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The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Kenneth R. Mladenka
Kenneth R. Mladenka*
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
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Abstract

It has long been assumed that urban political machines trade services for votes. However, this study of Chicago found no evidence to suggest that the political machine uses vital public services to reward loyal supporters and to punish enemies. With few exceptions, distribution patterns are a function of past decisions, population shifts, technological changes, and reliance upon technical-rational criteria and professional values. The urban bureaucracy is the major actor in the distributional process. Equity in the distribution of resources is accomplished according to formula and is increasingly a by-product of allegiance to professional standards.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 74 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 991 - 998
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1980

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