Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c47g7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T21:53:04.583Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Decision in Groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Lawrence S. Rothenberg*
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology

Abstract

Understanding why members leave or remain in groups has received little attention despite its fundamental importance for organizational maintenance. In this analysis, a theory of experiential search is proposed and applied to Common Cause. Group participation is conceptualized as a process by which imperfectly informed decision makers learn about the organizations they join. This framework makes quitting understandable and provides a link between the initial membership choice and follow-up decisions.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Amemiya, Takeshi. 1985. Advanced Econometrics. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Arnold, R. Douglas. 1982. “Overtilled and Undertilled Fields in American Politics.” Political Science Quarterly 97: 91103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Belsley, David A., Kuh, Edwin, and Welsch, Roy E.. 1980. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York: John Wiley & Sons.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1977. Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Burdett, Kenneth. 1978. “A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates.” American Economic Review 68: 212–20.Google Scholar
Chow, Gregory C. 1960. “Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions.” Econometrica 28: 591605.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, Peter B., and Wilson, James Q.. 1961. “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization.” Administrative Science Quarterly 6: 129–66.Google Scholar
Cohen, Michael D., March, James G., and Olsen, Johan P.. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cook, Constance E. 1984. “Participation in Public Interest Groups: Membership Motivations.” American Politics Quarterly 12: 409–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gotz, Glenn A., and McCall, John J.. 1983. “Sequential Analysis of the Stay/Leave Decision: U.S. Air Force Officers.” Management Science 29: 335–51.Google Scholar
Gotz, Glenn A., and McCall, John J.. 1984. A Dynamic Retention Model for Air Force Officers: Theory and Estimates. Rand Report R-3028-AF. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.Google Scholar
Hansen, John Mark. 1985. “The Political Economy of Group Membership.” American Political Science Review 79: 7996.Google Scholar
Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore: Resources for the Future.Google Scholar
Hausman, Jerry A. 1978. “Specification Tests in Econometrics.” Econometrica 46: 1251–71.Google Scholar
Hausman, Jerry A. 1978. “Specification Tests in Econometrics.” Econometrica 46: 1251–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausman, Jerry A., and Wise, David A.. 1979. “Attrition Bias in Experimental and Panel Data: The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment.” Econometrica 47: 445–73.Google Scholar
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Johnson, Paul E. 1987. “Social Choice in Voluntary Organizations: Myopia, Foresight, and Majority Rule Decision Processes.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.Google Scholar
McFarland, Andrew S. 1984. Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.Google Scholar
Maddala, G. S. 1977. Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
March, James G. 1978. “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice.” Bell Journal of Economics 9: 587608.Google Scholar
Moe, Terry M. 1980. The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Croups. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Mortensen, Dale T. 1986. “Job Search and Labor Market Analysis.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 2, ed. Ashenfelter, Orley and Layard, Richard. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Croups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pindyck, Robert S., and Rubinfeld, Daniel L.. 1981. Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts. 2d ed.New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1966. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally.Google Scholar
Shaiko, Ronald G. 1986. “Interest Group Research: Cultivating an Unsettled Plot.” Polity 18: 720–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, V. Kerry. 1985. “A Theoretical Analysis of the ‘Green Lobby.’American Political Science Review 79: 132–47.Google Scholar
Vuong, Quang H. 1986. “Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses.” Social Science Working Paper no. 605. California Institute of Technology.Google Scholar
Walker, Jack. 1983. “The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America.” American Political Science Review 77: 390406.Google Scholar
Wilde, Louis L. 1979. “An Information-Theoretic Approach to Job Quits.” In Studies in the Economics of Search, ed. Lippman, Steven A. and McCall, John J.. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Wilson, James Q. 1962. The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations, New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar