¹ Aaron, Richard, John Locke (Oxford, 1955), p. 273 Google Scholar.

² Marx, Karl, The German Ideology (International Publishers, 1960), p. 17 Google Scholar.

³ Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1952), pp. 203–214 Google Scholar.

⁴ The Works of John Locke (12th edition, London, 1824), vol. II, p. 408 Google Scholar. (Hereafter cited as Works.)

⁵ Thoughts on Education (Works, vol. VIII), sec. 186;Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, Works, Vol. IX, pp. 305–306; Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, MS c. 24, ff. 196–197. (Manuscript references are cited according to their shelf mark in the Bodleian Library, Oxford University, where they are housed.)

⁶ The Second Treatise is described on the title page as “An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government.” Inthe First Treatise, Locke writes: “We must know how the first ruler, from whom any one claims, came by his authority, upon what ground any one has empire, what histitle is to it, before we can know who has a right to succeed him in it….” par. 94. cf. par. 83. Two Treatises of Government (ed)., Peter Laslett (second edition, Cambridge, 1967). (Spelling and punctuation have been modernized.)

⁷ Second Treatise, par. 101.

⁸ The first argument does not quite apply to Filmer, however, sincehe does attempt to support his position with citations from an historical record that antedates government, i.e., the Bible. Locke himself refers to Filmer's “History out of Scripture on which he pretends wholly to build his government.” First Treatise, par. 128; cf. par. 154. The statement does make sense, though, assuming, as Locke did, that this so-called historical argument had been refuted in the First Treatise and that once divine history was discounted, no reference to human history could possibly take its place. The second argument is used against Filmer by showing that even Scripture records that men lived under different forms of government.

⁹ First Treatise, pars. 58, 59; Second Treatise, par. 103. The point is also stated in an unpublished manuscript: “For that which was very fit and reasonable to be done at one time may be very unfit and unreasonable at another”. MS c. 34, f. 89.

¹⁰ In matters of prudence, “a man is principally helped” by “the history of matter of fact.” Journal, June 26, 1681, MS f.5.From history “one may learn great and useful instructions of prudence.” Ibid, April 6–10, 1677, MS f.2. In fact, “history teaches this (prudence) best, next to experience.” Locke to King, Reverend, 08 25, 1703, Works, vol. IX, pp. 305–306 Google Scholar; cf. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed.) Alexander Fraser (Dover, 1959), Bk. 4, ch. 16, #11. (Hereafter cited by Book, chapter, and article numbers.) The study of history, however, is only instrumentally important to an understanding of morality. Locke writes: “I do not deny but history is very useful and very instructive of human life, but if it be studied only for the reputation of being an historian, it is a very empty thing.” Journal, March 29, 1677, MS f.2. Thus, while the “great end” of history “is to give an account of the actions of men as embodied in society …. with the reading of history, I think the study of morality should be joined. I mean not the ethics of the Schools …. but such as …. above all the New Testament teaches, wherein a man may learn how to live, which is the business of ethics.” Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, MS c.24, ff. 196–7; cf. note 12 below.

¹¹ First Treatise, par. 106 (italics added); cf. par. 122. In light of this, the question of origins should be rephrased. The purpose of political theory is not really to provide a narrative account of the origins of government, but rather, to relate the proper origins of government. Obviously, Filmer's Patriarcha did offer a genetic explanation of political society; in that sense it was a political theory. But Locke refutes it because it is a “false” political theory. And, being false, it is more like a “fiction” than a political theory. First Treatise, pars. 34, 147. See notes 74 and 105 below.

¹² Journal, April 6–10, 1677, MS f.2.

¹³ First Treatise, par. 124; cf. par. 153. Hence the telling argument against Filmer's theory is that for all of its reliance upon “Scripture history,” it cannot “be accommodated to the nature of things” norcan it “be made to agree with that constitution and order which God had settled inthe world.” Ibid, par. 137. And, in the opening sentences of the Second Treatise, Locke repeats the point, “it having been shown in the foregoing discourse” that “there being no Law of Nature nor positive Law of God” to support Filmer's arguments, we “must of necessity find out another use of government, another original of political power,” e.g., one which does conform to the Law of Nature. Second Treatise, par. 1; cf par. 143.

