More than 35 years ago, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) published their famous article, “Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.” Their central conclusion, that neonates can imitate, was and continues to be controversial. Here, we focus on an often-neglected aspect of this debate, namely, neonatal spontaneous behaviors themselves. We present a case study of a paradigmatic orofacial “gesture,” namely tongue protrusion and retraction (TP/R). Against the background of new research on mammalian aerodigestive development, we ask: How does the human aerodigestive system develop, and what role does TP/R play in the neonate's emerging system of aerodigestion? We show that mammalian aerodigestion develops in two phases: (1) from the onset of isolated orofacial movements in utero to the postnatal mastery of suckling at 4 months after birth; and (2) thereafter, from preparation to the mastery of mastication and deglutition of solid foods. Like other orofacial stereotypies, TP/R emerges in the first phase and vanishes prior to the second. Based upon recent advances in activity-driven early neural development, we suggest a sequence of three developmental events in which TP/R might participate: the acquisition of tongue control, the integration of the central pattern generator (CPG) for TP/R with other aerodigestive CPGs, and the formation of connections within the cortical maps of S1 and M1. If correct, orofacial stereotypies are crucial to the maturation of aerodigestion in the neonatal period but also unlikely to co-occur with imitative behavior.

Tongue protrusion-retraction is critical to early nutrition but is also a gustatory-olfactory aspect of early infant social behaviour that is, in part, reliant on pre-natal exposure and learning. Most early development is necessarily dyadic and intrinsically associated with other aspects of social functioning.

Keven & Akins (K&A) revisit the controversial subject of neonatal imitation through analysing the physiological foundations of neonatal spontaneous behaviour. Consequently, they regard imitative capacities in neonates as unlikely. We welcome this approach as an overdue encouragement to refuse cognitively rich interpretations as far as cognitively lean interpretations are conceivable, and apply this rationale to other phenomena in early childhood development.

Some individuals have a neurogenetic vulnerability to developing strong facilitation of ingestive movements by learned configurations of biosocial stimuli. Condemning food as addictive is mere polemic, ignoring the contextualised sensory control of the mastication of each mouthful. To beat obesity, the least fattening of widely recognised eating patterns needs to be measured and supported.

Infant behavior is viewed in a social-communicative context centered on the phenomenon of spontaneous communication. Symbolic communication is learned and culturally structured, intentional, consists of symbols, and is propositional in content. In contrast, spontaneous communication is innate in both its sending (display) and receiving (preattunement) aspects, non-intentional, consists of signs, and is non-propositional or emotional in content. It underlies infant imitation, interactional synchrony, primary intersubjectivity, emotional empathy, and mirror neurons; and it is associated with oxytocin.

Keven & Akins (K&A) redefine some of the neonatal imitation (NI) behaviors as developmental stereotypes. From a neuroconstructivist framework, those early gestures are also far from being considered as imitative behaviors. The cognitive substrate of imitation requires an interactive context to develop. Prior to intentional imitation, the dyad shows mimicry behaviors, which are automatic, but do not fade through development.

Keven & Akins (K&A) propose a biologically plausible view of neonatal imitation based on the analysis of sensorimotor development. Here, we consider imitation in the general context of motor cognition, taking examples from both typical and atypical development. Specifically, we will discuss the functional role of imitation, its multi-level nature, and its anomalous features in autism.

At the end of the target article, Keven & Akins (K&A) put forward a challenge to the developmental psychology community to consider the development of complex psychological processes – in particular, intermodal infant perception – across different levels of analysis. We take up that challenge and consider the possibility that early emerging stereotypies might help explain the foundations of the link between speech perception and speech production.

Despite the persuasiveness of Keven & Akins' (K&A) review, we argue that mentalization, or the ability to interpret the mental states of oneself and others, is required to construct the neonate mind, going far beyond sensorimotor imitation. This concept, informed by certain psychoanalytic and attachment theories, has produced a form of therapy called mentalization-based psychotherapy, which aims to improve emotional regulation. Our aim here is to shed light on a form of neonatal imitation that goes beyond sensorimotor imitation.

