¹ Mamertine seizure of Messana: Polybius (henceforth P.) 1.7.1–4; Diod. 21.18 and 22.1.3 (the tale in Festus 150L is an obvious benign fiction). They had hung on at Syracuse for a while after Agathocles’ death in 289 (Diod. 21.16.6,18.1) — but hardly as long as three years (as Antonia Vallone, Kokalos 1 [1955] 29–33). Allowing for civil strife and then elections at Syracuse, 288 is a reasonable date for their departure and, presumably some weeks later, their seizure of Messana (so too Philipp, , RE 15 [1931] 1227); or at latest 287.Google Scholar

² Fall of Rhegium: P. 1.7.10-13, with other sources listed in Broughton, Mag. of R. Rep. 1.191; Walbank, F.W., Hist. Comm. on P. 1 (1957), 52–3.Google Scholar

³ Hiero died in 215 (note 7 below). Petzold, K.-E. , Studien zurMethode des Polybios u. ihrer hist. Auswertung (München 1969), 158 n.2Google Scholar, points out that P. uses of Flamininus too (18.12.5) and Philopoemen (2.67.5), where in either case it can be shown that they were in their early 30 s. Hiero, who died at over 90 (7.8.7), perhaps at 92 (Ps.-Lucian, Macrobii 10), will have been born ca. 307/6 (so too Berve, H., König Hieron II [München 1959], 7;Google Scholar Walbank, 1.55; Lenschau, T., RE 7 [1912], 1503;Google ScholarGiovanna, de Sensi, Gerone II: un monarca ellenistico in Sicilia [Palermo 1977], 16 n.44).Google ScholarBeloch’s, K.J. effort to delay him to ca. 300 has to reject this evidence (Griech. Geschichte 4.2² [Leipzig 1927], 282).Google Scholar

⁴ How did Pausanias get the date? He is describing statues of Hiero at Olympia: were these set up some years after 275/4 listing his terms as strategus, thus allowing the observer to reckon back to their start? Paus. does not speak of him as king but as tyrant, and is very hazy about him after 263 — for instance having him, ratherthan his grandson and successor Hieronymus, assassinated (ibid § 4). Paus.’ date rejected: e.g. Lenschau, RE 7.1503 and 1505 (preferring 270); Beloch, 4.1² (Leipzig 1925), 643–4, and 4.2² .278–82 (269/8).

⁵ Gow, A.S., Theocritus² Cambridge 1952), 2.307,326.Google Scholar Berve(note 3), 8 n.3, etalii also cite Wilamowitz, U., Textgeschichte d. griech. Bukoliker (1906), 153ffGoogle Scholar., to much the same effect. One or two efforts to date the Hiero idyll toca. 265 or even 263 because of its anti-Punic sentiments (e.g. Lenschau, RE 7.1504; de Sanctis, G., Storia d. Romani 3.12 [Firenze 1970], 94 n.12)Google Scholar do not stand up: cf. also Gow, 306–7.

⁶ For 265,or 265/4:(e.g.)Reuss, F., Philol NF 14 (1901), 103,and 22(1909),412–13;Google Scholar Lenschau, 1504; de Sanctis, 3.1².93–4; Frank, T., Camb. Anc. Hist. 7 (1928), 668 hesitantlyGoogle Scholar; Philipp RE 15. 1227; Schenk von Stauffenberg, A., K#xöng Hieron Zweite v. Syrakus (Stuttgart 1933), 19–20,92–5;Google Scholar Vallone(note 1), 55–8; Walbank, 1.54; La Bua, V., Filino-Polibio Sileno-Diodoro (Palermo 1966), 178 n.6;Google ScholarHeuss, A., Der erste pun. Krieg u. das Problem des rom. Imperialismus ³ (Darmstadt 1970), 16 n.22;Google ScholarRizzo, F., Kokalos 17 (1971), 99, 101Google Scholar. Cf. Lippold, A., Orpheus 1 (1954), 154,Google Scholar and Consules (Bonn 1963), 113 n. 147. Beloch argued for 264 (4.1².644 n. 1,4.2².281) but on the view that the First Punic War started in 263.

