¹ The most widely known of these books, some of which have since passed through several editions, were published in Gisevius, Switzerland. H. B., Bis zum bıtteren Ende (2 vols.. Zurich, 1946)Google Scholar; Pechel, Rudolf, Deutscher Widerstand (Zurich, 1946)Google Scholar; von Hassell, Ulrich, Vom anderen Deutschland (Zurich, 1946)Google Scholar; Schlabrendorff, Fabian, Offiziere gegen Hıtler (Zurich, 1946)Google Scholar. However, Meinecke, Friedrich examined the more general causes of Germany's downfall in his Die Deutsche Katastrophe (2nd ed., Wiesbaden, 1946)Google Scholar, which Fay, Sidney B. has translated: The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections (Cambridge, 1950)Google Scholar.

² Wahn und Wirklichkeit: Die Aussenpolıtik des Dritten Retches, Versuch einer Darstellung (Stuttgart, 1947)Google Scholar. A professional diplomat, Kordt joined Ribbentrop's staff as chief of his secretariat in March, 1938, after the latter became Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 4, 1938. In 1941, he was transferred to Shanghai as Consul General. It was there in 1944–1945 that he drafted this first analysis of the foreign policy of the Third Reich, largely on the basis of personal memoranda and his recollections. He has recently been reported as the director of a training school for the future foreign ministry of the West German Federal Republic. His more personal second book, Nicht aus den Akten … (Stuttgart, 1950)Google Scholar, is distinctly more valuable.

³ These books and their authors are identified on their first mention in the text. The following have not been used in the preparation of this paper: von Schweppenburg, Geyr, Erinnerunyen eines Militärattaché. London, 1933–1937 (Stuttgart. 1949)Google Scholar; von Blücher, Wipert, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Wiesbaden, 1951)Google Scholar. Schweppenburg served as military attaché in London and Blücher as minister in Helsinki. For present purposes, the following have not been of much use: Westphal, Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln: aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn, 1950)Google Scholar; von Rintelen, Enno, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse: Erinnerungen des deutschen Militärattachés in Rom 1936–1943 (Tübingen, 1951)Google Scholar. The publication in London of the English version of von Papen's, FranzMemoirs has been announced for July, 1952Google Scholar.

⁴ Gilbert, Felix (ed.), Hitler Directs His War; The Secret Records of His Daily Military Conferences (New York, 1950)Google Scholar. The editor has selected significant parts from the small fraction that survived the burning of the stenographic reports of conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The dates fall between December, 1942, and March, 1945. Dr.Picker, Henry, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, 1941–1942 (introduction and arrangement by Gerhard Ritter, Bonn, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁵ Since 1923 a member of the translation service of the Foreign Ministry, Schmidt became Hitler's chief interpreter in 1935 and continued to serve in this capacity until the end of the war. His book is especially valuable on the high-level interviews he attended from Stresemann's time. Although he warns historians of certain problems involved in his memoranda of these interviews, he unfortunately fails to explain the nature of the documents in his possession. He said nothing of such documents during an interrogation at Nürnberg in February, 1947, in which the author participated. Dr.Schmidt, Paul, Statist auf Diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–1945: Erinnerungen des Chefdolmetchers in Auswärtigen Ami mit den Staaismännern Europas (Bonn, 1950), p. 481Google Scholar. The part of this book dealing with the period from 1935 has been translated in somewhat abbreviated form: Steed, R. H. C. (ed.), Hitler's Interpreter (New York, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁶ Meissner was successively chief of the presidential chancellery under Ebert, Hindenburg, and Hitler, the latter giving him ministerial status. Reports by Hitler to President Hindenburg are summarized in his book, but exact quotations are rare. Meissner, Otto, Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler: der Schicksalsweg des deutschen Volkes von 1918–1945, wie ich ihn erlebte (3d ed., Hamburg, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁷ A naval officer in World War I, Weizsäcker's diplomatic service alternated between posts in Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway, with intervals of duty at the Ministry in Berlin until February, 1938, when Ribbentrop appointed him State Secretary in charge of the Foreign Ministry. In 1943 he sought and secured a transfer to Rome, where he served as ambassador to the Vatican until the end of the war. Sentenced to seven years imprisonment in 1948 by the American Military Tribunal, he was released in 1950 and died during the following summer (1951). From a long interview in February, 1947, at Lindau before his arrest, the author gained the impression of a man in the tradition of the German nationalists and of a sincere opponent of Hitler. His memoirs are diminished in value by repeated efforts to justify his remaining in office under Hitler and by the brevity of the excerpts from his contemporary notes. von Weizsäcker, Ernst, Erinnerungen (Munich, 1950)Google Scholar. There is an English translation: Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker (Chicago, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁸ After service in Ribbentrop's personal foreign office (Dienststelle Ribbentrop) as its expert on France, Abetz served as ambassador in Paris during most of the occupation. He represents himself as having worked for Franco-German reconciliation and for the improvement of France's lot during the occupation. The French court which tried him remained unimpressed, for it sentenced him in 1949 to twenty years imprisonment. Abetz, Otto, Das offene Problem: ein Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Frankreichpolitik (Cologne, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁹ Rahn's diplomatic service, beginning in 1928, included periods of duty in Constantinople and Lisbon, special missions to Iran, Turkey, and South America, and service in the legal, oriental and press divisions of the Ministry. He joined the Paris embassy in occupied France in 1940, played a part in the attempt to arm the rebels in Iraq from Syria in 1941, and represented the Foreign Ministry in Tunisia and in Italy until the surrender of the German forces there in 1945, in which he seems to have played a considerable part. Rahn, Rudolf, Ruheloses Leben: Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen (Düsseldorf, 1949)Google Scholar. Further light is thrown upon Germany's relations with Mussolini and his Italian Social Republic after Badoglio's surrender and upon the surrender of the German forces in Italy in Eitel Moellhausen, Friedrich, Die Gebrochene Achse (Alfeld/Leine, 1949)Google Scholar, a book which appeared originally in Italy under the title of La Carta Perdente. Moellhausen entered the Foreign Ministry in 1939, served in the Paris embassy, accompanied Rahn to Syria and Tunisia, and finally served with him in Italy, where he acted as Consul General in Rome before its capture by the Allies in 1943.