¹⁴ To avoid any confusion, I would like to make it clear that I accept Laslett's evidence that the Second Treatise was written, or at least begun, before the First Treatise. Cf. Laslett, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 45–66. Indeed, given Locke's belief that one's moral principles should be “well settled” in his mind prior to consulting history, we should expect this tobe the case. Nevertheless, the sequential remarks in the text above are appropriate, refering to the order of the two treatises as the work was published.

In a way, the use of the term ‘fiction’ here and in the title of this article is somewhat misleading, since it would not have been acceptable to Locke. For him, a ‘fiction’ was a creation of one's “fancy,” a poetic construction bearing no relationship to reality. For that reason, he was prepared to label it“false.” First Treatise, par. 147. Filmer maintained that any theory which presupposed a state of nature was just such a “fiction.” Ibid, par. 34. Locke, of course, did not agree. Or, to put it another way, Locke believed it possible to use the state of nature as a ‘truth-concept,’ not only because it referred to actual human history, but also because, properly stated, it set forth the logical and moral conditions of human existence. And, because it described the “nature of things,” it was true. Having said this for Locke's benefit, I retain the word 'fiction,' to be understood as most contemporary readers would understand it: namely, as a logical construct independent of but relatable to a body of factual information. In this sense, it is very close to Locke's own understanding of the ‘state of nature.“

¹⁵ “since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known.” Bk. 3, ch. 11, #17.

¹⁶ Dunning, William A., A History of Political Theories (New York, 1921), p. 345 Google Scholar; Cobban, Alfred, In Search of Humanity (New York, 1960), p. 93 Google Scholar; Wiley, Basil, The Seventeenth Century Background (New York, 1955), p. 265 Google Scholar; Goldwin, Richard, “Locke,” in Strauss, Leo and Cropsey, Joseph (eds.), History of Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1963)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Cox, Richard, Locke on War and Peace (Oxford, 1960)Google Scholar; Leo Strauss, op. cit., p. 224; Bluhm, William T., Theories of the Political System (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), pp. 303ffGoogle Scholar.; Richard Goldwin, in Strauss and Cropsey, op. cit., pp. 435ff.

¹⁸ Wolin, Sheldon, Politics and Vision, (Boston, 1960), p. 307 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Second Treatise, pars. 89 (italics added), 125, 131; First Letter on Toleration (Works, vol. V), p. 10 Google Scholar.

²⁰ Cox, op. cit., pp. 75–76.

²¹ The citations by Cox from the Second Treatise are pars. 94, 198, 203, 219, 225.

²² Because of the “general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death,” men, according to Hobbes, are naturally ‘inclined’ to “contention, enmity, and war.” Leviathan, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1958, Part I, chapters 11, 13, 15; Part II, chapter 17. Locke agrees that “the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction,” but he nowhere describes the state of nature in those terms. Second Treatise, par. 16. Also, see note 49 below.

²³ Second Treatise, pars. 198, 219, 203. (Wher there are multiple references in a note, they will be listed according to the order in which they appear in the text of the article rather than by the chronological numbering of the paragraphs.)

²⁴ Cox, op. cit., p. 79.

²⁵ Second Treatise, par. 226.

²⁶ Ibid, par. 211. The point is that there are circumstances not dependent upon the use of force by some men—which does institute the state of war—whereby men are returned to the state of nature. See Locke's statement that when a government is “dissolved” by a “calamity” men are returned to the state of nature. Ibid, par. 121. This return may also bethe result of a neglect of duty or an abdication by the executive. Ibid, par. 219.

