² The agricultural appropriation bill (H.R. 3157) contained a rider which repealed the daylight saving law. On this account President Wilson vetoed the whole measure. The house voted on July 14, 248 to 135, to pass the bill over the President's veto, the attempt failing for want of the necessary two-thirds. A new bill was introduced with the daylight saving rider eliminated (H.R. 7413) and passed the house on July 18 (Public Law No. 22). This provision had been included in the agricultural appropriation bill by a senate amendment, since the house of representatives on January 18 had passed a special bill repealing the daylight saving law (H.R. 3854). This measure was reported in the senate on July 29, passed the senate on August 1, and was vetoed by the President on August 15. It passed the house over the veto on August 19 by a vote of 223 to 101, and the senate on August 20 by a vote of 57 to 19.

An interesting question of procedure was raised in the house of representatives on August 18, when Representative Wingo challenged the right of the Speaker to withhold the veto message from the house, making the point of order “that the veto message from the President of the United States is on the table and that under the practice and rules of the house and the constitutional provision the house should proceed to consider it.” Speaker Gillett said it was within his discretion to lay it before the house when he pleased, but a unanimous consent agreement to take the veto message up the next day relieved him of the necessity of a more direct and official ruling. It is extremely doubtful whether the Speaker has this discretion, and it would seem that a veto message must be laid before the house at once. In the present case, there was apparently some doubt as to whether the votes necessary to override the veto could have been mustered if the message had been laid before the house immediately, and it is possible that on a more important issue such discretion on the part of the Speaker might result in a decisive partisan advantage.

³ The Norris resolution, which came before the senate on November 15, 1918, (amending rule xxv of the standing rules of the senate) provided that no senator who was chairman of one of the important committees (omitting commerce and agriculture from the enumeration above) should be a member of any of the other committees. This was changed to the form in which it was adopted by the Republican conference. A number of the senators who have had long service are taken off one or more of these committees. Senator Lodge, for example, was on the finance, foreign relations, and naval affairs committees; Senator Penrose was on finance, naval affairs, and post offices and post roads; Senator Warren was on agriculture, appropriations, and military affairs. These senators have each been dropped from one committee.

The Norris resolution was aimed at a system of interlocking memberships on senate committees, under which a few men control legislation in the senate. The work of the system is seen at its worst advantage in the conference committees—composed of the chairman, ranking majority member, and ranking minority member. During the Sixty-fifth Congress, 105 conference committees were appointed, and five senators served on 82 of these, the number for each being as follows: Smoot 33, Warren 23, Nelson 11, Lodge 9, and Penrose 6. (The Searchlight, June, 1919.) On March 1, 1919, Senator La Follette made a lengthy speech in the senate which resulted in the defeat of the coal and oil bill. Part of this speech was taken up with an interesting analysis of the functions of these conference committees. He showed that in spite of rules denying conferees the authority to legislate, new provisions were frequently inserted in bills, and that the summary action in many cases taken on the reports of the conference committees deprived Congress of its legislative authority and handed it over to the small groups who were appointed to reconcile the ideas of the senate and house of representatives. He suggested that a new rule requiring that, during the short session, all bills originating in either house be sent to the other house not later than January 10 would be necessary in order to do away with the practice of approving eleventh-hour conference reports in order to get something accomplished.

⁴ War time Prohibition began with the Food Control Act of August 10, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 276) empowering the President to restrict the foodstuffs used in the manufacture of fermented liquors and to commandeer distilled spirits in bond or in stock. The importation of distilled spirits and the use of foodstuffs in their manufacture were forbidden.

A complete war time prohibition act was approved on November 21, 1918 (40 Stat. at L. 1045). It provided that after June 30, 1919, “until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States,” no liquors could be sold, and after May 1, 1919, no grains or food products could be used in the manufacture of “beer, wine or other intoxicating, malt or vinous liquor for beverage purposes.”

President Wilson in his message from Paris of May 20, 1919, suggested a repeal of this act so far as it applied to beers and light wines, and this recommendation was repeated in a special message of June 28. The President said that, under the opinion of the attorney-general, he had no authority to remove the ban until the demobilization of the troops was complete, and he could not say that this had been accomplished, although the emergency was past.

In spite of this recommendation, Congress proceeded to pass a stringent law enforcing war time prohibition and the constitutional amendment which was to go into effect January 16, 1920. A joint resolution adding this amendment to the Constitution was introduced in Congress in August, 1917, reintroduced at the regular session, and adopted on December 28. Three states ratified it on January 16, 1919, bringing the number up to 38, and the amendment accordingly went into effect a year later, January 16, 1920.

The prohibition enforcement bill was H. R. 6810 and had the following legislative history: House Report No. 91 (June 30); passed house July 22; Senate Report 151 (August 18); passed senate September 5; Conference Report agreed to in senate October 8 (senate Document 118) and in house October 10 (House Report 360); vetoed by President October 27 on the ground that constitutional prohibition and war time enforcement should not be coupled in the same measure; passed the house over the President's veto October 27 (176 to 55), and the senate October 28 (65 to 20).

