone survey of a nationally representative sample of ten countries that an opt-out regime (automatic installation) increases self-reported intention to accept a contact tracing app with exposure notification by 22 percentage points compared to an opt-in regime (voluntary installation). This effect is triple the size and of opposite sign of the effect found in Europe and the United States, potentially due to lower concerns regarding privacy and lower levels of interpersonal trust. We see that an opt-out regime is more effective in increasing willingness to accept for those who do not trust the government or do not use their smartphones for financial transactions. The local severity of the pandemic does not affect our results, but feeling personally at risk increases intent to accept such apps in general. These results can shed light on the use of default options not only for contact tracing apps but in public health overall in the context of a pandemic in Latin America.

This study investigated determinants of the willingness to get vaccinated in India and examined the relationship between engagement in preventive behaviours and vaccine uptake intent. A large-scale online survey covering aspects of COVID-19 preventive behaviours, vaccination status, moral emotions, trust in others, role models, and socio-demographics was used. A total of 953 Indians participated in the survey between May and June 2021, of which 770 contained valid data on vaccination status. Past preventive health behaviours (PHBs) such as avoiding social gatherings, higher interpersonal trust, and moral emotions were robustly associated with the willingness to take a COVID-19 vaccine. Results also showed that unvaccinated individuals were less likely to follow other PHBs, like wearing a mask; past COVID-19 infection status was associated with similar lower adherence to PHBs. Given the strong associations between positive moral emotions, like gratitude, and vaccine uptake intent (especially in the unvaccinated subsample), targeted communication interventions can boost uptake intent, and subsequently vaccine uptake, in jurisdictions with low vaccination rates.

In Indonesia, as in other countries, a large proportion of tax returns are filed at the last minute. In a population-wide randomised controlled trial (n = 11,157,069), we evaluated the impact of behavioural email prompts on the proportion of annual tax returns filed at least two weeks before the deadline; and overall filing rate. In two control conditions, taxpayers either received no email or an email used in prior years, emphasising regulatory information. The five treatments informed by behavioural science were (1) a simplified version of the existing email, emphasising early filing; (2) the simplified version with additional guidance on filing taxes; (3) the simplified version with a planning prompt and option to sign up for email reminders; (4) a version combining treatments 1, 2 and 3; and (5) an email appealing to national pride. Compared to the no-email control, all emails led to a statistically significant increase in early and overall filing rates. The planning email (3) was the most effective, increasing early filling from 34.9% to 37% (b 2.07 percentage points (pp), p < 0.001, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.97–2.17pp), and overall filing from 65.6% to 66.7% (b 1.10pp, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.99–1.19pp).

In the past decades, behavioral economics has credibly identified numerous decision-making biases leading people to make choices they would not have made if better informed about the long-term consequences of their actions. This has given rise to a new reason for government interventions: internalities. In contrast to traditional reasons for government intervention, such as redistribution and externalities, overcoming internalities often involves the use of paternalistic policies. We investigate theoretically and empirically the formation of attitudes toward paternalistic policies. Theoretically, we focus on the role of self-interest and distinguish between self-interest as construed for the rational decision-maker, self-interest when self-control problems are present, and self-interest when procedural or expressive elements, such as autonomy, matter. Empirically, we employ two novel data sets: a Danish survey on political opinion combined with administrative data on actual behavior and a large-scale cross-country survey to analyze attitudes toward paternalistic policies in the health and financial domains. We show that targets of paternalism are more opposed to paternalism than non-targets both in Denmark and across nine Western democracies and rely on our theoretical priors to explore mechanisms that can explain these attitudes.

Behavioural science has made significant contributions to public policy over the last decade from tax compliance to pensions and energy use. However, behavioural insights (BI) have not yet been able to claim significant policy shifts in the area of crime, despite increasing interest and experimentation. This paper offers a critical reflection on the state of BI and crime from the perspective of those who have been at the forefront of this work since the inception of the world's first behavioural science team in government. We outline how existing theories of crime have already laid foundations for the successful application of BI but identify opportunities to build on these with tools from behavioural science. We conclude by examining how continued cross-pollination of ideas between BI and disciplines such as applied criminology points to promising directions for future research.