²⁷ Essays on the Law of Nature, (ed.) Leyden, W. Von (Oxford, 1958), Essay VII, p. 201 Google Scholar; Essay I, p. 119; Essay VI, p. 189. To claim absolute liberty, as Locke believed that Hobbesian man did, is to “negate the law of nature.” Essay II, p. 123. Locke specifically rejects this claim in Essay VIII, pp. 207, 211, 213. (Hereafter this work will be cited as Essays.) Also, Locke argues, “were there no law (of nature), there would be no moral good or evil, but man would be left to a most entire liberty in all his actions.” First Tract on Government in Two Tracts on Government, (ed.) Abrams, Philip (Cambridge, 1967), p. 124 Google Scholar.

²⁸ Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, chapter 31.

²⁹ In fact, God “cannot choose what is not good.” Bk. 2, ch. 21, #50, 51 (italics given). “Wisdom and goodness must be ingredientsof that perfect or super excellent being which we call God.” Journal, August 1, 1680, MS f.4 (italics added). Also, see Essays, Essay VI, p. 183ff. Locke recognized, however, that he had not actually resolved the controversy over man's free will versus God's omnipotence. He confesses in a letter to a friend: “I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding—that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence or omniscience in God; though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I must freely assent to.” Locke to Molyneaux, William, 01 20, 1693, Some Familiar Letters Between Mr. Locke and Several of his Friends (London, 1708), pp. 26–27 Google Scholar. In the First Treatise, Locke argues that God cannot be supposed to have created man and placed him in a natural condition where he would “perish again, presently after a few moments continuance.” par. 86. cf. Second Treatise, par. 6.

³⁰ Referring to those who view the universe in mechanistic terms, as Hobbes certainly did, Locke declares that “by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent.”Hence,“morality and mechanism …. are not very easy to be reconciled or madeconsistent.” Bk. 1, ch. 2, #14 (italics added).

³¹ These, of course, were not Locke's only adversaries. From letters to his father and friends, Locke seems very early in life to have staked out a position for himself somewhere between the “glorious Oceana” of Harrington and the “goblins of war and blood” of Hobbes. MS c.24, ff.49, 173–4.

³² Second Treatise, pars. 22, 57.

³³ First Letter on Toleration, p. 45; Second Treatise, par. 8.

³⁴ Second Treatise, pars. 10, 11, 16, 172, 181.

³⁵ Ibid, par. 63.

³⁶ Essays, Essay V, p. 163: Second Treatise, par. 11.For a more extensive discussion of Locke and Hobbes on natural law, see my paper, “Natural Law and Political Obligation,” presented to a Conference on the Thought of John Locke, York University, Toronto, December 2–3, 1966.

³⁷ Second Treatise, par. 19 (italics added).

³⁸ Ibid, par. 128.

³⁹ Essays, Essay V, p. 163.

⁴⁰ Second Treatise, par. 16. “Every imprudent action does not make a man culpable in foro conscientiae,” Locke to King, Reverend, 08 25, 1703, Works, vol. IX, pp. 305–306 Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Not surprisingly, Locke's argument regarding revolution, which is a state of war between the ruler and the people, restates the same limitations. Thus, he maintains, “revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs.” Mistakes are permitted the ruler, so long as “the main of (his)conduct” is directed toward “nothing but the care of the public.” Locke is willing to go even further. “Great mistakes” and “many wrong and inconvenient laws” will be tolerated by the people “without mutiny or murmur.” In other words, a state of war must be a “declaration of a design” revealing moral corruption, and not simply human fallibility. Consequently, the “ill designs of the rulers” must be easily visible to members of society. The people must hold “strong suspicions of the evil intentions of their governors,” suspicions based upon “manifest evidence” and “the general course and tendency of things.” There must be, Locke concludes, “a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifaces, all tending the same way” as aprelude to a state of war. Second Treatise, pars. 20, 165, 205, 210, 225, 230 (italics added).

⁴² Ibid. pars. 8, 172, 181. The individual must separate himself from “the ties of the common law of reason.” par. 16.

⁴³ Ibid, pars. 16, 17; Thoughts on Education, sec. 143.

⁴⁴ Second Treatise, pars. 21, 241, 242.