⁷ Hiero died in 215: cf. de Sanctis, 3.2² (Firenze 1968), 317–22; Lenschau, RE 7.15389; Walbank, 1.52 and 2 (Oxford 1967), 2; Berve, 7, 84-5. Beloch, 4.22.278, unconvincingly argued for 214.

⁸ E.g. Meltzer, O., Gesch. d. Karthager 2 (Berlin 1896), 249–50,552–5;Google ScholarLuterbacher, F., Philol. NF 20 (1907), 398;Google ScholarMeyer, P., Der Ausbruch d. ersten pun. Krieges (Diss. Berlin 1908), 11,32–4;Google ScholarGeherin, M.Rom u. Karthago, ed. Vogt, J. (Leipzig1943), 179;Google ScholarThiel, J.H., A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War (Amsterdam 1954), 145–8;Google Scholar Berve, 14–15, and in Die Tyrannis beiden Griechen 1 (München 1967), 465; Hoffmann, W., Historia 18 (1969), 158, 160–7;Google Scholar Petzold(note 3) 145–6, 151-3, etc.; Schwarte, K.-H.,Historia 21 (1972), 210–11;Google ScholarHampl, F. in Aufstiegu. Niedergang d. rom. Welt 1.1 (Berlin-New York 1972), 416–17,421;Google Scholar de Sensi in Umanità e Storia: Scritti Attisani (Messina 1971), 516–24 (I am most grateful for Prof, de Sensi’s generosity in supplying me with an offprint), in Archivio per la Storia d. Sicilia orientale 70 (1974), 9–11, and most extensively in Ger. II, 223–32; Molthagen, J., Chiron 5 (1975), 94 n.36, 100–1;Google ScholarWelwei, K.-W., Historia 21 (1978), 573–4;Google ScholarHarris, W.V., War and Imperialism in Republican Rome … (Oxford 1979), 188 n.3.Google ScholarMommsen, , Hist of R. (Eng. tr., London 1894), 2.164–5Google Scholar, supposed that after winning at the Longanus in 270, Hiero besieged Messana for several years until the Mamertines in desperation appealed to Carthage and Rome.

⁹ Two garrisons in succession, between 270/69 and 264: Luterbacher, 399–400; P. Meyer, 11–12, 35–6, 39; Berve, 15, 17, 20–27; Petzold, 161, 164, 176–7.

¹⁰ Punic garrison from 270/69 to 265/4: Meltzer, 2.250-1; Gelzer, 180,182; Thiel, 134, 146–8 (269/8–64), cf. 148 n. 265; Bengtson, H., Grundriss röm. Geschichte 1 (München 1967), 74;Google ScholarFinley, M.I., Ancient Sicily ² (London 1979), 111, 114;Google Scholar Hoffmann, 164–5; Schwarte, 210; Hampl, 416; de Sensi( 1974) 13–15, and Ger. II, 67–9; Molthagen, 95, 100–1; Welwei, 573–6; Harris, 188 n.3.

¹¹ Timaeus took his narrative down to 264 (P. 1.5.1) — nor is F. Rizzo’s attempt to show that it went down to Hiero’s peace with Rome in 263 persuasive (ΦIΛIAΣ XAPIN: Miscellanea di Studi Classici in onore di E. Manni [Roma 1980], 6.1897-1920, esp. 1916–20). P.’s discussions of contradictions in his sources: 1.15.1–11, 1.58.5 (cf. 1.14.1–3 and 1.15.12); 3.8.1–9.7 on Fabius’ origins of the Second Punic; and on Philinus’ famous claim that the Romans in 264 broke a treaty barring them from Sicily, 3.26.

¹² Hoffmann (161–4,171) hypothesizes that P., having chosen to use Fabius as his source, and then finding a different account in Philinus, lacked the Quellenkritik and space to accommodate both versions, therefore ignored the latter. This hardly squares with P.’s readiness to expatiate on a surely less momentous set of discrepancies soon after (1.15); nor is Hoffmann’s assumption that P. was severely limited as a source-critic very compelling.

