Atran advances three theses: our folk-biological taxonomy is (1) universal, (2) innate, and (3) the product of natural selection. I argue that Atran offers insufficient support for theses (2) and (3) and that his evolutionary psychology thus amounts to nothing more than a just-so story.

Support for Howe et al.'s conclusion that musical talent is largely a myth is garnered from the sport literature. One issue germane to the nurture argument is how and when motivation to practice is formed.

Atran proposes that humans have a unique, innate, domain-specific tendency to create taxonomies of biological kinds. We show that: (1) in ontogenesis, children develop a notion Atran claims to be innate; (2) what Atran claims is unique to biological kinds may be found in artifact kinds; and (3) although Atran proposes a domain-specific mental construct for biological rank, it can be explained in domain- general terms.

Three- to six-year-olds were given Heyes's proposed task and theory of mind tasks. Although they correlated, Heyes's was harder; only 50% of participants with a theory of mind reached a criterion of 75% correct. Because of the complex series of inferences involved in Heyes's task, it is possible that one could have a theory of mind and fail Heyes's version.

Neural algorithms are conserved during evolution. Neurons with different shapes and using different molecular mechanisms can perform the same computation. However, evolutionary conservation of neural algorithms is not sufficient for claiming the realization of an algorithm for a specific computational problem. A plausible scheme for ontogenetic emergence of the structure of the algorithm must also be provided.

That organisms have a concept “see” does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on the basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protocol is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an experimenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attribution of knowledge to the experimenter.

The concept of rank is not a very clear one. Claims that two concepts occupy the same rank in different domains are in danger of being unintelligible. Examples show how hard it is to understand Atran's claim that the most significant concepts in folk biology occur at a higher level than nonbiological concepts. A reformulation preserves some of what Atran wants to claim.

The Simonton (1991) study of 120 classical composers may provide evidence for the existence of innate talent. A weighted multiplicative model of talent development provides a basis for evaluating the adequacy of Howe et al.'s conclusions.

Combination-sensitive neurons serve as the fundamental processing unit in Sussman and colleagues' proposal for the neural representation of stop consonants. This commentary describes recent studies in the mustached bat that show how ubiquitous and flexible this neural strategy can be. Sussman et al.'s proposal is an important contribution to a neuroethological consideration of speech perception.

We propose a naturalistic version of the “guesser–knower” paradigm in which the experimental subject has an opportunity to choose which individual to follow to a hidden food source. This design allows nonhumans to display the attribution of knowledge to another conspecific, rather than a human, in a naturalistic context (finding food), and it is readily adapted to different species.

From a developmental and comparative perspective, folk biology is a core “meme.” The universality and resistance to change in such core “memes” may be a function of the developmental timing of cognitive domains during childhood. Evidence from cognitive development in humans, monkeys, and apes is discussed. Suggestions for a developmental research program are offered.

Howe and colleagues demonstrate that deliberate practice is necessary for proficient levels of competence, a fact that is uncontroversial. They fail, however, to demonstrate the role of biology in talent, because the studies they cite are almost all irrelevant to the issue.

The most frequent criticism of the target article is the lack of clear separability of human speech data relative to neuroethological data. A rationalization for this difference was sought in the tinkered nature of such new adaptations as human speech. Basic theoretical premises were defended, and new data were presented to support a claim that speakers maintain a low-noise relationship between F2 transition onset and offset frequencies for stops in pre-vocalic positions through articulatory choices. It remains a viable and testable hypothesis that the phenomenon described by the locus equation is a functional adaptation of production mechanisms to processing preferences of the auditory system.

Whereas the reality of “innate talent” is questioned by the authors, the role of “attributed talent” is not discussed fully. “Attributed talent” is the imputation of high, not yet unfolded ability to an individual. Only if talent is attributed to a novice will resources be invested in the development of expertise. An alternative for estimating future achievement is discussed.

Heyes correctly points out some problems in primate theory of mind, but lacks a critical approach to children's theory of mind, and at times implies meta-awareness when discussing theory of mind. Also, in selecting pure experimental designs, she ignores its limitations, as well as the merits, and at times the necessity, of other methodologies.

A reanalysis of Atran's data is presented in which the comparison between Itzaj and Michigan animal names is represented in spatial rather than taxonomic form. Similarity among all subjects is also represented in spatial terms. Finally, culturally shared knowledge between the two cultures is shown to be about ten times larger than the culture-specific component unique to each culture.

What R&P term the “noise reduction model” implies that the psi-conducive state is related to the induction of an altered state of consciousness (ASC). Yet there is a problem in embedding psi in the ASC, because one anomaly is replacing another. This seems to be a general strategy in the literature of the anomalous.

Pseudoscience is not an appropriate label for parapsychology. Although the noise reduction model of extrasensory perception (ESP) is explanatory only in a limited sense, research does exist addressing the correlation between ESP and altered states of consciousness (ASCs). The term anomaly is not appropriately applied to experiences such as out of body experiences (OBEs) per se, but only to the question of their source. Research on both topics should be encouraged.

Heyes's literature review of deception, imitation, and self-recognition is inadequate, misleading, and erroneous. The anaesthetic artifact hypothesis of self-recognition is unsupported by the data she herself examines. Her proposed experiment is tantalizing, indicating that theory of mind is simply a Turing test.

Howe, Davidson & Sloboda's focus on learning has important implications because the amount and quality of training are relevant to all learners, not just those acquiring exceptional abilities. In this commentary, I discuss learning goals as an indicator of learning quality, and suggest that all learners can be guided towards more effective learning by shifting their learning goals.