The private letters of statesmen, diplomats and generals, as historians know, often are more valuable than voluminous official documents because they reveal more of the personalities and attitudes of the writers and illuminate more of the surrounding sociopolitical context in which they acted. With that in mind, the purpose of publishing the appended letters is two-fold. First, they offer new sources of information on Austro-Hungarian internal politics in the period 1867–1918, particularly the convulsive Czech-German language conflict of 1897–1899. Second, they serve to introduce historians to the private correspondence of Baron (after 1909, Count) Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister from 1906 until 1912.

By their nature, ruling groups tend to be conservative, preserving the status quo rather than working to alter it. But few leaders have responded to demands for change with the kind of stolid passivity that seems to have characterized the bureaucratic statesmen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the last years of its existence. Eduard Taaffe's day-to-day Fortwursteln is one of the more famous characterizations of their “desperate but not serious” attitude toward policy-making. The leaders may have agreed in private to the necessity of far-reaching reforms in the Monarchy's institutional structure, but, faced with the practical difficulties of carrying out those reforms, they were inclined to make few experiments and to take few risks. If one looks at the last statesmen of the Monarchy who both occupied central positions of authority and possessed the willpower to attempt to carry through radical change, besides the hapless Emperor Karl, only a handful of figures emerges: Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, who effected the Bosnian annexation; the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne; and Ottokar Czernin, Karl's foreign minister from 1916 to 1918.

In Berlin on November 10 and 11, 1915, the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, raised with the visiting Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Baron Burián, the subject of strengthening the diplomatic alliance between their governments during the current world conflict. In order to make this alliance “a permanent factor of international politics vis-á-vis our foes,” Bethmann-Hollweg suggested “an extension of the contractual obligations in political, economic and military respects.…” Speaking from a political standpoint, he noted that the treaty of 1879 between Germany and Austria-Hungary “was based on … the idea of the predominance of the Magyars in Hungary and the Germans in Austria.” Since then the Magyars had maintained their position, but the “influence of the Germans in the other half of the empire has been continuously reduced.” Therefore, the chancellor explained, “in connection with the extension and strengthening of the alliance, it is a matter of life or death for Germany that the German element regains its old deserved position and that a stop be put to any further Slavicization.” Bethmann-Hollweg went on to tell Burián about Germany's plans for a thirty year customs alliance based on preferential tariffs, which would be lower than those granted to other lands in most-favored-nation agreements. He expected that these internal duties would be reduced every ten years, and that other European states would join this commercial league. This meeting led to a series of official negotiations about a more comprehensive treaty of alliance, which were still in process when the Central Powers collapsed late in 1918.

Prevention of public violence is a primary task of an ordered state. If rioting occurs, it is usually a serious setback for the government in power, a sign of weakness or even forthcoming collapse, an injury to the citizens' commitment. During a riot, governmental leaders are often taxed to the ultimate because they may lose control of the society in the uncharted waters of the mob; their policy-decisions can sink while awaiting enforcement. The rioters who participate in collective public violence lose their restraint, their individuality that previously caused them to respect authority, and turn to irresponsible acts they would not normally commit. For these reasons established political leaders place a high priority on preventing violence. Should it break out, their automatic inclination is to contain it. Some revolutionaries, on the other hand, see creativity in violence, are even willing to stimulate it, hoping that it will sweep traditional institutions away.