¹⁰ Franz Haider succeeded Ludwig Beck as Chief of the General Staff in September, 1938 in which capacity he continued to serve until retired because of differences with Hitler in 1942 over the conduct of operations in Russia. Haider's valuable diary remains unpublished, and only excerpts revealed in connection with the Nürnberg trials are available. Bor, Peter, Gespräche mit Halder (Wiesbaden, 1950)Google Scholar. Haider's well-known pamphlet, Hitler als Feldherr (Munich, 1949)Google Scholar, denies Hitler's alleged gifts as a military leader and, by inference, exalts the General Staff.

¹¹ Adolf Heusinger served as a member and as chief of the Operations Division of the Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres), 1937–1945, and is now one of the military advisers of the Bonn government. Heusinger, Adolf, Befehl im Widerstreit: Schickssalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923–1945 (Tübingen, 1950)Google Scholar.

¹² Schmidt, , Statist auf Diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 429, 430Google Scholar. He apparently thinks it significant that Hitler acted the part of a gracious and experienced host at the reception in honor of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden in 1935. Ibid., p. 303.

¹³ The four volumes of Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1919–1945, Series D, 1937–1945, that have so far appeared cover the period from September, 1937, to the occupation of Prague, March 15, 1939. The third volume, on the Spanish Civil War, begins in July, 1936. The same period is also covered by the four volumes of Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series.

¹⁴ Kordt, , Nicht aus den Akten …, pp. 178, 183, 184Google Scholar. By requiring the normal examinations, Kordt claims he effectively locked the doors against them.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 388–399.

¹⁶ Useful information on Ribbentrop's private foreign office, which was set up across the Wilhelmstrasse from the official Foreign Ministry appears in Kordt, , Nicht aus den Akten, pp. 78, 79, 88Google Scholar and in Abetz, , Das offene Problem, pp. 45–51Google Scholar. Upon the least-known and in some respects the most significant of these competing party agencies, Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, which worked with German minorities abroad, these books throw no light whatsoever.

¹⁷ Ribbentrop insisted that Weizsäcker was responsible solely to himself just as he was to Hitler. Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, pp. 167, 168Google Scholar. Weizsäcker told the author in February, 1947, in reply to a specific question, that he had no more than six private interviews with Hitler during five years of service as State Secretary. On March 26, 1946, von Steengracht, Weizsäcker's successor, testified at Nürnberg he had seen Hitler only twice on official occasions. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (40 vols., Nürnberg, 1947), Vol. X, p. 110Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Guderian, Heinz, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg, 1951), p. 75Google Scholar. Sitting next to Hitler at luncheon, October 10, 1939, after the Polish campaign in which he commanded the armored forces, Guderian drew this conclusion from Hitler's astonishment when he replied, to Hitler's question as to what the army's and people's reaction had been to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, that the army had sighed with relief. Cf. Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, p. 254Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Kordt, , Nicht aus den Akten, pp. 273, 274Google Scholar; Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, pp. 187, 188, 258Google Scholar.

