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The Prussian Theory of Monarchy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

W. W. Willoughby*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University

Extract

During the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when absolute monarchy was the prevailing governmental type in Europe, the principle was very generally held by the rulers, and not infrequently acted upon, that the people of a state, together with their lands and other goods and chattels, were, in a very real sense, the property of their king and constituted his patrimonium. That this view should have prevailed, is historically explainable. The entire feudal system, out of which the modern monarchy had evolved, was founded upon the idea that the ownership of land carried with it, as one of its incidents, the right of political rulership. When, then, by a process of development, the king had obtained a supremacy over his feudal lords, when his “peace” had become higher than theirs, and had extended over the whole country, and when these lords and those who in turn held of them were forced to concede that they held their lands by a conditional grant from the king, their liege lord, the idea that the monarch was the owner of the entire realm was complete. In him lay the final legal title to all land. All other persons had “tenures” rather than rights of ownership. And, as for the people themselves, the idea that one person might be another person's “man” or “woman” was universal. The influence of these ideas on recent political conceptions may be indicated by recalling that serfdom did not disappear from Germany until well into the nineteenth century.

This patrimonial conception of monarchy explains the accepted idea that the throne might be inherited, or willed away by testament, like a piece of property, and that it might be bought and sold, and acquired by marriage. It explains also the recognized right of the king to requisition, upon occasion, the goods of his subjects, and even to sell those subjects themselves to foreign powers, as, for example, was done when the Hessian soldiers were sold by their ruler to England for use against the Americans in the Revolutionary War.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1917

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References

1 Quoted by Borgeaud—Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions Eng. trans.), 68.

2 The constitution of France, if its fundamental laws can be regarded as constituting a complete instrument of government, does not contain an explicit statement of popular sovereignty, but the principle certainly finds acceptance in her constitutional jurisprudence. Perhaps the clearest statement of the doctrine in formal terms is to be found in the constitution of Belgium, adopted in 1831, in which the following declarations occur: “Art. 25. All powers emanate from the people. They shall be exercised in the manner established by the Constitution…. Art. 29. The executive power is vested in the King, subject to the regulations of the Constitution.‥‥ Art. 129. No law, ordinance, or regulation of the general, provincial, or communal government shall be obligatory until after having been published in the manner prescribed by law. Art. 130. The Constitution shall not be suspended, either in whole or in part.”

3 The history of political theories shows that there have been not a few philosophers who, admitting an original ethical right in the people to control their own political destinies, have asserted the possibility of its complete alienation to their rulers, so that when this act of surrender has been once performed, they are as wholly without the right to control their rulers as though they had never possessed it. It is immaterial for the purposes of this essay to distinguish between the status of those who once had the right of self-government but are conceived to have surrendered it, and those who are regarded as having never possessed it.

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