⁴⁵ For, “in all collections of men,” there are bound to be a “variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests.” Ibid, par. 98; First Letter on Toleration, p. 53.

⁴⁶ Bk. 2, ch. 28, #5.

⁴⁷ Bk. 2, ch. 28, #20.

⁴⁸ Bk. 1, ch. 2, #6, 18; Bk. 2, ch. 28, #8; Bk. 4, ch. 3, #18; Bk. 4, ch. 10, #7; Epistle to the Reader, pp. 18–19.

⁴⁹ Second Treatise, par. 19 (italics given). Thus, Locke argues, “the state of war (does not consist) in the number of partisans, but the enmity of the parties.” First Treatise, par. 131. See note 22 above.

⁵⁰ The Law of Nature cannot be “altered to comply with (man's) illordered choice.” Bk. 2, ch. 21, #57. “The nature of good and evil is eternal and certain, and their value cannot be determined either by the public ordinances of men or by any private opinion.” Essays, Essay I, p. 121; Essay VII,p. 199.

⁵¹ Essays, Essay VII, pp. 199, 201; cf. Essay I, p. 117.

⁵² Journal, June 26, 1681, MS f. 5.

⁵³ Essays, Essay V, p. 163; Second Treatise, par. 19.

⁵⁴ Second Treatise, pars. 128, 172.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pars. 6, 7, 8.

⁵⁶ Ibid, pars. 6–13.

⁵⁷ In the context of speaking of the inhabitants of the West Indies, who reside under state of nature conditions, Locke records in his Journal that the individual can improve his lot if he cultivates that knowledge which will “shorten or ease” his labor and increase his “stock of riches.” And, he adds, “another use of his knowledge is to live in peace with his fellow men, and this also he is capable of.” Journal, February 8, 1677, MSf. 2 (italics added).

⁵⁸ Second Treatise, pars. 14, 145, 183, 184.

⁵⁹ Ibid., par. 14; Third Letter on Toleration (Works, vol. V), p. 212 Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Second Treatise, par. 107 (italics added).

⁶¹ Journal, March 20, 1678, MS f.3 (italics added).

⁶² Works, vol. II, p. 309 Google Scholar.

⁶³ Second Treatise, par. 87 (italics added).

⁶⁴ Ibid., par. 61, “We are born with faculties and powers capable of almost anything.” Works, vol. II, p. 331 Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pars. 57, 59, 60 (italics added).

⁶⁶ Works, vol II, p. 312 Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Essays, Essay I, p. 115, First Treatise, par 58. Men may be “cooped in close by the laws of their countries,” and so prevented from acting in accordance with the precepts of natural law. Bk. 4, ch. 20, #4. “Fashion, discipline, and education have put eminent differences in the ages of several countries and made one generation much different from another in arts and sciences.”Conduct of the Understanding (Works, vol. II) sec. 24; Bk. 2, ch. 21, #71. Locke observes that “men's tempers commonly [grow] good or bad with the conditions and circumstances they are in.” MS c.34, f.25; Bk. 1, ch. 3, #12. More specifically, the “great difference and contrariety of opinions” amongst men are generally traceable to their “worldly interests” and the inequalities arising from certain “temporal advantages.” Journal, April 6–10, 1677, MS f.2.

⁶⁸ Second Treatise, pars. 71, 173, 174.

⁶⁹ Ibid, pars. 101, 110, 162.

⁷⁰ Ibid, pars. 94, 105, 110.

⁷¹ Ibid, pars. 74, 75, 76, 94, 107, 110, 111, 117. Locke also reverses the metaphor, labelling the natural relationship of the father to the child “ a temporary government,” par. 67.

⁷² Ibid, pars. 107, 110.

⁷³ Ibid, par. 106 (italics added).

⁷⁴ The dichotomy is not as sharp as this sentence implies, because Locke merges several propositions together. Thus, all ‘governments’ are the products of consent, and consent is a necessary—though not a sufficient—prerequisite of the proper political society. Given this view, the historical origins of government does supply at least a part of the justification for the “true extent and end of government.” See note 98 below.