¹³ Thus, e.g., Bung, P., Q. Fabius Pictor: der erste röm. Annalist (Diss. Köln 1950), 135–6;Google Scholar Thiel, 146–7 and n.262; Petzold, 175; Hoffmann, 161, cf. 170–4; Hampl, 416–17.

¹⁴ That Livy believed in the ‘Philinus treaty’ (cf. note 11) is entirely possible (Per. 14; 21.10.8) though it cannot be argued here. See CQ 35 (1985), 92–109.

¹⁵ 13.9 jumps to a point after the expulsion of the Punic garrison in 264.

¹⁶ If that source was the pro-Punic Philinus (cf. P. 1.14.3, 3.26.1–5 on his bias). At 23.1.4 Diod. has the Romans send help seemingly sua sponte — on learning of Messana being besieged by the Carthaginians and Hiero in alliance, i.e. much later on — and incorporates Hiero’s scathing criticisms of them for it. If Philinus, who had his ‘treaty’ with which to blame the Romans, suppressed even the excuse of the Mamertines’ appeal, he would leave them no way at all to avoid or palliate guilt.

¹⁷ 15.2.4: Cassander poisons Alexander (323 B.C.), ‘mox’ Olympias and Alexander’s son (316).

¹⁸ De Sanctis, 3.1².93 n . l l ; followed by Vallone, 57‘8, and La Bua (note 6), 178 n.6.

¹⁹ Reuss, Philol. 1901, 104, and especially Phil. 1909, 412–13. Since Diodorus does it eight times at 13.3–7 it does not seem enough to put this down to mere error (as Luterbacher [note 8] 398, and Berve, K. Hier. II, 17–18).

²⁰ Stauffenberg (note 6), 93.

²¹ Beloch, 4.2².281 (the 54 years ‘sich auf seine ganze Regierungsdauer beziehen’ and to insist on a literal interpretation of ‘ist eine arge Pedanterie’), followed by Lenschau, 1505; Stauffenberg (note 6), 93; Heuss(note6), 16 n.22; Rizzo,Kok. 1971, 101–3 citing only de Sanctis who, however, has a different solution (above at note 18). On Attalus I: Walbank, 2.603–4.

²² De Sanctis, loc. cit. note 18 (‘papiri di Elefantine’): cf.Rubensohn, O. (ed.), Elephantine-Papyri(Sonderheft von Agyptische Urkunden aus den Königl. Museen in Berlin: Gr. Urkunden, Berlin 1907), 24Google Scholar [pap. 2, line 24], 30–1 [3.1 and 4.1], cf. 22, where too Rubensohn cites IG 14.1184 dating Menander’s death to ‘year 32’ of Soter. See also Samuel, A.E., Ptolemaic Chronology (München 1962), 3–24Google Scholar, 30.

²³ Cf. 1.9.7 (secure after Cyamosorus) and 8 ( after Longanus). De Sensi, Ger. II, 227, holds that it is an exact echo: on the ground that at 1.8.3-4 and 1.9.8 (six books earlier) P. uses ‘estrema precisione terminologica’ (ibid. n. 22). One might grant the latter (I would not press the precision myself) without seeing that it proves anything about 7.8.4.

²⁴ Cf. perhaps Oros. 4.7.3 ‘amissa fiducia’; P. Meyer (note 8), 76; de Sanctis, 114; Berve, 35. Petzold, 131, thinks that P. does clearly distinguish between and at 7.8.4 — though agreeing that at §§ 3–5 and are applied to . This second point is plain in P.: not the first.

²⁵ Thus e.g. Berve, 9–10 (cf. 8 n.2); de Sensi (1971), 506–7, and Ger. II, 22–25, 35–7, cf. 204–5, 223–5

²⁶ De Sensi (1971), 526–30.

²⁷ As de Sensi scrupulously shows (ibid., 528 n. 90), though she also shows that there is a good case for ascribing them to Hiero: e.g. they bear the lettering IE.

