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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Larry B. Hill*
Affiliation:
University of Oklahoma

Abstract

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Type
Communications
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1975

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References

1 Parenthetically, it is not, as Thayer contends, the latter approach which led me to the conclusion that ombudsman have little real power; that is simply an empirical circumstance based upon their legal limitations. A further point of fact: I did not say that departments “never” view the ombudsman as a dangerous enemy; there are times when they have done so, and I have written about such cases.

2 For a more extensive treatment than is provided in the article under discussion of the relationship of the ombudsman to these concepts and for a citation of much relevant literature, see my article: The New Zealand Ombudsman's Authority System,” Political Science, 20 (09, 1968), 4051CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See Hill, Larry B., “Affect and Interaction in an Ambiguous Authority Relationship: New Zealand's Bureaucrats and the Ombudsman,” Journal of Comparative Administration, 4 (05, 1972), 3558CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Chapter 8 of my unpublished manuscript, “The Model Ombudsman: New Zealand's Democratic Experiment.”

5 For a lengthy elaboration of these matters see Chapter 2 of my forthcoming book, Ombudsmen, Bureaucracy, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

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