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A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Louis P. Benson*
Affiliation:
Kent State University

Abstract

The purpose of this research note was to determine whether Philippine politics could be characterized as fitting a “machine politics model” (James Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development, APSR, 63 [December, 1969], 1142–1158). A province was selected which matched the criteria cited in Scott's model, and provincial political leaders and subleaders were asked to evaluate important considerations they used in deciding whom to support for public office.

Scott proposed that in electoral political systems, support moves from a dependence on deference to a dependence on particularistic rewards, and finally to dependence on ideology. Part of the study tested the three-phase model using factor analysis on ten variables generally thought to be crucial in Philippine politics. The factor analysis revealed six factors, three which matched Scott's three phases plus: the chance of winning, the use of threats, and party loyalty. Although Scott's three-phase model was rejected as inadequate, at the descriptive level the general attributes of machine politics (particularly as Philippine politics has moved from a reliance on deference and personal loyalty to a dependence on material reward) could be used to characterize Philippine politics.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1973

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Footnotes

*

I am indebted to the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii which made the field research in the Philippines possible. The data used in this article were gathered in a Southern Luzon province during 1970 for my dissertation at the University of Hawaii entitled “Political Leadership Through Political Liders: A New Approach for the Analysis of Philippine Provincial Leadership Positions.”

References

1 Dahl, Robert, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 102.Google ScholarVidich, Arthur J. and Bensman, Joseph, Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958)Google Scholar, devote a section of their book to the study of linkages in electoral politics from the local to the state and national levels. One of the best studies of subnational urban politics in America is Eldersveld, Samuel, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).Google Scholar

2 In the Philippines, interest in local government has been reflected in the research done by the Community Development Research Council (CDRC) and more recently the Local Government Center. For an interesting discussion of thinking on local development see Riggs, Fred W., Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifffin, 1964), pp. 365396Google Scholar, and Abueva, Jose and Guzman, Raul de, Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics (Manila: Bookmark, 1969).Google Scholar

3 Most of the accounts of subnational politics in the Philippines have been solely descriptive, such as Abueva, Jose V., Focus on the Barrio Citizens in Iloilo as They Affect Community Development (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council (CDRC), University of the Philippines, 1960).Google Scholar A series of four monographs published in 1968 from the Local Government Center of the University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration (Tito Firmalino and Nextor Pilar, The 1963 Local Elections in Aklan; Gabriel Iglesia and Elena Gazboa, The 1963 Local Elections in Lanao del Norte; Aprodicio Laquian and Roberto Pangilian, The 1963 Local Elections in Manila; and Romeo and Estrella Ocampo, The 1963 Local Elections in Davao) dealing with local elections and political leader recruitment in four localities still lacked a coherent framework since each author pursued his own interest.

4 Hollnsteiner, Mary, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality (Quezon City: CDRC, University of the Philippines, 1963), p. 163.Google Scholar Robert Schulze and Leonard Blumberg reported their findings in Schulze, and Blumberg, , “The Determination of Local Power Elites,” American Journal of Sociology, 63 (November, 1957), 290296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Warriner, Charles K., “The Prospects for a Philippine Sociology,” Philippine Sociological Review, 9 (January-April, 1961), 1218Google Scholar; quotation on p. 17.

6 Riggs, Fred W., “A Model for the Study of Philippine Social Structure,” Philippine Sociological Review, 7 (December, 1959), 132Google Scholar; quotation on p. 18. Recently a similar precaution was voiced by Simbulan, Dante C., “On Models and Developing Societies,” Asian Studies, 6 (December, 1968), 421430.Google Scholar

7 Scott, James, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969), 11421158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 The research for this study was conducted in a rural Philippine province of Southern Luzon during the first half of 1970. The province had eleven municipalities and was a lone congressional district. The economy was dependent on timber and agriculture, and the literacy rate in the province was the highest outside Manila.

9 Machine politics in Britain has been characterized eloquently by SirJennings, Ivor, Parly Politics, Volume l, Appeal to the People (London: Cambridge Press, 1960)Google Scholar; and Walcott, Robert Jr.English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Machine politics in the United States has been described by social scientists like Banfield, Edward and Wilson, James Q., City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard and M.I.T. Press, 1963)Google Scholar; and Zink, Harold, City Bosses in the United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1930)Google Scholar; and by practitioners like Flynn, Edward, You're The Boss (New York: Viking Press, 1947).Google Scholar Machine politics was noted at the local level even in Japan after the Meiji Reformation by Beardsley, Richard, Hall, John, and Ward, Robert, Village Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), Chapters 12 and 13.Google Scholar

10 Interesting and humorous examples of offering particularistic rewards such as jobs, money, and lodging can be found in Wendt, Lloyd and Kogan, Herman, Bosses in Lusty Chicago: The Story of Bathhouse John and Hinky Dink (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967).Google Scholar

11 Scott, pp. 1149–1150.

12 Scott, p. 1143. These criteria were used in the selection of the province studied. For instance in the province no governor or congressman was ever re-elected except for the incumbent congressman in the 1969 election. One political subleader referred to the province as basically an oppositionist province that would not reelect office holders so as to give other people a chance to hold office.