Keven & Akins' (K&A's) compelling new hypothesis explaining the developmental and neural basis of neonatal tongue protrusion has important implications for current understanding of primate imitation and the explanatory value of mirror neurons. If correct, this hypothesis eliminates a major source of evidence for neonatal imitation. I explore the implications this has for mirror neuron research and the arguments building upon them.

The claim that human newborns imitate is widely accepted and influential. Yet reliable evidence that newborns match modeled behaviors is limited, and there is no empirically based explanation of how the knowledge that imitation requires could develop before birth. In their target article, Keven & Akins (K&A) contribute important new evidence to an alternative account of newborns' matching that challenges the newborn imitation claim.

Keven & Akins (K&A) propose that neonatal “imitation” is a function of newborns' spontaneous oral stereotypies and should be viewed within the context of normal aerodigestive development. Their proposal is in line with the result of our recent large longitudinal study that found no compelling evidence for neonatal imitation. Together, these works prompt reconsideration of the developmental origin of genuine imitation.

That neonates imitate is an assertion that lacks supporting evidence. Orofacial stereotypies are critical to optimizing food rejection. Matching of tongue-protrusion is not imitation, but a manifestation of the infant's arousal by the modeler's exhibition of the same behavior. The support for the nativist assertion that newborn infants imitate is not compelling, and we should proceed on the assumption that they do not.

Newborns are born into a social environment that dynamically responds to them. Newborn behaviors may not have explicit social intentions but will nonetheless affect the environment. Parents contingently respond to their child, enabling newborns to learn about the consequences of their behaviors and encouraging the behavior itself. Consequently, newborn behaviors may serve both biological and social-cognitive purposes during development.

Keven & Akins suggest that innate stereotypies like TP/R may participate in the acquisition of tongue control. This commentary examines this claim in the context of speech motor learning and biomechanics, proposing that stereotypies could provide a basis for both swallowing and speech movements, and provides biomechanical simulation results to supplement neurological evidence for similarities between the two behaviors.

Imitation is central to human development. Imitation involves mapping between the perception and production of actions. Imitation after delays implicates preverbal memory. Imitation of people informs us about infants' processing of social events. A comprehensive theory needs to account for the origins, mechanisms, and functions of imitation. Neonatal imitation illuminates how the initial state engenders and supports rapid social learning.

Three arguments are advanced from human and nonhuman primate infancy research for the exaptation of ingestive mouth movements (tongue protrusion and lip smacking) for the purposes of social communication: their relation to affiliative behaviours, their sensitivity to social context, and their role in social development. Although these behaviours may have an aerodigestive function, such an account of their occurrence is only partial.

According to Keven & Akins (K&A), infant orofacial gestures may not reflect imitative responses. Here, we emphasise that these actions nonetheless represent a significant feature of the infant's early sensorimotor experience, and therefore may play a key role in the development of imitative capacities. We discuss how the ideas proposed in the target article could contribute substantially to experiential accounts of imitation.

Accounts of behavior, including imitation, often suffer from philosopher's disease: the unnecessary, inappropriate, theoretically driven explanation of behavior in terms of cognition, rationality, and consciousness. Embryos are perversely unphilosophical and unpsychological, starting to move before they receive sensory input. Postnatal contagious yawning and laughing indicate that pseudo-imitative behavior can occur without conscious intent or other higher-order cognitive process.

Empirical studies are incompatible with the proposal that neonatal imitation is arousal driven or declining with age. Nonhuman primate studies reveal a functioning brain mirror system from birth, developmental continuity in imitation and later sociability, and the malleability of neonatal imitation, shaped by the early environment. A narrow focus on arousal effects and reflexes may grossly underestimate neonatal capacities.