²⁰ Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, p. 187Google Scholar.

²¹ Wahn und Wirklichkeit, pp. 311, 312. “Vergeblich sucht man in Hitlers Politik nach. einer Linie.” Nicht aus den Akten, pp. 396, 397Google Scholar.

²² Wahn und Wirklichkeit, p. 13. The italics are mine.

²³ Such is the trend of the book on Halder and of the writings of Heusinger and Westphal. Cf. Görlitz, Walter, Der deutsche Generalstab: Geschichte und Gestalt (Frankfurt am Main, n.d.)Google Scholar. However, there is conflicting evidence in Hossbach, who states that he drafted the overall organizational plan for the army in 1935 when Hitler decided to restore universal service. Hossbach, Friedrich, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934–1938 (Wolfenbüttel, 1949), pp. 94–95Google Scholar. Hossbach was the General Staff's adjutant with Hitler from 1934 to 1938. Guderian, no great admirer of the General Staff's conservative views on military matters, claims that it favored the attack upon Russia and expected a decisive victory in a matter of weeks. Guderian, , Erinnerungen, p. 128Google Scholar.

²⁴ Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, pp. 22, 34, 35, 47. It should be noted, however, that Hossbach acknowledges he was among those in 1933 who hoped for better things for Germany from Hitler's regime under Hindenburg's watchful care, and he is not one of those who claim to have foreseen the events of 1945. Ibid., p. 9. Cf. Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, , Es geschah in Deulschland: Menschenbilder unseres Jahrhunderts (Tübingen, 1951), pp. 306–307Google Scholar. Schwerin-Krosigk was Minister of Finance from 1932 to 1945. On the point of committing suicide in April, 1945, Hitler named him Foreign Minister in the shadow government of Admiral Dönitz. Cf. Lüdde-Neurath, Walter, Regierung Dönitz: Die Letzlen Tage des Dritten Reiches (Göttingen, 1951)Google Scholar.

²⁵ Staatssekretär, pp. 337–339. In the absence of printed sources and of direct quotations from documents presumably now in Meissner's possession, no adequate means of testing the truth of these assertions exist.

²⁶ von Dirksen, Herbert, Moskau-Tokio-London: Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren Deutscher Aussenpolitik, 1919–1939 (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 202Google Scholar. This book has been translated: Moscow, Tokyo, London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy (Norman, Okla., 1952)Google Scholar. After serving as head of the East European division of the Ministry, Dirksen went as ambassador to Moscow in 1928, to Tokyo in 1933, and to London in 1938. He was given no further diplomatic assignment after his return to Berlin in August, 1939. Because the Russians seized h s private papers in Silesia, he wrote his memoirs largely from memory. Soviet Russia has published selections from his private papers. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, Vol. II, Dirksen Papers (1938–1939) (Moscow, 1948)Google Scholar.

²⁷ The Hossbach Protocol may be conveniently consulted in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. I, From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937–September 1938) (Washington, 1949), pp. 29–39Google Scholar. Konstantin von Neurath, Foreign Minister at that time, attended along with the Minister of Defense, Marshal von Blomberg, and the chiefs of armed services, General Fritsch, Goering, and Admiral Raeder.

²⁸ Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, pp. 191–193. Blomberg, in fact, joined Neurath and the chiefs of the armed services in warning against the dangers of war before the completion of Germany's rearmament. Hitler's removal of Blomberg and Fritsch along with Neurath some three months later may well have been influenced by their opposition at this time.

²⁹ Nicht aus den Akten, p. 227. Nothing, it is true, was done to follow up the idea of working out Hitler's idea of prolonging the Spanish Civil War. On the contrary, the diplo-matic documents show that the Wehrmacht as well as the Foreign Ministry supported Italy's desire for as speedy an end to it as possible. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. III, The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Washington, 1950), pp. 544, 545, 554–557, 628Google Scholar.

³⁰ Staatssekretär, p. 418.

³¹ Churchill does not fix the exact date. Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, Vol. I, The Gathering Storm. (Boston, 1948). pp. 222–224Google Scholar; Picker, , Hitlers Tischgespräche, appendix, pp. 443–450Google Scholar. Ribbentrop's memorandum of January 2, 1938, in which he wrote that a “change in the eastern status quo to Germany's advantage [im deutschen Sinne] can only be accomplished by force” is sometimes cited to prove Hitler's intentions to take the Ukraine. Neither the Ukraine nor Poland is mentioned. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. I, From Neurath to Ribbentrop, pp. 162–168.

³² Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. II, Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937–1938 (Washington, 1949), p. 504Google Scholar. By this Weizsäcker meant the autonomy of minorities in Czechoslovakia and its eventual break-up. He uses the same expression in his memoirs. Erinnerungen, p. 165.

³³ Memorandum dated May 29, 1938, on Hitler's speech to the generals on the preceding day. Foerster, Wolfgang, Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg: aus nachgelassenen Papieren des Generalstabschef Ludwig Beck (Munich, 1949), pp. 90–96Google Scholar. The rapid influx of young officers of National Socialist orientation undoubtedly worried the General Staff.

³⁴ On September 10, 1938, Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador, wired Lord Halifax that Weizsäcker, while insisting that Hitler would not believe Great Britain would intervene, “recommends merely friendly message be sent him describing our difficulties and apprehensions.” Henderson, who of course may not have reported Weizsäcker correctly, although they were seeing each other frequently at this time [Henderson, N., Failure of a Mission (New York, 1940), pp. 149, 150Google Scholar], in fact advised against a strong warning as it might precipitate the feared armed action. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, Vol. II, 1938 (London, 1949), pp. 283, 284Google Scholar. Cf. Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, pp. 177–179Google Scholar; Kordt, , Nicht aus den Akten, pp. 245 ff.Google Scholar; Hassell, , Vom anderen Deutschland, p. 17Google Scholar.

³⁵ Staatssekretär, pp. 455, 520, 536. He also approves the verdict of guilty for the invasion of the Low Countries, May 10, 1940. Ibid., p. 540. His book, though bulky and expensive, has, it should be noted, gone through at least three editions.

³⁶ Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 302.

³⁷ Es geschah in Deutschland, p. 217.

³⁸ Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, pp. 148–149Google Scholar.

³⁹ Kordt, , Nichi aus den Akten, p. 192Google Scholar; Meissner, , Staatssekretär, pp. 447–452Google Scholar. Meissner suspects that French influence was behind Schuschnigg's decision.

⁴⁰ Halder says that the part of the general directive for overall operations which applied to Austria (Fall Otto) was directed against an attempted monarchical restoration and was never worked out in detail. Bor, , Gespräche mit Halder, p. 117Google Scholar; Guderian, , Erinnerungen, pp. 42–46Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, pp. 147, 148.

⁴² An excerpt from the diary of Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstabe, who was among the war criminals executed following the principal Nürnberg trial. Foerster, , Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg, p. 81Google Scholar.

⁴³ A tour of inspection of the Czech frontier by British military attachés had shown no evidence of unusual troop concentrations. The following are the more detailed accounts of this affair: Kordt, , Wahn und Wirhlichkeit, pp. 109, 110Google Scholar; Kordt, , Nicht aus den Aklen, pp. 224–226Google Scholar; Schmidt, , Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 388–392Google Scholar; Meissner, , Staatssekretär, p. 459Google Scholar; Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, pp. 164, 165Google Scholar; Dirksen, , Moskau-Tokio-London, pp. 212, 213Google Scholar. Hitler's speech of May 28, 1938, is reconstructed from Beck's notes in Foerster, , Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg, pp. 88–90Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Nicht aus den Akten, p. 313 ff. A new file, labelled “Einkreisung,” was set up in the Ministry before the end of March, 1939, as a catchall for correspondence relating to the general international situation.

⁴⁵ Das offene Problem, pp. 100, 101.

⁴⁶ As is well-known, Hitler never regarded the question of colonies either as a serious obstacle or as an effective basis for an understanding. The question was discussed to some extent during the Hitler-Halifax conversations at Berchtesgaden, November 19, 1937. For the German memorandum on these conversations, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. I, From Neuralh to Ribbentrop, September 1937–September 1938, pp. 54–67.

⁴⁷ Picker, , Hitlers Tischgespräche, pp. 42, 43 (July 22, 1941)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Nicht aus den Akten, pp. 103 ff., 159. Contrary to his expectations, the series, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, will presumably in due course throw light upon the contacts Ribbentrop established in Spain and Portugal with the Duke of Windsor in July-August, 1940, after the defeat of France. Kordt concludes that Edward probably had no conception of Hitler's and Ribbentrop's schemes in which he was to play so important a rôle. Ibid., p. 399.

⁴⁹ Moskau-Tokio-London, pp. 120–122. Hitler nevertheless agreed that credits already arranged should be prolonged. The Treaty of Berlin of 1926 had been renewed May 5, 1933.

⁵⁰ Staatssecretär, p. 342.

