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Symposium on Scientific Explanation in Political Science: Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John G. Gunnell
John G. Gunnell*
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Albany
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Extract

The purpose here is to explore certain aspects of the philosophy of science which have serious implications both for the practice of social and political science and for understanding that practice. The current relationship between social science and the philosophy of science (or the philosophy of the social sciences) is a curious one. Despite the emergence of a considerable body of literature in philosophy which is pertinent to the methodological problems of social science, there has been a lack of osteusive ties between the two areas. A justified concern with the independence of social scientific research has contributed to a tendency toward isolation which is unfortunate in view of the proliferation of philosophical problems which necessarily attends the rapid expansion of any empirical discipline. Although in the literature of contemporary social science there are frequent references to certain works in the philosophy of science and to philosophical issues relating to methodology, these are most often in the context of bald pronouncements and shibboleths relating to the nature of science, its goals, and the character of its reasoning. But what is most disturbing about the fact that social scientists have little direct and thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of science is not merely that there has been a failure to carefully examine the many logical and epistemological assumptions which are implicit in social scientific inquiry, since this task might normally and properly be considered to be within the province of the philospher of science.

Type
Symposium on Scientific Explanation in Political Science
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1969 , pp. 1233 - 1246
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1969

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References

1 For some preliminary arguments supporting this position, see Gunnell, John G., “Social Science and Political Reality: The Problem of Explanation,” Social Research, 35 (Spring, 1968)Google Scholar.

2 Norton E. Long, Foreword to Meehan, Eugene J., Explanation in Social Science (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), p. v Google Scholar.

3 Eckstein, Harry and Apter, David, Comparative Politics (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), p. v Google Scholar.

4 See, for example, Rudner, Richard S., Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966)Google Scholar.

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9 For the most comprehensive statement of Hempel's position see his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965)Google Scholar. Nagel's, Ernest most popular work is The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1961)Google Scholar.

10 See, for example, Meehan, Eugene, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. v, vi, 3, 8, 9 Google Scholar.

11 Meehan, , Explanation, p. 3 Google Scholar.

12 Ibid, p. 2; MacKinnon, Edward, “Epistemological Problems in the Philosophy of Science, I,” Review of Metaphysics, XXII (09, 1968), p. 113 Google Scholar.

13 Brodbeck, May, “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge,” in Brodbeck, (ed.), Readings in The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 364 Google Scholar; cf. Hesse, M. B., “A New Look at Scientific Explanation,” Review of Metaphysics, XVII (Spring, 1963)Google Scholar.

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15 Hempel, , Aspects, p. 488 Google Scholar.

18 Brodbeck, , “Introduction,” in Brodbeck, (ed.), pp. 7, 9 Google Scholar.

17 For a discussion of some of these problems and their relation to assumptions about theory construction in social science, see Gunnell, John G., “The Idea of The Conceptual Framework: A Philosophical Critique,” Journal of Comparative Administration, I (08, 1969)Google Scholar. In order to scotch any misunderstanding from the outset, it must be emphasized that in this context the “deductive model” is not to be understood as equivalent to the rather loose and variable characterization of scientific reasoning often referred to as the hypothetico-deductive method or, roughly, the idea that explanation is a process of formulating hypotheses which are tentatively confirmed or disconfirmed by observational tests. Although there are often numerous similarities between the deductive model and specific formulations of the H-D method [e.g., Braithwaite, R. B., Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953)Google Scholar] such as the tendency to view the logic of science as essentially deductive in character and although many of the criticisms relating to the accuracy and sufficiency of the H-D account such as those most prominently associated with the work of N. R. Hanson and his concern with the “logic of discovery” are pertinent to a consideration of the deductive model, it is probably generally accepted that science utilizes a form of inference which in its broad outlines resembles this representation. Neither should the deductive model be equated with Karl Popper's ideas on the deductive testing of theories and the attending thesis of falsifiability. Although Popper maintains that the logic of science is entirely deductive in character in the sense that the principle of modus tollens is the only rule of inference available to science, his concern is essentially with the criteria for the rejection and corroboration of empirical hypotheses and choosing between hypotheses [ The Logic of Discovery (New York: Science Editions, 1961), pp. 41, 75–70]Google Scholar. Whatever labels may be attached to Popper's position, his focus is on “providing some sort of justification for a mode of nondemonstrative inference,” and it might well be argued that in this sense his approach “is not properly characterized as deductivism.” [ Salmon, Wesley C., “The Foundations of Scientific Inference,” in Colodny, Robert G. (ed.), Mind and Cosmos (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 160–161]Google Scholar. While the deductive model stresses the subsumption of phenomena under general laws, Popper stresses the development of theories and conjectures which can survive the severest possible tests or attempts at falsification, and the difference in distribution of emphasis is significant. Finally, Popper's views, especially those concerning the relation between theory and observation language, have provided the foundations for some of the most damaging criticism of traditional logical empiricism.

