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Welfare Consequences of the Six-Year Presidential Term Evaluated in the Context of a Model of the U.S. Economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Henry W. Chappell Jr.  and
William R. Keech
Henry W. Chappell Jr.
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina
William R. Keech
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Abstract

We evaluate the six-year presidential term proposal in the context of a model of the U.S. economy characterized by a short-run but not a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Votes and public welfare are separately conceptualized as functions of inflation and unemployment, which are indirectly controlled by the president through manipulation of government spending.

In a series of simulation experiments, the vote-maximizing choice of policy instruments led to less we(fare loss with six- than with four-year terms under most conditions. Ironically, vote maximizing was shown to lead not only to short- and long-term welfare loss, but also to long-run political disadvantage.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , March 1983 , pp. 75 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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