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Neo-Behavioralism—A Rebuttal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Wallace Mendelson
Affiliation:
University of Texas
Fred Kort
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut

Abstract

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Type
Communications
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1963

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References

page 951 note 1 Schubert, (ed.), Judicial Decision-Making (New York, 1963)Google Scholar.

page 951 note 2 The Roosevelt Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. xiGoogle Scholar.

page 952 note 3 Kort, , “Simultaneous Equations And Boolean Algebra In The Analysis of Judicial Decisions,” Law And Contemporary Problems, Vol. 28 (1963), pp. 143, 160CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Despite its date, this was published in August, 1963.

page 952 note 4 As to Alfange's assertion that “Pritchett is most emphatically not a behavioralist,” see my response to Pritchett, above.

page 952 note 5 359 U.S. 344 (1959).

page 952 note 6 360 U.S. 474 (1959).

page 952 note 7 For opposite responses to the over-broad opinion of the Court, see Thornhillv. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In the former, there were no qualifying opinions, but the Court's language was cut down to size in a series of later decisions. In Youngstown, every judge who supported the “opinion of the Court” wrote a qualifying opinion-thus presumably reducing the occasion for surprise and apparent reversal in future cases. It has been said that the absence of qualifying opinions in Thornhill is due to a tradition which precludes them in a case involving a judge's first opinion for the Court.

page 952 note 8 See Strauss, , “An Epilogue” in Storing, Essays On The Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 308Google Scholar.

page 952 note 9 Ulmer, , “Supreme Court Behavior And Civil Liberties,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1960), p. 311CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 953 note 10 See, however, Robert Dahl's behavioral conclusion: “… the role of the Court as a policy making institution is not simple; and it is an error to suppose that its functions can be either described or appraised by means of simple con-cepts drawn from democratic or moral theory.” Decision Making In A Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court As a National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law, Vol. 6 (1958), p. 293Google Scholar.

page 953 note 11 Loc. cit., note 9, above, pp. 295, 311.

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