⁵¹ Kordt, , Wahn und Wirklichkeit, p. 142Google Scholar.

⁵² Ibid., p. 155, n. 2. This claim is not confirmed by the published German diplomatic correspondence. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. IV, The Aftermath of Munich, October 1938–March 1939 (Washington, 1951), pp. 602–633Google Scholar.

⁵³ Wahn und Wirklichkeit, pp. 159, 160 fn.; Nicht aus den Akten, pp. 313 ff.; Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, p. 235Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 444, 539.

⁵⁵ Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche, passim.

⁵⁶ Abetz, , Das offene Problem, p. 126 ff.Google Scholar; Hitler in a situation conference, end of March, 1942, Heusinger, , Befehl im Widerstreit, p. 180Google Scholar; Picker, , Hitlers Tischgespräche, p. 60 (April 1, 1942)Google Scholar, p. 78 (April 28, 1942), p. 83 (May 13, 1942); Meissner, , Staatssekretär, p. 546Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Picker, , Hitlers Tischgespräche, p. 107 (July 7, 1942)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 100, 101 (June 27, 1942).

⁵⁹ For a first-hand account of the struggle over the control of policy in Eastern Europe, see Kleist, Peter, Zwischen Stalin und Hitler, 1939–1945 (Bonn, 1950), pp. 129–225Google Scholar. Following service in administrative offices concerned with East Germany (1932–1936), Kleist worked in Ribbentrop's personal foreign office (Dienststelle Ribbentrop) in various capacities in connection with Fastern Europe until January, 1943, when he became one of the higher officials (Ministerial Dirigent) in Rosenberg's Ministry. The final phase of his career, as a member of Ribbentrop's personal staff (1943–1945), is mentioned in connection with peace moves.

⁶⁰ Picker, , Hitlers Tischgespräche, pp. 44, 45 (November 8–10, 1941)Google Scholar; pp. 71–72 (April 11, 1942); p. 303 (May 12, 1942); p. 102 (June 29, 1942); p. 314 (July 2, 1942); pp. 110, 111 (July 9, 1942); p. 114 (July 22, 1942); pp. 125–126 (July 27, 1942).

⁶¹ Gilbert, , Hitler Directs His War, pp. 105, 106Google Scholar.

⁶² Schmidt, , Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 552, 576Google Scholar.

⁶³ Weizsäcker, , Erinnerungen, pp. 373–375Google Scholar. Guderian, Chief of the General Staff from the attempt upon Hitler's life, July 20, 1944, to March, 1945, says he suggested to Ribbentrop on January 25, 1945, that the two should together go to Hitler and propose an effort to secure an armistice with one side or the other. Ribbentrop refused, alleging Hitler's rejection of negotiations with the enemy. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, pp. 364–368. In a second volume, Paul Schmidt writes briefly of three agents' having been sent to Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden in February, 1945. with Hitler's approval. Their mission was to secure a slackening of Allied operations in the West, not a formal armistice, to enable Germany to concentrate against the Red Army. As they could offer only the evacuation of occupied territory, while the Western Allies insisted upon the disappearance of the National Socialist regime, nothing was accomplished. There are obvious inconsistencies between this and the evidence of Weizsäcker and Guderian. Schmidt, Paul, Der Statist auf der Galerie, 1945–1950: Erlebnisse, Kommentare, Vergleiche (Bonn, 1951), pp. 10–13Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Kleist, , Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, pp. 230–278Google Scholar. Kleist claims to have tried unsuccessfully for contacts with representatives of the Western powers in Stockholm, also that he personally regarded an agreement with the Soviet Union as a betrayal of the anti-Bolshevik Russians such as General Vlassov.

⁶⁵ According to late information, Holldack is a member of the staff of the Süddeutsche Zeitung of Munich. Holldack, Heinz, Was wirklich geschah: Die diplomatische Hintergründe der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Munich, 1949), p. 143Google Scholar. The book reprints a representative selection of documents.

⁶⁶ The italics are Assmann's. Assmann, Kurt, Deutsche Schicksaljahre: Historische Bilder aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und Seiner Vorgeschichte (Wiesbaden, 1950), pp. 539–540Google Scholar. Had Hitler died after Munich, history would have regarded him, in Assmann's opinion, as one of the greatest and most successful statesmen of modern history. Ibid., p. 38. In charge of the historical section of the German Naval High Command, Assmann worked for more than three years after 1945 in the German naval archives in London, where they are under the control of the British Admiralty. Several of Assmann's articles, some of which were used in the preparation of his volume, have appeared in American periodicals.