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Representational structures only make their mark over time: A case from memory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
Memory structures range across the dimensions that distinguish language-like thought. Recent work suggests agent- or situation-specific information is embedded in these structures. Understanding why this is, and pulling these structures apart, requires observing what happens under major changes. The evidence presented for the language-of-thought (LoT) does not look broadly enough across time to capture the function of representational structure.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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