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23 Weingartner, p. 350; Also see Shapere, Dudley, “Meaning and Scientific Change,” in Colodny, Robert G. (ed.), Mind and Cosmos (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 41–50 Google Scholar.

24 Rudner, op. cit., pp. 4–5.

25 See Toulmin, Stephen, The Uses of Argument (Cambiidge: Cambridge University Press, 1958)Google Scholar, Ch. IV and Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), Ch. 1Google Scholar.

26 These distinctions are set forth by Hempel in many of his writings. See Aspects. Brodbeck, , “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge,” p. 375 Google Scholar. Also Gustav Bergmann, “Imperfect Knowledge,” in Brodbeck (ed.), op. cit.

27 Ibid., pp. 375, 371–372.

28 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 147.

29 Scriven, Michael, “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” in Gardiner, Patrick (ed.), Theories of History (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 450 Google Scholar.

30 Ibid., pp. 468–469; Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” in Feigl, Herbert and Maxwell, Grover (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), Vol. III, pp. 173–190, 196, 202 Google Scholar.

31 Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” p. 225 Google Scholar.

32 Scriven, , “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” pp. 452, 456 Google Scholar.

33 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 146.

34 Brodbeck, , “Explanation, Prediction, and Imperfect' Knowledge,” p. 371 Google Scholar.

35 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 146. Also Scriven, , “Definitions, Explanation, and Theories,” in Scriven, Feigl, and Maxwell, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), Vol. II, pp. 192–193 Google Scholar; Black, Max, “The Justification of Induction,” in Morgenbesser, Sidney (ed.), Philosophy of Science Today (New York: Basic Books, 1967)Google Scholar.

36 Hempel, , “Explanatory Incompleteness,” p. 400 Google Scholar and “Explanations and Prediction by Cover-Laws,” p. 130.

37 Scriven, , “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” p. 452 Google Scholar and “Definitions, Explanations, and Theories,” p. 100.

38 Hempel, , “Explanatory Incompleteness,” p. 399 Google Scholar.

39 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 45.

40 Hempel, , “Explanatory Incompleteness,” p. 411 Google Scholar.

41 Loc. cil., emphasis added.

42 Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” p. 211 Google Scholar.

42 Scriven, , “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” pp. 459, 460, 462 Google Scholar.

44 Scriven, , “Definitions, Explanations, and Theories,” p. 193 Google Scholar. See also Scriven, , “The Limits of Physical Explanation,” in Baumrin, Bernard (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar (New York: Interscience, 1963), Vol. 2 Google Scholar.

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46 Toulmin, op. cil., p. 144.

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48 Bergmann, , Philosophy of Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), p. 31 Google Scholar; Brodbeck, , “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge,” pp. 370, 385 Google Scholar.

49 Yolton, op. cit., p. 207.

50 Brodbeck, , “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge,” pp. 365–368 Google Scholar.

51 Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” p. 202 Google Scholar.

52 Mischel, Theodore, “Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, 33 (1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53 Toulmin, , Philosophy of Science, pp. 93–94, 103–104 Google Scholar; Uses of Arguments, 101, 114, 121–122, 220; Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 120–125 Google Scholar; Scriven, , “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” pp. 445–451 Google Scholar; Sellars, Wilfrid, “The Language of Theories,” in Feigl, Herbert and Maxwell, Grover (eds.), Current Issues in The Philosophy of Science (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961), esp. p. 71 Google Scholar.

54 Brodbeck, , “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge,” p. 384 Google Scholar.

55 Ibid., p. 383.

56 For representative discussions see Gardiner (ed.), op. cit.

57 See, for example, Berelson, Bernard and Steiner, Gary A., Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964)Google Scholar.

58 Easton, , System, p. 4 Google Scholar.

59 Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” p. 212 Google Scholar.

60 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 10.

61 Louch, A. R., Explanation and Human Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) pp. 38–40 Google Scholar.

62 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 11.

63 Brodbeck, , “Introduction,” p. 2 Google Scholar.

64 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 346.

65 Ibid., p. 3.

66 Toulmin, , Foresight and Understanding (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 15 Google Scholar.

67 Ibid., p. 14.

68 See Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

69 Toulmin, , Foresight and Understanding, p. 17 Google Scholar.

70 Meehan, , Explanations in Social Science, p. 1 Google Scholar.

71 Ibid., p. 21.

72 Schefller, Israel, The Anatomy of Inquiry (New York: Knopf, 1903), pp. 53–55 Google Scholar.

73 Ibid., p. 54.

74 Yolton, op. cit., p. 194.

75 Toulmin, , Foresight and Understanding, p. 99 Google Scholar.

76 Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” p. 213 Google Scholar.

77 Yolton, op. cit., pp. 200–201.

78 Scriven, , “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” p. 225 Google Scholar; “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” p. 452.

79 Hempel, , “Explanation and Prediction by Governing Laws,” p. 130 Google Scholar.

80 Scheffler, Israel, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 4 Google Scholar.

81 Ibid., p. 5.

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