⁷⁵ Second Treatise, pars. 105, 112; cf. par. 103.

⁷⁶ Ibid, pars. 107, 110, 112.

⁷⁷ Ibid, pars. 111, 162.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pars. 110.

⁷⁹ Ibid, pars. 31, 51, 75, 108, 109.

⁸⁰ Ibid, pars. 36, 37, 38. Beneath this veil of “history,” of course, is the Christian view of man's fall from grace. Elsewhere, Locke writes that when man was created by God, he was “put into a possession of the whole world” in a state where “there was scarce room for any irregulardesires. But instinct and reason carried him the same way, and being neither capable of covetousness or ambition when he had already the free use of all things …. [the fall of Adam is then explicitly mentioned] and when private possessions and labor which now the curse on the earth had made necessary, by degrees made a definition of conditions, it gave room for covetousness, pride, and ambition, which by fashion and example spread the corruption which has so prevailed over mankind.” A note entitled, “Homo Ante Et Post Lapsum,” 1693, MS c. 28, f. 113 v. See also Secon Treatise, pars. 56, 57.

⁸¹ Ibid, pars. 45, 36, 38, 107; cf. Bk. 2, ch. 16, #6.

⁸² Ibid, pars. 107, 111, 162.

⁸³ Ibid, par. 101.

⁸⁴ Ibid, par. 45; cf. par. 36.

⁸⁵ Ibid, par. 37. Money is “little useful to thelife of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage,” par. 50. The “intrinsic value” of money is not “natural,” but is, rather, “a barren thing and produces nothing.” MS e. 8, ff. 11, 20.

⁸⁶ Thoughts on Education, secs. 105, 110.

⁸⁷ Second Treatise, par. 38.

⁸⁸ Works, vol. IV, pp. 5, 7, 12–14, 16, 148 Google Scholar; MS e. 8, ff. 7, 10.

⁸⁹ Second Treatise, par. 48.

⁹⁰ Ibid, par. 108; cf. pars. 74, 162; First Letter on Toleration, p. 42. “A multitude of strong, healthy people being the riches of every country and that which makes it flourish.” Journal, July 15, 1678, MS f. 3. In the First Treatise, Locke argues that absolute monarchy is a barrier to and is incompatible with the growth of population and riches, pars. 33, 41.

⁹¹ Second Treatise, pars. 38, 45.

⁹² Ibid, par. 98; cf. First Letter on Toleration, p. 53.

⁹³ Ibid, pars. 50, 120, 42 (italics added).

⁹⁴ Second Letter on Toleration, p. 119; First Letter on Toleration, pp. 10, 43.

⁹⁵ This is the view of Sterling Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York, 1962), p. 127 Google Scholar, and Peter Laslett. See Laslett's note to par. 111, op. cit. p. 360.Sheldon Wolin's distinction between the “ideal” and the “fallen” states of nature parallels in many respects the argument offered here. Wolin, op. cit., pp. 306–309. However, there is no attempt by Wolin to portray the two different stages of the state of nature as descriptions of man's actual historical development. Also, I cannot accept Wolin's conclusion that the effect of Locke's dichotomous view of the state of nature “was to obscure the political character of civil society.” On the contrary, Locke's separation of the early from the later stage of man's development in his natural condition provides us with precisely the information and rationale we need in order to understand Locke's commitment to political institutions of a particular form.

⁹⁶ The shift occurs at this point in Locke's argument as we have presented it. The actual order of discussion in the Second Treatise employs several such shifts and is considerably more difficult for the reader to follow. This is due less to Locke's devious nature or to his indifference as to the distinctive nature of the arguments themselves than it is to the fact the Second Treatise was pieced together and revised over a ten year period, as Laslett has shown. The breakdown of the chapters of most interest to us seems to be as follows: The first four chapters of the Second Treatise essentially set down the moral framework for the discussion of government. Chapter five, “Of Property,” is much more historically-oriented. Chapter six, “Of Paternal Power,” is a rather balanced mixture of historical and moral arguments. Chapter seven, “Of Political or Civil Society,” returns to the level of ethics, laying down the criteria for distinguishing between the various forms of government. This discussion is summarized and carried over into the first part of Chapter eight, “Of the Beginning of Political Societies.” But, beginning with paragraph 100 of that chapter, Locke returns to history to account for the origins of government. It will be seen, therefore, that in our presentation of Locke's historical view of the state of nature, we have cited almost exclusively from Chapters five and eight, while the shift to which reference is made in the text above returns us to the arguments Locke advances in Chapter seven.

