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Moralization of preferences and conventions and the dynamics of tribal formation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Don Ross
Don Ross*
Affiliation:
School of Sociology, Philosophy, Criminology, Government, and Politics, University College Cork, Cork T12 AW89, Ireland. don.ross931@gmail.comhttp://uct.academia.edu/DonRoss School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Private bag, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa Center for Economic Analysis of Risk, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303.
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Abstract

Stanford casts original light on the question of why humans moralize some preferences. However, his account leaves some ambiguity around the relationship between the evolutionary function of moralization and the dynamics of tribal formation. Does the model govern these dynamics, or only explain why there are moralizing dispositions that more conventional modeling of the dynamics can exploit?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e111
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

Edgerton, R. (1992). Sick societies. Free Press.Google Scholar