²⁸ Many scholars prefer the late 270’s: not just ‘early’ Longanus supporters (as Meltzer, 2.244–5; P. Meyer, 29–31; Berve, 12: Petzold, 152 n. 2; Molthagen [note 8] 93 n. 26; de Sensi [1971] 524, Ger. II, 44) but one or two ‘late’ ones too (Walbank, 1.56; Rizzo, 102). Walbank dates it ‘shortly after 275/4’ on the ground that P. classes it among Hiero’s (1.8.5): but this time-scale is purely relative: the Longanus directly follows the Cyamosorus in P., which on this basis makes it another of the πρ..

²⁹ Cf. Walbank, 1.53‘not to be pressed’. At 1.35.3 and5.26.13, context shows that it does mean‘very promptly’. But Reuss’ andBeloch’s suggestion that at 1.8.2 it refers only to a prompt weakening of Mamertine power once they lost the support of the Rhegium Campanians (Philol. 1901,103;GG4.12.644n. 1) is averyforced interpretation of P.’s text.

³⁰ The Campanians were originally sent to Rhegium by the Romans, in 282 (Walbank, 1.52, gives the evidence), but this cannot be used to narrow the gap. P. dates the seizure of Rhegium to 280 or later (1.7.6-8). De Sensi, perhaps conscious of this difficulty, dates the Mamertines’ coup at Messana to 282 (de Sensi [ 1971 ], 497), but this is far too late.

³¹ Paton, who translates the phrase at 1.8.2 as ‘at once’, renders it ‘not long’ at 1.7.5!

³² Despite Paton translating the phrase: ‘the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested’. The participle is aorist and there is no ‘now’. Unsatisfactory too I. Scott-Kilvert (Polybius: The Rise of the Roman Empire [Penguin Classics, 1979]): ‘when the outlawed Roman garrison in Rhegium was closely besieged by theircompatriots’ — not only inaccurate, but verbose. The Longanus fought during the Rhegium siege: Meltzer, 2.552; Thiel, 145;

³³ cf. Petzold, 132-3. Cf. Walbank, 1.616-17. Petzold, 141,notes that in the P. ’s concern is not so much chronological exactitude as the correct order of events, so as to show cause and effect (but he still holds to an ‘early’ Longanus).

³⁴ At 3.26.5 P. claims to have mentioned earlier Philinus' allegation of a Roman breach of treaty in crossing to Sicily in 264: bad phrasing again, as at best he is misremembering 1.15.1–11, where other discrepancies in Phil’s narrative are outlined. And after narrating the Roman-Punic crisis over Sardinia of 237 (1.88.8–12, cf. 83.6–11) he seems later to imagine that he has also discussed the rights and wrongs of that affair (3.10.1–2).

³⁵ Cf. Rich, J., Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion (Bruxelles 1976), 121–3.Google Scholar The passage contains a hint of some such truth: Reuss (1901), 105–7; Bung (note 13), 145; Walbank, 1.355, cf. 60.

³⁶ Reuss(1901), 103 (cf. note 29 above); Beloch,4.1².643–4; Petzold, 154–5 (arguing–if I follow him aright— that a late Longanus is impossible because the Mamertines could not have been reckless and self-confident after being weakened in 270); de Sensi, Ger.II, 63; cf. also Lenschau, 1505.

³⁷ So too Lippold, Orpheus 1954, 164 n. 57.

³⁸ De Sensi reads this differently: Punic occupation from 269 on leading to internal dissension at Messana (she sees vols as ‘domestic polities’): the remnant Greek population at odds with the Mamertine majority and finally fleeing for refuge () to the Punic garrison in the citadel (Ger. II, 63-6). But for P., however furiously condensing his sources, to compress such entirely new developments into so elliptical a reference is all but impossible to believe; and if he did, why then his stress on an increasingly remote Longanus when (to repeat the point inthe text) a Mamertine appeal against Punic oppression was tailormade to Roman propaganda? Why in any case should a supposed Greek element at Messana turn to the Carthaginians when Hiero, with Messanian exiles in his army, was the professed (and Greek) champion of their side? (Diod. 22.13.4 for the exiles.) To account, moreover, forP.’s peculiar treatment of these surmised facts de Sensi not merely presumes(as do many others) that Fabius Pictor suppressed mention of the Punic rescue after the ‘early’ Longanus, but also supposes that P., for post-Longanus developments in Sicily, jettisoned the Sicilians Philinus and Timaeus in favour of F abius — and thus, because of Fabius’ silence about the Punic intervention, ‘lo storico [i.e. Polibio] deve averdedotto che non lo si dovette considerare storico’ (op. cit., 203). Both suppositions are inexplicable — and not necessary.