On December 15, 1919, by a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held the measure constitutional as applied to distilled liquors (Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., No. 589, October Term, 1919). On January 5, by a vote of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court sustained the power of Congress to define “intoxicating” as a content of alcohol in excess of ½ of 1 per cent (Ruppert v. Caffey, No. 603, October Term, 1919). The Court by a unanimous decision held that the manufacture of 2.75 per cent beer prior to the enactment of the Volstead measure—that is, under the act of November 21, 1918, which did not define “intoxicating”—was legal (U. S. v. Standard Brewing Co., No. 458, October Term, 1919).

These decisions indicate that had the President issued his proclamation as empowered by the act of November 21, 1918, liquors could have been sold up to January 16, 1920, and that there is no doubt as to the power of Congress to define “intoxicating” as a content of more than ½ of 1 per cent of alcohol, for the enforcement of the prohibition amendment. See my article “‘Life, Liberty, and Liquor:’ A Note on the Police Power,” 6 Virginia Law Review, 156, 179 (December, 1919). The constitutional amendment will be attacked on the ground that it infringes the rights of the states and was illegally adopted, but it is not likely that these suits will be successful.

⁵ These figures are a revision of a table which appears in the Monthly Compendium for December, 1919.

⁶ The act was to amend a charter granted by Congress March 16, 1886. See Congressional Record, August 2, p. 3789.

⁷ The President signed four bills on October 22 (including the amendments to the Food Control Act), but failed to sign one which became law (Public No. 64) on account of the expiration of the time limit. The President approved a number of bills while he was in Paris. H. R. 2329 (war risk deficiencies) was enrolled on May 23, sent to the President the next day, and signed in Paris. H. R. 1200 (mileage appropriations for the house) was sent to the President on June 2 and signed in Paris June 17. The Indian appropriation bill (H. R. 2480) was sent to him June 16, and approved on June 30 on board the George Washington. During the short session of the Sixty-fifth Congress a number of bills were approved in Paris.

⁸ As to the meaning of “inability” and the proper authority to determine when it exists, constitutional lawyers are not very definite. Professor W. W. Willoughby simply states the problem but does not answer it. (2 Willoughby on the Constitution, 1146.) The most elaborate discussion occurred apropos of President Garfield's illness in 1881; Senator Trumbull, Judge Cooley, Professor Dwight, and Benjamin F. Butler contributed to an interesting symposium on the question in the North American Review, November, 1881. Of interest also is Hamlin, , “The Presidential Succession Act of 1886,” 18 Harvard Law Review, 191.Google Scholar Judge Cooley said that all the circumstances would have to be taken into consideration. In times of supreme trial—such as April, 1861 or April, 1917—it would be disastrous if a President withdrew himself for days, whereas at other times, a withdrawal for weeks or even months would not be too inconvenient. Judge Cooley urged that the question of “inability” was one for Congress to determine. “It is possible,” he said, “for a case to arise so plain, so unmistakably determined in the public judgment, that public opinion, with unanimous concurrence, would summon the Vice-President to act. But though this would make him the acting President de facto he would become acting President de jure only after solemn recognition in some form by Congress.” It is worthy of mention that the constitutional provision above quoted does not consider the possibility of the death of the President or Vice-President subsequent to the election but prior to the inauguration. Until 1886, succession vested in the President pro tempore of the senate and the Speaker of the house, instead of the secretary of state, etc. as at present. At that time the president pro tempore did not hold over from Congress to Congress until a successor was chosen; consequently if both the President and Vice-President had died during an interim between Congresses there would have been no one to succeed. Furthermore, under this arrangement succession could vest in a member of the political party which had been defeated in the election. During Cleveland's first administration and after Vice-President Hendricks died a Republican was president pro tempore of the Senate.

⁹ H. Res. 168 which passed on July 31 created a special committee (Good, chairman) to devise a plan for a budget. The testimony in the hearings before the committee is of great interest. The bill reported (H. R. 9783; House Report 362) passed on October 21.

¹⁰ H. Res. 324, House Report No. 373. So far as “pork” is concerned the only difference under the budget system as proposed by the house committee would be that the legislation would be framed by the rivers and harbors and public buildings committees and the appropriations would go through the single appropriation committee. Speaking of the difficulty of changing the existing committee system, Congressman Frear said: “No Hottentot king or dusky Senator in the far-off cannibal islands was ever more proud of his huge earrings ‥‥ than are some honored members of appropriation committees who have finally reached chairmanships on these powerful committees. ‥‥ Finally intrenched in power, they possess ordinary human attributes and cannot willingly be expected to relinquish seniority rights reached only after years of patient waiting.” In the Senate a special committee was appointed to devise a budget plan (McCormick, chairman; S. Res. 58; July 14, 1919) but the committee did not begin to function until after the close of the special session.

¹¹ The Government of England, vol. I, p. 267.

¹² Much of this space was of course taken up with extensions of remarks and reprints of various kinds of documents, a majority of which, perhaps, related to the League of Nations. Many Washington Post editorials were made available to the country through publication in the Record, and the views of many American citizens on the Peace Treaty were inserted in the proceedings of the senate. The Record frequently seemed like the Review of the Foreign Press, which was published by the British government during the war. Senator Williams read to the senate a long description of what would happen if the senate undertook to debate “Now I lay me down to sleep.”

¹³ See, for example, the Congressional Record for September 5, 1919.