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Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

David Deener
Affiliation:
Tulane University

Extract

The problem of guarding the constitution is fundamental in any political system. If the term “constitution” is given a very broad definition, such dictatorial devices as powerful secret police and special tribunals for the safety of the state may be regarded as means for the protection of the “constitution” of a totalitarian regime. However, western democracy does not rely upon repressive means for safeguarding the constitution, except in times of crisis when use is made of martial law, the state of siege, and constitutional dictatorship. For normal times, western democracy has developed constitutional means of protection that essentially resemble ordinary legal and political processes, such as the amending process, special deliberative bodies, and judicial review.

This study is concerned with judicial review as a means of guarding against legislative encroachments on the constitution. The acceptance of judicial review in national constitutional systems will be traced historically, with emphasis upon twentieth-century developments. Some attention will be given to the historical background of judicial review and to its theory and practice under various modern constitutions, but no systematic treatment of these subjects is attempted.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1952

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References

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38 Radin, p. 119.

39 Jaffin, G., “New World Constitutional Harmony: A Pan-Americanadian Panorama,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 44, p. 47 n. 109 (1942)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, asserts that Colombia and Haiti at first followed the French example of the sénat conservateur; see, for Colombia, Constitution of Cundinamarca, 1811, Title 1, Art. 9. For the later adoption of judicial review, see Constitution of Haiti, 1843, Art. 162; Colombia, Constitutional Law of 1910, Art. 41.

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41 Argentina, Constitution of 1860, Art. 100; Brazil, Constitution of 1891, Art. 59 (1), 60; Mexico, Constitution of 1857, Art. 101.

42 Honduras, Constitution of 1894, Arts. 118, 126, 128; El Salvador, Constitution of 1886, Arts. 37, 102; Nicaragua, Constitution of 1911, Arts. 63, 124.

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49 Laferrière, op. cit. (above, n. 34), p. 329.

50 Arts. 38, 81. Under the Finnish Constitution of 1919, Art. 58, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court may formally request legislation modifying or interpreting laws and ordinances.

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56 Art. 123. The National Assembly was given certain powers with respect to safeguarding the constitution, Arts. 91 (1), 123.

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64 Art. 163.

65 Art. 149. See also, Cuba, Constitution of 1934, Art. 78; Venezuela, Constitution of 1936, Art. 123; Haiti, Constitution of 1929, Arts. 26, 99. The citizen's action apparently first appeared in Colombia, 1910.

66 Arts. 182, 183, 194.

67 Arts. 83–86.

68 Art. 103.

69 See, Transjordan, Constitution of 1928, Arts. 42–55; Hejaz, Constitution of 1926, Art. 6; Iraq, Constitution of 1925, Arts. 75–80.

70 Art. 2.

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73 Art. 140.

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80 Ibid., pp. 642–643. M. de Menthon, MRP, rapporteur général, resigned his post at this juncture, being replaced by Pierre Cot.

81 Arts. 91–93.

82 In agreeing to except the Preamble from the competence of the Constitutional Committee, Coste-Floret declared: “We agree to make a concession, but our position has not changed, and we feel that the constitutional control of the declaration of rights is and remains possible, and that it will be established one day.” Séances de la Commission de la Constitution: Comptes rendus analytiques, imprimés en execution de la résolution votée par l'Assemblée le 2 octobre 1946 (Paris, 1946), pp. 104105Google Scholar.

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89 Atti Parlementari, Camera dei Deputati, Documenti—Disegni di legge e relazioni, 1949, N. 469-A. See Tesauro, A., “La Corte Costituzionale,” Rassegna di diritto pubblico, Vol. 5, pp. 205253 (1950)Google Scholar; Galeotti, Sereo, La garanzia costituzionale (Milan, 1950)Google Scholar.

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91 Art. 100 (1), (3).

92 Arts. 18, 19, 21. See also Arts. 92, 93, 94, 98, 99.

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97 Art. 66.

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104 Art. 76.

105 Arts. 63, 122. The question of constitutionality can be referred by one-fourth of the members of the legislature or the president prior to the promulgation of a law.

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108 Arts. 151–153. See Second Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, 1951, General Assembly, Official Records, 6th sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/1949), pp. 1–70.

109 Art. 81.

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115 Arts. 54–72, 168–172, 177–179.

116 Art. 81.

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