13 Scott, pp. 1142–1146.

14 References to the intermediaries are made by authors from Holmes, Geoffrey, British Politics in the Age of Anne (London: MacMillan, 1967)Google Scholar, to Weiss, Nancy Joan, Charles Francis Murphy, 1858–1924: Respectability and Responsibility in Tammany Politics (Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1968).Google Scholar

15 Dahl, , Who Governs?, p. 108.Google Scholar

16 Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 88.Google Scholar

17 Hollnsteiner, p. 41. Another useful description of liders is made in a monograph by Villanueva, Buenaventura, “Municipal Government and Politics,” (Laguna, Philippines: University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, June, 1962).Google Scholar

18 See Walcott and Zink.

19 Kaut, Charles, “Utang na Loob: A System of Contractual Obligations among the Tagalogs,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 17 (Autumn, 1961), 256272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The concept of “face” is also involved in utang na loob. It is considered disgraceful not to honor one's utang na loob. See Hollnsteiner, p. 77 and Grossholtz, Jean, The Politics of the Philippines: A Country Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 8691, 95–100, and 187–188.Google Scholar The notion of repaying personal favors is the basis of utang na loob, and it actually is not peculiar to the Philippines. Others have commented on the importance of debts of gratitude or reciprocity. For instance, Gamson, William, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 78Google Scholar, states: “Many politicians are eager to create obligations to themselves by doing small favors for others; such obligations can be converted into specific inducements at election time or when a crisis occurs.” Also Blau, Peter, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 1621Google Scholar, points out that in social intercourse reciprocity is usually expected.

20 Generally, fictive kinship or compadrazgo ties take the form of a wealthy patron's sponsoring a poor client. In the Philippines compadre ties are made by a wealthy individual's acting as the godparent of a client's child in a baptism or wedding. Hollnsteiner, pp. 63–67; Grossholtz, ; and Landé, Carl, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 14–23 and 133–148.Google Scholar For a comparative discussion of compadrazgo ties see Powell, John, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970), 411425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 One group contends that it is personal loyalty which has the greatest effect: Youngblood, Robert, “A Study of the 1963 Mayoralty Election in Jolo, Philippines,” Unpublished Master's Thesis, Honolulu, 1966, pp. 8790Google Scholar; and Agpalo, Remgio, “The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro,” Unpublished Manuscript, Quezon City, 1966.Google Scholar A second group places importance on capability and issues: Patanne, Eufemio, “Political Opinion,” Abueva, Jose and Guzman, Raul de, eds., The Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Politics, pp. 114118Google Scholar; and Averch, H., Denton, F., and Koehler, J., A Crisis of Ambiguity: Political and Economic Development in the Philippines (Santa Monica: Rand, 1970), pp. 60, 77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 Grossholtz, p. 152.

23 Scott, pp. 1156–1157; and Banfield and Wilson, pp. 121–125.

24 It is generally considered that Filipino politics is not based on ideology since politics is highly personalized. According to Agpalo and Villanueva, political support depends on family pattern, status and position, and self-interests. Landé, pp. 141–148, suggests that politics is based on dyadic relationships between patrons and clients. Other authorities such as Hollnsteiner and Grossholtz also emphasize social reciprocity.

25 As an example, Abueva, Jose, “Conditions of Administrative Development: Exploring Administrative Culture and Behavior in the Philippines,” CAG Occasional Paper (Bloomington: December, 1966)Google Scholar, points out that once they were away from their home province, the administrative personnel in Manila have tended to disregard their traditional family and compadre ties.

26 The questions which yielded the most realistic responses were designed so as to have the respondents answer about other liders. When questions which asked the liders about their own views were administered, the liders would give what they considered “correct” or proper answers. In several instances, liders who were influenced by money or jobs denied that money or jobs were important to them personally. Therefore, sixty-one liders were asked questions about others as well as questions about themselves. The results reported here are based on responses from questions about others.

27 By not using a rank ordering, the liders were better able to give tied scores for some variables if they chose to do so. Although the questionnaire was administered in English, those who completed the schedule demonstrated an understanding of the questions and the scale by elaborating on their numerical scoring with examples.

28 Cattell, Raymond B., “Scree Test for the Number of Factors,” Multivariate Behavior Research, 1 (1966), 245276.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

29 Powell.

30 When the liders elaborated after giving a score for the different variables, they referred to family ties, compadre ties, and utang na loob differently than Scott's term, “deference,” suggests. The liders defined these variables as personal bonds between themselves and others, either superordinates or subordinates. Deference implies the obedience given to only a superior. See Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development,” pp. 11461147.Google Scholar

31 See notes 19 and 24.

32 Downs.

33 Landé, pp. 48–69. In Philippine politics, political leaders switch from one party to another depending on which party can accommodate them the best. For instance President Ferdinand Marcos was the leader of the Liberal Party in the Senate before Liberal President Macapagal decided to run for reelection in 1965. Marcos was invited to join the Nacionalista Party as the party's presidential nominee.

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