³⁹ minus , and1.10.1 minus its first phrases ( M to ), would in fact run together smoothly. The extra phrases could have been added to accommodate the Hiero story.

⁴⁰ Note 6 above.

⁴¹ Berve, 15–16; Petzold, 152–3 with 152 n. 2; followed by Molthagen (note 8), 94–5; de Sensi, Ger. 77,52–3. P. Meyer (note 8), 31–4, assigns everything to one year (270 in his view); Stauffenberg, 95 (cf. 19–20), rejects the view that Mylae was taken, because Hiero does not hold it at 13.2, and he starts Hiero’s campaign with the capture of Ameselum, putting this and everything that follows (Longanus included)in 265.

⁴² Consuls in officeca. 1 May: e.g. de Sanctis, 3.12.241; R. Wemer,DerBeginn derrbm. Republik (Munchen 1963), 64 n. 2; M. GwynMorgan,Chiron 7 (1977), 90–1.01.129: P. 1.5.1. On P.’s Olympiad year see (e.g.) Walbank, 1.35–7, and in Polis and Imperium: Studies… Salmon (Toronto 1974), 62; Werner, 45–61 (56–7 on 264 B.C.); R.M. Errington,/R>S57 (1967), 96–108. Caudex’ advocacy of aid to Messana is very probable (P. 1.11.2 with Walbank’s note). Beloch put the Roman calendar in 264 a month or more behind (i.e. ‘May’ really = June: 4.2².261-71), cf. P. Meyer, 12 (1-2 months behind), Werner, 61 (2½ weeks behind).

⁴³ Rich (note 35), 18–55; it holds best for only theThird Macedonian and Third Punic.

⁴⁴ Garibaldi, in another triumphant northern campaign (1860), got from Marsala via Palermo to Milazzo in 2Vi months from 6 May, then after a victory on 20 July received the surrender of Messina on the 28th (Hibbert, C., Garibaldi and his Enemies [paperback ed., N.Y.-Toronto-London 1970], 200–54).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ E.g.Gelzer, M., Caesar (Oxford 1968), 195–223.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For this I draw on Loyn, H.R., The Norman Conquest ² (London 1967), 89–99.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ De Sensi(1971),499, andGer. II, 11–6;contra Meltzer, G. d. Kar. 2.242; P. Meyer, 28; Stauffenberg, 4–5, 9, 94–5; Berve, 9–10, 13; Rizzo, 100–1, 103–4 (all see it as a campaign against the Carthaginians. But Theocritus provides no support for this [as Berve, 9] for he wrote after Hiero had come to the leadership). De Sanctis, 91, and Vallone, 49–50, see it as one against the Mamertines. ‘Mergane’ is not otherwise known: Morgantia, near mod. Aidone about 50 miles (80 km.) N-W of Syracuse, is one idea (de Sanctis, Vallone — though this hardly suits their idea of a Mamertine war) but several places called Morgantia, Murgentia etc. are attested (Manni, E., Geogrqfia fisica e politico d. Sicilia antica [Roma 1981], 204–5;Google Scholar 207 a ). But P. Meyer, 27 n. 17, and now Manni, 203, make the attractive guess that‘Mergane’ is a corruption for Megara N. of Syracuse, which incidentally would suit de Sensi’s thesis that the troops were returning from operations in Pyrrhus’ campaigns (Ger. II, 12).

⁴⁸ Mercenaries only: Griffith, G.T., Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 1935),203–4;Google ScholarLenschau, , RE 7. 1503;Google Scholar Berve, 9, 11 n. 10, suggesting that pro-Hiero tradition camouflaged them as ‘citizens’ to make Hiero look better.

