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Peace, War, and the Balance of Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

R. Harrison Wagner
R. Harrison Wagner
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
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Abstract

Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation. I argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation. The most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are (1) whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and (2) how many states' interests will be affected by the outcome.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 88 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 593 - 607
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1994

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