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Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Henry W. Chappell Jr.  and
William R. Keech
Henry W. Chappell Jr.
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina
William R. Keech
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Abstract

We present a model of party competition that produces more realistic patterns of results than those often emphasized in the literature. Reversing Downs (1957), we assume that parties win elections in order to formulate policies, rather than formulate policies in order to win elections. Voters are modeled first as having perfect information about candidate positions, and then under conditions of uncertainty. In simulation experiments we show that policy motivation and voter uncertainty can bring about persistent and predictable party differences in sequential majority rule elections. As the degree of voter certainty decreases, parties diverge towards their optima, whereas increases in voter certainty draw parties towards cycles in which party positions vary, but predictable issue stances are maintained on the average.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 80 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 881 - 899
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1986

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