⁴⁹ Special magistracy: de Sensi, loc. cit. note 47. Contrast her earlier view: (1971), 501. It is not certain that the ‘stages’ in Justin’sversion of Hiero’s advance (magistratus, dux etc.) must correspond exactly to P.’s archon, strategus etc., and thus confirm archon as a separate office (Ger. II, 15–16).

⁵⁰ De Sensi, op. cit. 21.

⁵¹ Not to mention that the fleet anchors (so MSS.), usually emended to (so Teubner ed.). Some scholars have tried to rescue Polyaenus for the aftermath of the Longanus and the Punic intervention (P. Meyer, 35 n. 49; de Sensi, op. cit. 58-9,198-9) or, likewise putting those in 269, for a renewed attack by Hiero in 264 (Berve, 17 n. 24; 20). It fits neither. And de Sensi, arguing that Polyaen. is compatible with Diod.’s version of the intervention, leaves it to be inferred that Timaeus was Polyaen.’s ultimate source since Diod. is viewed(quite possibly correctly) as reproducing Philinus — which would mean that Timaeus, generally seen as pro-Hiero (cf. de Sensi, 197–206), recounted an episode unflattering to the king while the pro-Punic Philinus left it out, even though it tells of a Punic success.

⁵² Stauffenberg, 9.

⁵³ Rizzo (1971), 103–4; the winning of Halaesa he also presents as part of the ‘Punic’ war, but in Diod. it comes after the statement in question.

⁵⁴ De Sensi (1971), 510, and Ger. II, 27–30, 44; so too Molthagen, 92. A formal peace eventually: Meltzer, 2.242; P. Meyer, 28; Mazzarino, S., Introduzione alle Guerre puniche (Catania 1947), 52–3Google Scholar, whose ‘evidence’ for it, however (‘Justin 23.3.10’) is nonexistent.

⁵⁵ Stauffenberg, 20, and de Sensi (1971), 512–13 andGer. II, 50, think Tauromenium did join the Syracusan alliance at this time.

⁵⁶ De Sensi, Ger. II, 113–15, citing earlier work and refuting Berve’s(Hieron II, 36–7) and others’ view that Tauromenium was not part of the post-263 kingdom.

⁵⁷ Raids before 278: Plut. Pyrrh. 23.1. Gela and Camarina were sackedca. 280 during the tyranny of Phintias at Agrigentum (Diod. 23.1.4, cf. 22.2.2; Finley,Anc. Sic.², 109, suggests 282). Alliance with Carthage: Diod. 22.7.4; Plut. Pyrrh. 24; cf. Trogus, Prolog. XXIII. Raids and tribute in 270’s: P. 1.8.1. No raids on Punic Sicily: Meltzer 2.242–3, 556; de Sanctis, 3.1².90 n. 4; La Bua (note 6), 211 (Punic Sicily raided only before 278); cf. Vallone, 49 — but the Carthaginian intervention after the Longanus does not prove smooth Punic-Mamertine relations after 276, for it was in Carthage’s own interest to prevent Syracuse growing too strong by taking Messana. Attempt on Agrigentum: Walbank, 1.53 from P. 1.43.2.

⁵⁸ Halaesa, Tyndaris and Abacaenum yielded to Hiero later (Diod. 22.13.2), so de Sensi plausibly sees them as Mamertine allies till then (o.c, 46-51); though Halaesa’s ‘surrender’, , could imply a garrison, possibly of mercenaries. Plausible too that Mylae and Ameselum, stormed by Hiero in 265, were garrisoned by mercenaries, for he promptly enrolled the garrisons in his own army (Diod. § 1; de Sensi, ibid.).

⁵⁹ De Sensi, o.c. 50. P. Meyer, 26, and Berve, 15, also exclude both from Mamertine control.

⁶⁰ As de Sensi, loc. cit.

⁶¹ De Sensi, 48.

