The authors present a compelling argument for a science of intentional change by unifying evolutionary psychology (EP) with the standard social science model; however, since its inception, traditional EP models have not held up well to empirical scrutiny. The authors address the importance of cooperation in individuals and social systems, but the Darwin machine they propose does not adequately stress fundamental aspects of evolutionary processes.

There is an extensive literature on the negativity bias, including its conceptualization, measurement, temporal stability (individual differences), and neural and genetic associations. Hibbing et al. posit that the difference across individuals in the negativity bias is a key factor in determining political predisposition. The measures and paradigms developed in this literature provide a means of testing this hypothesis.

Cook et al. suggest that motor-visual neurons originate from associative learning. This suggestion has interesting implications for the processing of socially relevant visual information in social interactions. Here, we discuss two aspects of the associative learning account that seem to have particular relevance for visual recognition of social information in social interactions – namely, context-specific and contingency based learning.

The authors connect conservatism with aversion to negativity via the tendentious use of the language of threats to characterize conservatism, but not liberalism. Their reliance upon an objective conception of the negative ignores the fact that much of the disagreement between liberals and conservatives is over whether or not one and the same state of affairs is negative or positive.

We discuss ambiguities of the two main dimensions of the map proposed by Bentley and colleagues that relate to the degree of self-reflection the observed agents have upon their behavior. This self-reflection is a variant of the “looping effect” which denotes that, in social research, the product of investigation influences the object of investigation. We outline how this can be understood as a dimension of “height” in the map of Bentley et al.

Behavioral change may occur through evolutionary processes such as running stochastic evolutionary algorithms, with a fitness function to determine a winning solution from many. A science of intentional change will therefore require identification of fitness functions – causal mechanisms of adaptation – that can be acquired only with analytical approaches. Fitness functions may be subject to early-life experiences with parents, which influence some of the very same brain circuits that may mediate behavioral change through interventions.

This commentary argues that Bentley et al.’s mapping of shifts in collective human behavior provides a novel vision of how social science theory can inform large data set analysis.

The attempt to construct an applied science of social change raises certain concerns, both theoretical and ethical. The theoretical concerns relate to the feasibility of predicting human behavior with sufficient reliability to ground a science that aspires to the management of social processes. The ethical concerns relate to the moral hazards involved in the modification of human social arrangements, given the unreliability of predicting human action.

The target article offers a negative, eliminativist thesis, dissolving the specialness of mirroring processes into a solution of associative mechanisms. We support the authors' project enthusiastically. What they are currently missing, we argue, is a positive, generative thesis about associative learning mechanisms and how they might give way to the complex, multimodal coordination that naturally arises in social interaction.

Hibbing and colleagues argue that political attitudes may be rooted in individual differences in negativity bias. Here, we highlight the complex, conditional nature of the relationship between negativity bias and ideology by arguing that the political impact of negativity bias should vary as a function of (1) issue domain and (2) political engagement.

At odds with Hibbing et al., we argue that political ideology is best explained by at least two dimensions linked to economic and social ideology. In addition, Hibbing et al's claim that conservatism is grounded in a heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes, something closely tied to the personality trait of neuroticism, does not fit with the established personality correlates of political ideology. Conscientiousness and a lack of openness to experience are linked to conservatism but there is no established connection to neuroticism.

Bentley et al.’s framework assigns phenomena of personal and collective decision-making to regions of a dual-axis map. Here, we propose that understanding the collective dynamics of decision-making requires consideration of factors that guide movement across the map. One such factor is self-awareness, which can lead a group to seek out new knowledge and re-position itself on the map.

We suggest the authors' endeavor toward a science of intentional change may benefit from recent advances in informationally meaningful self-organizing dynamical systems. Coordination Dynamics, having contributed to an understanding of behavior on several time scales – adaptation, learning, and development – and on different levels of analysis, from the neural to the social, may complement, if not enhance, the authors' insights.

In the past decade many studies have demonstrated the existence of a mirror mechanism that matches the sensory representation of a biological stimulus with its somatomotor and visceromotor representation. This mechanism, likely phylogenetically very old, explains several types of mirroring behaviours, at different levels of complexity. The presence in primates of dedicated neuroanatomical pathways for specific sensorimotor integrations processes implies, at least in the primate lineage, a hard-wired mirror mechanism for social cognitive functions.

We challenge Cook et al.'s claim about the vagueness of the notion of action understanding in relation with mirror neurons. We show the multidimensional nature of action understanding and provide a definition of motor-based action understanding, shedding new light on the various components of action understanding and on their relationship. Finally, we propose an alternative perspective on the origin of mirror neurons, stressing the necessity to abandon the dichotomy between genetic and associative hypotheses.

Hibbing and colleagues argue convincingly that liberals and conservatives differ in reactivity to (negative) stimuli. Yet their analysis sidesteps evidence that cognitive ability differs as a function of ideology. Cognitive abilities, like cognitive preferences (e.g., structure needs), shape whether stimuli are psychologically threatening (prompting avoidance) or offer opportunity (prompting approach). Incorporation of these findings is critical despite any socially “delicate” implications.

Adaptation demands effective responses to both recurrent and novel environmental challenges. Developmental plasticity and domain-general mechanisms have important consequences with respect to our human capacity for imagining, creating, and adapting to novel environments. They facilitate the evolution of any cognitive mechanism, no matter how opportunistic, flexible, or domain-general, that is able to solve new problems or achieve new goals.

We propose an extension to the map of Bentley et al. by incorporating an aspect of underlying network structure that is likely relevant for many modes of collective behavior. This dimension, which captures a feature of network community structure, is known both from theory and from experiments to be relevant for decision-making processes.