This article deals with the divine knowledge of particulars in Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut and Ḍamīma. It examines how the concept of relation, generally neglected, is at the heart of the dispute between Avicenna, al-Ġazālī, and the Commentator. In al-Ġazālī’s eyes, Avicenna's misconception of divine knowledge “in a universal way” is based on a misuse of relation in the case of God's knowledge. If particulars change and God does not, his knowledge of particulars, insofar as it undergoes change, can be considered a pure relation without ontological consequences. Averroes contests both al-Ġazālī’s criticism and his proposal, despite the fact that, for different reasons involving the coming-to-be of human knowledge, he too employs the notion of pure relation in his Long Commentary on the Physics.