⁶² A defeat, whitewashed by propaganda: (e.g.) Beloch, 4.1².644; de Sanctis, 3.1².92; Stauffenberg, 17–19; Vallone, 51–3; Walbank, 1.56, a modified view; Berve, 12–13; La Bua, 212; Petzold, 15 2 n. 2, and 15 4; Rizzo, 102; Molthagen, 93. De Sensi (1971)502-3 holds that P. does not hide it was a defeat. Timaeus is generally seen as the source of the propaganda, cf. Petzold, 150.

⁶³ Filino-Polibio, 212.

⁶⁴ Cf. note 72; de Sensi, Ger. II, 51, on the Mylae and Ameselum garrisons.

⁶⁵ De Sensi (1971), 502–4; Ger. II, 30–3. That the ‘restive and mutinous’ description refers to some ‘fatto ben preciso’ in the mercenaries’ past (like the coup against Hicetas ca. 279 [ib., 31–2]) does not convince: this and the later description (9.6) should refer to Cyamosorus times. Unconvincing too the suggestion that Hiero won the support of both oligarchs and assembly at Syracuse by promising to get rid of the mercenaries ([1971] 504): if even the assembly knew the plan the mercenaries would surely have got wind of it too and taken steps to protect themselves.

⁶⁶ Griffith (note 48), 205 thinks merely that he got ridof them to avoid paying them.

⁶⁷ Stauffenberg, 18–19; Walbank, 1.56; de Sensi, Ger. II, 34.

⁶⁸ Contra Stauffenberg, 18.

⁶⁹ Probably mod. Regalbuto 10 km. west of Centuripe and 12 east of Agira, with the Salso (= Cyamosorus) 3 km. N.: so too Manni, Geog. Sic. ant,142. It was a medieval strongpoint and a battleground in 1943 (Sicilia [Touring Club Italiano. 1968] 350–1).

⁷⁰ Meltzer, 2.250; P. Meyer, 31-2; Berve, 15; de Sensi, Ger. II, 50–1, 52.

⁷¹ Petzold, 152 n. 2, thinks that, because Hiero afterwards retired westwards to Mylae, he must have struck at Messana from Mylae. The idea that Hiero's first Diodorean campaign is the Polybian Cyamosorus campaign (Freeman, E.A., Sicily [London 1892] 273;Google Scholar Walton, Loeb ed. of Diod., 11.73 n. 2; and Pareti, L., Sicilia antica [Palermo 1959] 258–9)Google Scholar has nothing to recommend it: cf. de Sensi (1971) 512 n. 49 on Pareti.

⁷² Petzold, 152 n. 2, thinks that, because Hiero afterwards retired westwards to Mylae, he must have struck at Messana from Mylae. The idea that Hiero's first Diodorean campaign is the Polybian Cyamosorus campaign(E.A. Freeman, Sicily [London 1892] 273; Walton, Loeb ed. of Diod., 11.73 n. 2; and L. Pareti, Sicilia antica [Palermo 1959] 258-9) has nothing to recommend it: cf. de Sensi (1971) 512 n. 49 on Pareti. P. Meyer also thinks the enemy army had been awaiting Hiero inland, but does not offer a reason. Hiero was to have 11,500 men at the Longanus; from Mylae and Ameselum he recruited, say, 2500 (Diod. §§ 1-2). Atthe Longanus there were 8000 Mamertine foot, and perhaps 900 (note 80) cavalry. So the Syracusan and allied army could have been some 9000 strong at the start of the first campaign; if he detached (say) 3000 to . demonstrate W. of Aetna the rest would be too few to risk a battle, yet too numerous for 8-9000 only lightly-equipped foes to challenge. It is not likely that Hiero laid siege to Messana (one editor, Wurm, amended the MSS. to approved by Berve, 15 n. 21). Thatwould have tied him down dangerously with the Mamertine army loose in his rear. De Sensi, without accepting the emendation (Ger. II, 46), uses Polyaenus to infer that Hiero had a fleet too and blockaded Messana by sea (54–5) — but Polyaen. is a broken reed (note 51 and text).

