I provide a thematic reconstruction of Hegel's positive concept of right. Against those who charge that Hegel denies any role to substantive political evaluation, I argue that the Philosophy of Right articulates a notion of the right to recognition (Anerkennung) as the central feature of the modern state. The concept of recognition, I contend, requires not just toleration of others but a more robust notion of respect for the “free personality” that is the philosophical ground of right. The right to recognition is, furthermore, intended to provide the foundation for a new form of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), Hegel's modern analogue to classical conceptions of civic virtue. In conclusion I examine briefly two objections that stand in the way of a contemporary rehabilitation of Hegelian political philosophy.

Both rapid leadership turnover and remarkably durable leaders can be found side by side in African systems of personal rule. In order to explain differences in time in power among African leaders we employ life tables analysis and hazard models, a multivariate technique. We find that the risk of losing power is a decreasing function of time that is little affected by country or leader particularities. The best predictor of whether a leader will lose power in any given period is the length of rule up to that point.

We present a contingency model of Soviet foreign policy making that focuses on decision making in the Politburo. The model is designed around three questions and shows how the answers to these questions determine the likely nature of the decision the Politburo will reach at any point in time. The questions are (1) Whose positions on the Politburo are critical to making a decision? (2) What are the positions or preferences of those who count on the issue under consideration? (3) How are disagreements among these individuals handled? The model is illustrated by examining the Soviet decision to increase significantly the numbers and types of weapons delivered to Egypt in early 1973. Of interest in this case is accounting for the shift in Soviet policy from refusing Egypt offensive weapons to providing them.

In the logic of crisis stability, first-strike advantages may still be destabilizing, although even a successful first strike cannot protect a state from a terribly costly retaliatory second strike. If there is an advantage to striking first and if war seems sufficiently likely, launching a preemptive first strike may seem to be the least of evils. I reconsider the logic of crisis stability by studying games that are completely stable, although there are first-strike advantages. Four general conditions ensure stability. Identifying these conditions refines our understanding of crisis stability by also identifying the potential sources of instability, and this more refined understanding shows that the logic of crisis stability focuses attention too narrowly on first-strike advantages. Stability results from a more subtle interaction of several factors of which a first-strike advantage is only one.

The decision to stay at home when you have no umbrella and rain is probable is an appropriate problem for decision theory. The decision to speed when you are in a hurry and the police might be patrolling is a game against a rational opponent. Treating the latter like a problem for decision theory is what I call the Robinson Crusoe fallacy. It is quite common and leads to incorrect conclusions. If the game has no pure strategy equilibrium, changes in the payoffs to a player affect not that player's strategy but the strategy of the opponent in equilibrium. For example, modifying the size of the penalty does not affect the frequency of crime commitment at equilibrium, but rather the frequency of law enforcement. I provide examples of this fallacy in regulation, international economic sanctions, and organization theory and argue that it stems from inappropriate use of the concept of probability.

From Stokes's (1963) early critique on, it has been clear to empirical researchers that the traditional spatial theory of elections is seriously flawed. Yet fully a quarter century later, that theory remains the dominant paradigm for understanding mass-elite linkage in politics. We present an alternative spatial theory of elections that we argue has greater empirical verisimilitude.

Based on the ideas of symbolic politics, the directional theory assumes that most people have a diffuse preference for a certain direction of policy-making and that people vary in the intensity with which they hold those preferences. We test the two competing theories at the individual level with National Election Study data and find the directional theory more strongly supported than the traditional spatial theory. We then develop the implications of the directional theory for candidate behavior and assess the predictions in light of evidence from the U.S. Congress.

While candidates regularly spend much time and effort campaigning on foreign and defense policies, the thrust of prevailing scholarly opinion is that voters possess little information and weak attitudes on these issues, which therefore have negligible impact on their voting behavior. We resolve this anomaly by arguing that public attitudes on foreign and defense policies are available and cognitively accessible, that the public has perceived clear differences between the candidates on these issues in recent elections, and that these issues have affected the public's vote choices. Data indicate that these conclusions are appropriate for foreign affairs issues and domestic issues.

Survey data are used to test the basic tenets of rational choice theory. We find that (1) voters' preferences are orderly but voters do not always have preferences. When the perceived difference between two candidates is below some threshold, voters are indifferent between them. (2) Most voters choose candidates whose issue positions are congruent with their own. (3) Lack of knowledge about candidates affects choice and utility through two routes—indifference and risk aversion.

Most voters have highly structured utility functions, but the thresholds and risk aversion in these functions place relatively unknown candidates at a disadvantage in presidential primaries and other electoral situations. Moreover, the importance of knowledge in these functions suggests that social choice theorists must take seriously the classic concerns of public opinion research—the operation of the media and the dynamics of information in elections.

Are local political institutions responsive to the demands of racial minorities for a more equitable share of scarce public resources? Does an enhanced political presence improve black and Hispanic prospects in the struggle for public jobs? Based upon data for 1200 cities, my analysis reveals that while minority council members make a substantial contribution to employment success, minority mayors do not. For blacks, an interactive effect was also discovered for the relationship between the level of political representation, governmental structure, and employment outcomes. This research reveals that the political process does work. However, its effectiveness for minorities is mediated by a complex of factors that includes an interaction between political power, racial polarization, and the nature of local political institutions.

Understanding the dynamics of policy distribution requires an appreciation of federal grant programs that have achieved a prominent place in nearly all areas of domestic policy. The theoretical literature on distributive politics, however, focuses almost exclusively on a centralized, top-down view of policy distribution. By examining the role of presidents, legislators, and bureaucrats, scholars have ignored participants who have become key actors in the distribution of federal expenditures—the recipient jurisdictions. This analysis of the allocation patterns under six federal programs shows that local governments exert important influences on the distribution of federal grants and that the distributional patterns and their determinants vary over time. The analysis also points out the importance of disaggregation by focusing on programs and recipient jurisdictions, as opposed to total federal expenditures and regions, states, or congressional districts.

Students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout. This may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters, but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation. Another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization. We explore the latter possibility by using FEC and state data on campaign expenditures in House, Senate, and gubernatorial races. Our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels. We also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of Senate and gubernatorial expenditure on House turnout.

Political philosophy or science first emerged in response to certain contradictions in political life that thoughtful citizens could not but face. Nowhere is this process better portrayed than in Thucydides, who of all great students of politics remains closest to the perspective of practice, at the same time showing how practice points us toward a place of critical distance from politics. The Greek political world, like all prescientific worlds, acknowledged certain gods who, as rulers, made demands on humankind. But because these were neither the only, nor in practice the most insistent, demands made on humankind, the question necessarily arose as to the gods' status in the event of conflict—as to the relative necessity of these divine demands. From this followed the further question—crucial for the emergence of political science or philosophy—as to whether the political world was ruled indeed by the gods or by necessity.