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The Dead March: A History of the Mexican-American War. By Peter Guardino. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. Pp. 512. $39.95 cloth.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 November 2018

Barbara A. Tenenbaum*
Affiliation:
Hispanic Division, Library of Congress, Washington, District of Columbiabten@comcast.net
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Abstract

Type
Book Review
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 2018 

Scholars who study Mexico and Mexicans themselves would probably agree that the most important event in the history of the Mexican nation was its war with the United States. The war, like the US Civil War, was a consequence of slavery—in the Mexican case, its abolition. In 1829, Mexico's only afro-mestizo president, Vicente Guerrero, ended its citizens' legal rights to hold other people in bondage as property. When the Mexican government shifted from federalist to centralist in 1836, the Anglo settlers in Tejas-Coahuila revolted against the possibility that they could no longer hold others as slaves. Guerrero's decision would ultimately cost Mexico over one-half of the territory it held at independence in 1821. Had the war not occurred, Mexico would have continued to claim Texas and California, two of the richest and most highly populated states in the United States.

Yet, relatively few books have appeared on this crucial subject, and almost none seek to cover both sides of the conflict. Fortunately, Peter Guardino accepted the challenge to study the war that changed history and has produced a superb account of events leading up to the war on both sides and to the war itself. Guardino is particularly suited to this task. He has two earlier books that examine rural people in Guerrero, Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of the National State, Guerrero, 1800–1850 (1996), and Oaxaca, A Time of Liberty: Popular Politics and Culture in Oaxaca, 1750–1850 (2005), respectively. His work on these books gave him a sense of life in villages during that period. In writing the present book, Guardino seems to have read just about everything on the war, and he regales the reader with over 100 pages of endnotes, for a text of fewer than 400 pages. Readers, however, may wish that Harvard University Press had allowed for a bibliography instead of just letting the notes speak for themselves.

Guardino dispels many myths about the conflict, including two of the most prevalent. He disputes the idea that Mexico lost the war because its people were more attached to their ‘patria chica’ than to the nation as a whole. In so doing, he reminds the reader that less than 13 years later, the United States was locked in a vicious war pitting region against region. Then too, he specifically refutes the notion that the Anglo was so far superior to the Mexican that the consequences of the conflict were inevitable. Instead, he points out the glaring disparities between the two countries. Obviously, it is impossible to quantify what it meant that the United States was a far wealthier nation than Mexico. Yet, that difference alone accounted for the invaders' better weaponry and ability to buy rations. Meanwhile, Mexicans lacked ammunition, cannons, and decent up-to-date rifles, and often fought hungry. The Mexican government's desperate financial situation was also at fault, as courageous generals and their men could not afford anything better.

Much too is made of the squabbles among the Mexican generals, as if all of their counterparts on the US side were fast friends. Guardino shows that Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga was the only general who put personal ambition above country when he marched a force of 12,000 men to Mexico City to take over the government instead of fighting the enemy. Then too, General Gabriel Valencia disobeyed his superior, Santa Anna, which cost the Mexicans a victory. And curiously, when Santa Anna desperately needed forces, Oaxacan governor Benito Juárez refused to send them. Santa Anna, in Guardino's hands, comes out far better than usual, as he organizes his men to fight and shows a willingness to use his own funds to support the troops. In addition, Guardino discusses each battle in such meticulous detail and riveting style that even audiences who hate reading about wars of any sort will find themselves captivated.

This is a wonderful book that deserves to be published in Spanish as soon as possible. Its fans can hardly wait.