⁹⁷ See Hanna Pitkin, “Obligation and Consent,” this Review, 59 (Dec. 1965), 990–999; and Dunn, John, “Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke,” The Historical Journal, 10 (1967), 153–182 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁸ “All government, whether monarchical or other, is only from the consent of the people.” Notes on Samuel Parker's Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity, MS c. 39. Governments cannot “be founded on anything but the consent of the people.” Second Treatise, par. 175; cf. pars. 102, 104, 105, 106, 112, 119, 198. Also, there is a relevant historical note by Locke (“Politia,” 1682, MS c. 42) cited by Laslett in his note to par. 106, op. cit., p. 356.

⁹⁹ Second Treatise, pars. 175, 176, 186.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pars. 23, 135, 137, 149, 164, 171, 172.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, par. 131.

¹⁰² Ibid, pars. 137, 91, 93, 135, 163, 164.

¹⁰³ The Turkish government is specifically mentioned as an absolutist state. Ibid, par. 192; First Treatise, par. 33. Also, there seemsto be an obvious reference to Russia (‘Czar’) in the Second Treatise,par. 91. Explicit mention is made of Ceylon in par. 92.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, par. 133.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, par. 201; cf. pars. 93, 192, 198, 202. Hence, Locke is not entirely clear in his argument. He wants to maintain that, as an historical description, all government—even Filmer's patriarchical and absolute monarchy—is the product of consent (see note 98 above). At the same time, he wants to argue, against both Hobbes and Filmer, that no “rational” man could consent to live under an absolute monarchy as a part of his moral conception of human nature (seenotes 100–103 above). And, finally, he grants that tyranny—even without consent—is a de facto, though not a de jure, form of government. Either consent is an inherent part of the meaning of “government,” and history records the actions of irrational men in consenting to a tyranny, or consent is only a necessary ingredient of “lawful” governments, and his statement about the origins of government is a case of history ideologized. The latter seems to be the most accurate reading of Locke's view. In the First Treatise, he contrasts “lawful government” with “tyranny” or “usurpation”: pars. 72, 81. Later, he contrasts “tyranny and usurpation” with “elections and consent”: Ibid,par. 148. Thus, Locke's point is that even if tyranny is the product of consent, it is not legitimate, although, as a matter of historical fact, itis usually not instituted by consent but by force.

¹⁰⁶ Second Treatise, par. 95 (italics added).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, pars. 87, 89 (italics added).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, par. 99 (italics added).

¹⁰⁹ Moreover, “general submission” and “general consent” are not the same. The latter seems to be tied to some system of elections,whereas the former is merely the product of force. Notes on William Sherlock's The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers Stated and Resolved…., MS c. 28, f. 96.

¹¹⁰ Second Treatise, pars. 142, 87, 89, 141.

¹¹¹ Ibid, pare. 88, 89 (italics added).

¹¹² Ibid, pars. 90, 91, 174 (italics added).

¹¹³ Ibid, par. 94 (italics added).

¹¹⁴ Ibid, par. 143.

¹¹⁵ The ideological aspects of liberalism as they are related to Locke's political theory and the intellectual and historical events of seventeenth century England provide the primary focus for my longer—but yet uncompleted—work, The Roots of Liberalism.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Sabine, George, A History of Political Theory (Third Edition, New York, 1961), pp. 523–540 Google Scholar.

¹¹⁷ Easton, David, The Political System (New York, 1943), p. 313 Google Scholar.