The aim of this study is to respond to Cass Sunstein's question: ‘Why are some nudges ineffective, or at least less effective than choice architects hope and expect?’—particularly in view not only of the rational basis in decision-making but also of the direct influence of emotions on the behavior of those who must choose. In this study, I used findings from psychology surveys, specifically considering the influence of emotions on the fallibility of nudges in social interactions when wealth is compared. Special attention is dedicated to vanity, a combined emotion that leads to emotional choices, which arises in self-presentation and self-comparison when external signs of wealth are displayed. Imagination plays an important role in simulation to the extent that it causes failure in further nudges. In conclusion, I argue that vanity impels people to act differently, as expected of choice architects.

Spillover effects are considered important in evaluating the impacts of food, energy and water (FEW) conservation behaviors for limiting global greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Failure to account for all possible spillovers, or indirect and unintended results of an intervention, not only obscures valuable information pertaining to the dynamic interactions across domains but also results in biased estimates. In this study, we first systematically reviewed articles that investigate the idea that the performance of one pro-environmental behavior influences the conduct of subsequent behaviors(s) from the FEW domains. From our review of 48 studies in the last decade, we note that a big part of the discussion on spillover concerns the nature and direction of causal relationships between individual FEW conservation behaviors. We identify a critical gap in the literature regarding the distinction between spillover effects caused by the interventions as distinct from those caused by the primary behaviors. Next, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis of the reviewed empirical studies to find a modest but overall positive spillover effect. Finally, we reviewed the theoretical and methodological plurality in the FEW spillover literature using a systemic thinking lens to summarize what is already known and identify future challenges and research opportunities with significant policy implications.

As nudge interventions have become more popular, academic research is developing that assesses to what extent these interventions are effective. My paper contributes to this stream of research: collating and synthesising evidence on the effectiveness of nudge interventions that aim to increase consumer search and switching in retail financial markets. Following a systematic search strategy, I identify 35 relevant papers, including qualitative studies, laboratory experiments, field experiments and ex post analyses, covering a range of retail financial products and different types of nudges. The review results in two main contributions. First, it demonstrates that different study designs serve different purposes in evidence accumulation. Second, based on over 400 estimates extracted from these papers, it establishes that the currently available evidence shows that nudges increase consumer search and switching in retail financial markets by 2–3 percentage points on average. Structural nudges that change the choice architecture more profoundly have a higher impact on search and switching than nudges that provide, simplify or highlight information. While nudge interventions may be efficient on a cost–benefit basis and can lead to a large increase in relative terms (e.g. doubling switching rates from 1% to 2%), regulators cannot expect them to significantly alter consumer behaviour.

In The Rhetoric of Reaction, published in 1991, Albert Hirschman identified three standard objections to reform proposals: perversity, futility and jeopardy. In Hirschman's account, these objections define reactionary rhetoric. A proposal would be “perverse” if it would aggravate the very problem it is meant to solve; it would be “futile” if it would not even dent the problem; it would produce “jeopardy” if it would endanger some other goal or value (such as liberty or economic growth). The rhetoric of reaction comes from both left and right, though in Hirschman's account, it is a special favorite of the right. In recent years, the perversity, futility and jeopardy theses have often been invoked to challenge reforms, including nudges. While the three theses are sometimes supported by the evidence, they are often evidence-free speculations, confirming Hirschman's suggestion that the rhetoric of reaction has “a certain elementary sophistication and paradoxical quality that carry conviction for those who are in search of instant insights and utter certainties.”

This is an appreciation of the life and work of Michael Jones-Lee. It describes his pioneering role in establishing and developing the theory and practice of the elicitation of monetary values for changes in risks to life, health and safety, using stated preference methods.