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The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Amihai Glazer
Amihai Glazer*
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
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Abstract

If candidates are uncertain about the policy position preferred by the median voter and therefore face the risk of stating an unpopular position, in equilibrium both candidates may prefer to make their positions ambiguous rather than to specify them. The incentives to be ambiguous are further increased if the position announced by one candidate allows the other candidate to estimate the preferences of the voters better.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 237 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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