⁷³ Soo too P. Meyer, 32 n. 42; Berve, 16; Petzold, 152 n. 2. Vallone, 54 (following L. Pareti and V. Casagrandi), supposes that this Mylae must have been a place — unattested — near Tauromenium. But Hiero’s campaign makes sense without this notion.

⁷⁴ Mamertine coins with AΔPANOY: Vallone, 44–5. But de Sensi thinks they refer to the god Hadranus (Ger. II, 49).

⁷⁵ Cf. Berve, 17–18 (but he supposes that the army acclaimed Hiero after the Longanus, and dismisses Diod.’s use before and during the battle as ‘irrig’, or ‘falschlich’ [Die Tyrannis (note 8), 2.734]); de Sensi, 61. Other field acclamations: PM.Demetr. 18; P.18.41.7 (Attalus I).

⁷⁶ Cf. Meyer, 33; Berve, 16; de Sensi, 55.

⁷⁷ Diod. 13.2 has Aoitavov, but P.’s reading is confirmed by the existence of a town Longane in the area (Steph. Byz. s.v. Λογγώνη IG 14.594; Manni, Geog., 197). Textual corruption is obviously easy: ΛΟΓΓ- to ΛΟIT. . The Longanus is probably the modern Patri (also called Rodi) and the remains of Longane lie upriver between Rodi and Milicitowns (Sicilia [note 68] 397; cf. Manni, 114).

⁷⁸ Cf. Meyer, 59; Thiel (note 8), 154 n. 280.

⁷⁹ Cf. P. Meyer, 35 ‘Beobachtungsgeschwader’.

⁸⁰ La Bua, 178 n. 8, supposes 40,000 men, because Diod.’s text gives the Punic garrison at Messana as μ (= 40: §7), which he takes to combine two errors, μ (40,000) and consequently the size of Hannibal’s entire army, not just the garrison detached therefrom. How such a double confusion got into Diod.’s text is not expounded. That /j.’ might be an error for ‘mille’ (Walton ad 23.9.1) is just as improbable: it presumes a Roman source. The likeliest figure is 900, usually π ‘ but often written ’ or π’ (Der KleinePauly [Munchen 1979], 5.1450s.v.‘Zahlensysteme’), and thus mistakeable for an M. This would also fit the ‘;μ" Mamertine cavalry at the Longanus (§ ii, cf. note 72). As for Hannibal’s supposed 40,000 troops, with that many he could have dictated terms to Syracusans and Mamertines alike.

⁸¹ P. does not, in fact, write ‘some (and others) of the Mamertines‘ (= M)but; again in a passage where, on any theory, he is vigorously abbreviating his source(s). This phrasing could, on the other hand, be another clue that the Hiero-digression was added after the main narrative had been written (cf. note 39) — that would not invalidate the thesis in my text.

⁸² Civil strife: Càssola, F., I Gruppi politiciromaninel III secolo a. C. (Trieste 1962, repr. Roma 1968), 179–80;Google Scholar Petzold, 166–7; and for de Sensi's theory see note 38. Factions, though not necessarily strife, are seen by Stauffenberg, 21; Heuss (note 6), 15–16; Lippold, Orpheus 1954,154-5; Berve, 20–2; Walbank, 1.57; E. Frézouls in ΦIΛIAΣ XAPIN(note 11), 3.971.

⁸³ Diod. 19.65.5 (315 B.C.), cf. 71.6 (peace negotiated by the Carthaginian Hamilcar).

⁸⁴ Forts: Philinus apud P. 1.15.3. Less likely occupied during his joint offensive with Carthage against Messana later in 264 — if he had not wanted themearlier, why then?

⁸⁵ So Zon. 8.6.14; cf. Dio frg. 43.1; quite possible, for removal of the Campanians would deny the Mamertines even the hope of help in emergency from Rhegium, and to Rome the prospect of Syracusan approval could only enhance their claims to be observing fides towards the dispossessed Rhegines (cf. P. 1.7.12). But though Hiero may have helped the Romans with food, he is most unlikely to have sent troops too (as Zon. claims) — or have made a formal alliance.

⁸⁶ Cf. note 75. By deputations from the allied cities?